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The Iraq Debacle: The reporting of Iraq during the UNSCOM stand-off 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores broadsheet newspaper reporting of Iraq across the 
sampled four month period, with discussion divided broadly between 
quantitative and qualitative results. Quantitative results are presented first to 
provide an overall profile of coverage, followed by a more detailed 
qualitative analysis of the claims, assumptions and arguments of the 
newspaper articles. 
Quantitative results are presented as tables, with data drawn from the 
summarised frequencies produced by coding the content of the articles (see 
Chapter 3). The quantity of data produced by this coding process is 
substantial and consequently, as with the preceeding chapters, only those 
variables germane to the reporting of Iraq were included in this section. But, 
in an effort to present standardised results across the thesis, certain key 
variables - for example, 'topic', 'actor', 'country' and the physical 
characteristics of the articles, amongst others - will be presented in order to 
provide a cogent and coherent profile of press coverage across the various 
chapters. 
The qualitative results explore the detailed and particularly well 
developed discursive strategy of the story which dominated these Iraq 
articles over the sampled period of newspapers: the UNSCOM weapons 
inspections and resulting `stand-off between Iraq, the UN and the US. This 
section argues that a single dominant discursive strategy is present across 
the sampled Iraq articles, directed at justifying military attacks on Iraq and 
the removal of President Saddam Hussein from power. The discussion is 
divided across six sub-sections, analysing the manifest, the implied and the 
presupposed argumentation of the sampled Iraq articles which support this 
strategy. Following this: a section analyses the minority of dissenting articles 
and the arguments they employ in undermining the dominant discursive 
strategy; and a final eighth section discusses Iraq articles which, at first 
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glance, appear unconnected to the issues of UNSCOM, war and Saddam 
Hussein. 
6.2 Quantitative results and discussion 
Table 6.1 below shows the size and frequency of the reports published by 
the seven newspapers across the four month sample: 
Table 6.1: Size and Number of Iraq articles, by newspaper 
Article size (cm) 
Mean Sum Valid N 
Newspaper Financial Times 172 14938 N=87 
Guardian 192 23363 N=122 
Independent 204 15526 N=76 
Telegraph 192 17129 N=89 
The Times 190 22930 N=121 
loS 244 4147 N=17 
Sunday Times 311 5916 N=19 
Total 196 103949 N=531 
Table 6.1 shows that 103,949 centimetres of column space were dedicated 
to covering Iraq over the four month sample, across 531 articles. Distributed 
across the 123 days of sampled newspaper coverage, this amounts to a 
average 4.32 articles on Iraq per day covering 845.1 centimetres of column 
space: a daily mean of 184.9 column centimetres and a little less than one 
article (n= 0.95) per newspaper. Of the daily newspapers, the Guardian and 
The Times printed the highest number of articles on Iraq whilst the 
Independent printed the least. The Independent on Sunday and the Sunday 
Times, show totals substantially lower than the daily newspapers (17 and 19 
respectively). When their frequencies are multiplied by six, the totals better 
all but the Guardian and The Times, illustrating that these low frequencies 
are due to being published once a week. 
Table 6.1 shows that the Sunday Times had the highest mean column 
size (311 cm), followed by the Independent on Sunday (mean 244 cm), 
whilst the Financial Times had the lowest (172 cm). 
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Graph 6.1 below shows the distribution of articles on Iraq across the 
four month sample: 
Graph 6.1: Number of Iraq articles, by date 
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Three 'peaks' in reporting are discernible: the first starts at the onset of the 
sample, peaks on the 15 November 1997 with 32 articles and decreases to 
an average 1.3 articles per day between 29 November and 8 December 
1997. The second peak occurred between 9 December and 27 December 
1997, with the highest count (7 articles) falling on 16 December. Finally, the 
quantity of articles reporting Iraq started to increase again on 13 January 
1998, peaked on the 19 and 20 January with 15 and 10 articles respectively, 
and remained high for the remainder of the sample. 
Graph 6.2 overleaf shows the total daily centimetres of column space 
which the newspapers devoted to reporting Iraq. 
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Graph 6.2: Daily column centimetres of broadsheet Iraq articles 
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Graph 6.2 indicates that the reporting of Iraq hit a clear peak on 15 
November, with the sampled newspapers devoting 6,802 centimetres of 
column space to reporting Iraq. The combined column centimetres of these 
Iraq articles for 15 November and the three days either side of this date (i. e. 
the week between 12 & 18 November 1997) amounted to 24,464 
centimetres, or 23.5 per cent of the column centimetres dedicated to 
reporting Iraq across the whole sample. This peak in reporting was due to an 
escalation in the inspections crisis following the expulsion of American 
members of the UNSCOM team and the US threatening 'serious 
consequences' should this action not be reversed. A deal was brokered and 
accepted by both sides on 15 November. 
The second peak in output occurred on the 13 December 1997 
amounting to 1,674 centimetres of column space. This day's high column 
centimetres appears anomalous to the surrounding coverage and is almost 
wholly attributable to a single feature article in the Saturday Times colour 
supplement (1,144 centimetres of column). 
The column cm started to increase again on 13 January, peaking on 
19 January 1998 with 2,630 centimetres of column space. This peak was 
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due in part to Saddam Hussein reneging on the earlier deal and the threat of 
hostilities increasing again. 
Table 6.2: Format of Iraq articles, by newspaper 
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News Count 62 75 65 71 94 10 15 392 
Col % 71.3% 61.5% 85.5% 79.8% 77.7% 58.8% 78.9% 73.8% 
Editorial Count 4 4 2 6 9 1 26 
Col % 4.6% 3.3% 2.6% 6.7% 7.4% 5.3% 4.9% 
Column Count 3 9 1 1 2 1 17 
Col % 3.4% 7.4% 1.3% 1.1% 1.7% 5.9% 3.2% 
Feature Count 1 2 2 1 3 2 11 
Col % . 8% 2.6% 2.2% . 
8% 17.6% 10.5% 2.1% 
Letter Count 1 5 1 4 1 12 
Col % 1.1% 4.1% 1.3% 3.3% 5.9% 2.3% 
Weekly News Count 3 3 
summary Col % 2.5% . 6% 
Review Count 1 1 
Col % 5.3% . 
2% 
News in brief Count 17 24 5 9 11 2 68 
Col % 19.5% 19.7% 6.6% 10.1% 9.1% 11.8% 12.8% 
Obituary Count 1 1 
Col % . 
8% . 
2% 
Total Count 87 122 76 89 121 17 19 531 
Col% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 6.2 shows that the sampled broadsheet newspapers reported Iraq in 
similar ways over the four months of reporting. 'News' was the format most 
frequently used: 73.8 per cent of Iraq articles were 'news', significantly 
higher than the percentage for the sample as a whole (63.9%; n= 1624). 
Editorials (4.9%; n= 26) were also used to report Iraq more often than in the 
sample as a whole (2.7%; n= 69) whilst 'news in brief (12.8%; n= 68) were 
used significantly less (20.2%; n= 513). These percentages signal the 
importance which the newspapers gave to reporting Iraq - an interest which 
their readers did not appear to share since `readers' letters' on Iraq (2.3%; 
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n= 12) were printed less often than across the sample as a whole (3.4%; n= 
86). 
A 'hard news' index was then calculated in order to reveal the 
(differing) priorities placed on 'hard' and 'soft' news by the seven 
newspapers. This was achieved through combining the frequencies of the 
'hard news' formats: 'news', 'editorial', 'news summary' and 'news in brief'; 
and comparing them with the combined counts of the 'soft' formats: 'column', 
'feature', 'cartoon', 'diary', 'letter', 'review' and 'obituary'. The results for Iraq 
reporting are shown below: 
Table 6.3: 'Hard' and 'soft' Iraq articles, by newspaper 
Format: 'hard' and 'soft' news 
'Hard' news 'Soft' news 
Count Row % Count Row % 
Total 
Count Row % 
Financial Times 83 95.4% 4 4.6% 87 100.0% 
Guardian 106 86.9% 16 13.1% 122 100.0% 
Independent 72 94.7% 4 5.3% 76 100.0% 
Telegraph 86 96.6% 3 3.4% 89 100.0% 
The Times 114 94.2% 7 5.8% 121 100.0% 
loS 12 70.6% 5 29.4% 17 100.0% 
Sunday Times 16 84.2% 3 15.8% 19 100.0% 
Total 489 92.1% 42 7.9% 531 100.0% 
The percentage of 'hard news' for the sample as a whole is 87.8 per cent (n= 
2229), illustrating the predominance of 'hard news' when the sampled 
newspapers reported Iraq: 92.1 per cent (n= 489) of these Iraq articles 
adopted a 'hard news' format. Only the Guardian, the Independent on 
Sunday, and the Sunday Times returned a percentage lower than the mean 
of the sample as a whole. In the case of the Guardian, their 86.9 per cent (n= 
106) of `hard news' articles was still higher than the percentage observed 
across the total sampled Guardian articles (83.9%; n= 521). 
This high proportion of 'hard news' items inevitably favours the 
reporting of 'events' as opposed to coverage discussing the importance and 
effects as experienced and perceived both by the newspapers and the Iraqi 
people. This hard news focus may also inadvertently favour an 'elite' 
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representation (for example US, UK and Iraqi elites) of the events reported 
and of Iraq itself, because of the centrality of 'authoritative' and 'credible' 
sources to 'hard news' reporting. This is discussed further below (see Table 
6.12). 
Table 6.4: By-lined source in Iraq articles 
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No source Count 3 4 5 2 14 
given Col % 3.4% 3.3% 6.6% 11.8% 2.6% 
Staff writer Count 73 89 60 86 106 14 19 447 
Col % 83.9% 73.0% 78.9% 96.6% 87.6% 82.4% 100% 84.2% 
Agence France Count 1 3 3 7 
Presse Col % 1.1% 3.4% 2.5% 1.3% 
Associated Count 6 4 2 12 
Press Col % 4.9% 5.3% 1.7% 2.3% 
Reuters Count 8 13 5 5 31 
Col % 9.2% 10.7% 6.6% 4.1% 5.8% 
US newspaper Count 1 1 
Col % 
. 8% . 
2% 
'Agencies' Count 1 4 1 6 
Col % 1.1% 3.3% 1.3% 1.1% 
UK Count 1 2 3 
Government Col % 1.1% 1.6% 
. 6% 
Member of Count 4 1 4 1 10 
Public Col % 3.3% 1.3% 3.3% 5.9% 1.9% 
Total Count 87 122 76 89 121 17 19 531 
Col % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table 6.4 above shows that the majority of articles (84.2%; n= 447) written 
about Iraq were by-lined to staff journalists. Differences between 
newspapers' use of staff journalists were noticable, ranging from the 
Guardian (73.0%; n= 89) to the Telegraph (96.6%; n= 86). By contrast, the 
Guardian showed the highest percentage of articles by-lined to 'agency' 
sources (18.9%; n= 23) compared with the daily newspapers The Times 
(8.3%; n= 10) and, lowest of all, the Telegraph (3.4%; n= 3). The Sunday 
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broadsheets did not use one press release from the agencies. Articles 
written by `Members of the Public' or the `British Government' were mainly 
`letters to the editor'. 
As stated in Appendix 1, the variables recording `Country' aimed at 
coding not just the geographical location of the reports but also other 
countries involvement in the reported action. Methodologically, this is 
particularly important in international reporting, where the 'reported event' is 
often commentary and explanation offered by elite individuals and nations 
regarding other individuals, nations and international events. 
Table 6.5: Primary country in Iraq articles 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Iraq 317 59.7 59.7 59.7 
USA 96 18.1 18.1 77.8 
UK 33 6.2 6.2 84.0 
Jordan 13 2.4 2.4 86.4 
Russia 13 2.4 2.4 88.9 
Israel 12 2.3 2.3 91.1 
Kurdistan 12 2.3 2.3 93.4 
Germany 6 1.1 1.1 94.5 
Turkey 4 
.8 .8 
95.3 
Iran 3 .6 .6 95.9 
Kuwait 3 .6 .6 96.4 
'Arab' countries 3 .6 .6 97.0 
Libya 2 .4 .4 97.4 
Palestine 2 
.4 .4 97.7 
France 2 
.4 .4 
98.1 
China 2 .4 .4 98.5 
Egypt 1 
.2 .2 98.7 
Sudan 1 
.2 .2 
98.9 
Syria 1 
.2 .2 99.1 
Yemen 1 
.2 .2 99.2 
Canada 1 
.2 .2 99.4 
Australia 1 .2 .2 99.6 
'UN' 1 .2 .2 99.8 
'EU' 1 .2 .2 100.0 
Total 531 100.0 100.0 
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Table 6.5 above shows that the most frequently cited geographical location 
for these Iraq news articles was 'Iraq' (n= 317; 59.7%). Such a finding was 
perhaps predictable, given that the articles in question report or regard 'Iraq'. 
What was perhaps less expected was that Iraq would be cited as the primary 
country in only 59.7 per cent (n= 317), or less than two-thirds of cases. In 
100 of these articles (18.8%), Iraq was the only country cited. The USA (n= 
96) and the UK (n= 33) are cited as the primary country in almost a quarter 
of Iraq articles (24.3%; n= 129), indicating the centrality of American and 
British action, explanation and commentary in the sampled newspapers' 
representation of Iraq. By way of contrast, the remaining three permanent 
members of the UN Security Council - Russia, France and China - are cited 
as the primary country in only 17 articles (3.2%), despite Russia's important 
role in negotiating UN access to and in Iraq. 
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Table 6.6: Secondary country in Iraq articles 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Iraq 178 33.5 41.3 41.3 
USA 163 30.7 37.8 79.1 
UK 27 5.1 6.3 85.4 
Russia 14 2.6 3.2 88.6 
Iran 11 2.1 2.6 91.2 
'Western' countries 6 1.1 1.4 92.6 
Jordan 4 .8 .9 
93.5 
Turkey 4 
.8 .9 
94.4 
'Arab' countries 4 .8 .9 
95.4 
'UN' 4 .8 .9 
96.3 
Kuwait 2 .4 .5 
96.8 
Kurdistan 2 .4 .5 
97.2 
China 2 .4 .5 97.7 
Iceland 2 .4 .5 
98.1 
Israel 1 .2 .2 98.4 
Libya 1 
.2 .2 
98.6 
Saudia Arabia 1 .2 .2 
98.8 
Finland 1 .2 .2 99.1 
Australia 1 .2 .2 99.3 
Croatia 1 .2 .2 99.5 
Japan 1 .2 .2 99.8 
'EU' 1 .2 .2 100.0 
Total 431 81.2 100.0 
Missing 100 18.8 
Total 531 100.0 
Table 6.6 shows that Iraq was the most frequently mentioned secondary 
country (n= 178; 41.3% of valid cases) being referred to as a secondary 
country in 33.5 per cent of these 531 Iraq articles. The USA represents the 
secondary country in the vast majority of the remaining cases (n= 163; 
37.8% of valid cases), resulting in the USA being presented as 'primary' or 
`secondary country' in almost half of these Iraq articles (n= 259; 48.8% of 
Iraq articles). The few remaining cases are predominately constituted by: the 
UK (n= 27; 6.3% of valid cases); Russia (n= 14; 3.2% of valid cases); Iran 
(n= 11; 2.6% of valid cases); and the generic `Western Countries' (n= 6; 
1.4% of valid cases). 
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Table 6.7: Tertiary country in Iraq articles 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
USA 41 7.7 27.9 27.9 
Iraq 36 6.8 24.5 52.4 
UK 30 5.6 20.4 72.8 
Turkey 7 1.3 4.8 77.6 
Russia 7 1.3 4.8 82.3 
'UN' 7 1.3 4.8 87.1 
Israel 5 .9 
3.4 90.5 
Iran 4 .8 
2.7 93.2 
'Arab' countries 3 .6 
2.0 95.2 
France 2 .4 1.4 
96.6 
Algeria 1 .2 .7 
97.3 
Egypt 1 .2 .7 
98.0 
Multiple Muslim countries 1 .2 .7 
98.6 
'EU' 1 .2 .7 
99.3 
'Western' countries 1 .2 .7 
100.0 
Total 147 27.7 100.0 
Missing 384 72.3 
Total 531 100.0 
Table 6.7 shows that only a little over a quarter of Iraq articles (27.7%; n= 
147) featured more than two countries. The most frequently mentioned 
tertiary country was the USA followed by Iraq and then the UK. These three 
countries collectively represent 72.8 per cent (n= 107) of tertiary countries. 
Tables 6.8 - 6.11 present summaries of the 'Primary' and 'Secondary 
Topics' featured in the sampled coverage. The findings were abridged, to 
include only the 95 per cent of cases, so that the tables were of a 
manageable size. 
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Table 6.8: Primary topic in Iraq articles 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
UNSCOM standoff 350 65.9 65.9 65.9 
Threat of war 28 5.3 5.3 71.2 
Actions of International 25 4.7 4.7 75.9 
leaders 
Int. Relations/Politics, 15 2.8 2.8 78.7 
Illegal weapons 
Civil War 12 2.3 2.3 81.0 
Int. Relations/Politics, 9 1.7 1.7 82.7 Terrorism 
Business, Oil 9 1.7 1.7 84.4 
Int. Relations/Politics, 8 1.5 1.5 85.9 
Spying 
Crime, Violence 7 1.3 1.3 87.2 
International 7 1.3 1.3 88.5 
Relations/Politics, General 
Sanctions 7 1.3 1.3 89.8 
Antagonism between 6 1.1 1.1 91.0 
nations 
Int. Relations/Politics, aid 5 .9 .9 
91.9 
Executions/Capital 4 .8 .8 
92.7 
punishment 
Int. Relations/Politics, 4 8 .8 93.4 Meetings between leaders 
Court rulings 3 .6 .6 94.0 
UN 3 .6 .6 94.5 
Culture/Custom, Travel 3 .6 .6 
95.1 
Crime, hostages/hijacking 2 .4 .4 
95.5 
Table 6.8 above summarises the primary topics of 95.5 per cent of the 
sampled Iraq articles. The remaining 4.5 per cent of cases (n= 26) were 
spread over 19 variable labels (topics) -a mean count of 1.37 per topic. 
Table 6.8 shows that the most frequently cited primary topic of these 
Iraq articles was the UNSCOM 'stand-of (n= 350; 65.9%), forming a 
defining schematic topic against which the majority of the Iraq articles were 
framed. The second highest count was much lower, and was achieved by the 
topic'threat of war'. The `parent topics' of these primary themes illustrate the 
limited topical range in which articles 'cover' Iraq: 
233 
Table 6.9: Primary Parent Topic in Iraq articles 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Int. Relations/Politics 444 83.6 83.6 83.6 
War 49 9.2 9.2 92.8 
Crime 11 2.1 2.1 94.9 
Business 9 1.7 1.7 96.6 
Policing/Law & Order 8 1.5 1.5 98.1 
Culture/Custom 6 1.1 1.1 99.2 
Health 4 .8 .8 
100.0 
Total 531 100.0 100.0 
Table 6.9 above shows that 92.8 per cent of articles reporting Iraq were 
concerned with 'International Relations/Politics' or 'War' (n= 493). The 
combined percentage of these two parent topics changes according to which 
'Primary country' the article cites: where the UK is cited as the primary 
country it decreases to 81.8% (n= 27); in articles which cite Iraq as the 
primary country it increases only slightly to 93.7% (n= 297); but it increases 
to 99 per cent in articles in which the USA is cited as the primary country (n= 
95). In addition, 19.8 per cent (n= 19) of the articles in which the USA is 
cited as the primary country, cite the parent topic 'War' in a primary position. 
This simple crosstabulation of 'primary country' and 'primary topic' perhaps 
serves to illustrate the manner in which the US government - as the primary 
definer in the articles in which the USA is cited as the primary country - 
presented war as `the solution' to the 'problem' of Iraq. 
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Table 6.10: Secondary topic in Iraq articles 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Threat of war 90 16.9 17.8 17.8 
UN 78 14.7 15.4 33.1 
UNSCOM standoff 62 11.7 12.2 45.4 
Int. Relations/Politics, 49 9.2 9.7 55.0 
Illegal weapons 
Actions of International 45 8.5 8.9 63.9 
leaders 
Sanctions 26 4.9 5.1 69.0 
Int. Relations/Politics, 18 3.4 3.6 72.6 
Peace deal 
Antagonism between 17 3.2 3.4 75.9 
nations 
Int. Relations/Politics, 17 3.2 3.4 79.3 Diplomacy 
Int. Relations/Politics, 7 1.3 1.4 80.7 Spying 
War between nations 6 1.1 1.2 81.9 
Acts of war 6 1.1 1.2 83.0 
International 5 .9 1.0 84 0 Relations/Politics, General . 
Int. Relations/Politics, 5 .9 1.0 85.0 Meetings between leaders 
Israel/Palestinian peace 5 .9 1.0 86.0 process 
War, General 5 .9 1.0 87.0 
Executions/Capital 4 .8 .8 87.8 punishment 
Peace talks 4 .8 .8 88.6 
Crime, hostages/hijacking 3 .6 .6 89.2 
Int. Relations/Politics, 
Cordial relations 
3 
.6 .6 89.7 
'Democracy' 3 
.6 .6 
90.3 
Civil War 3 
.6 .6 
90.9 
War and civilian death 3 .6 .6 91.5 
Culture/Custom, 'faith' 3 .6 .6 92.1 
Business, arms trade 3 .6 .6 92.7 
Business, Oil 3 
.6 .6 
93.3 
Child malnutrition 2 .4 .4 94.1 
Table 6.10 shows that the frequencies of secondary topics in these Iraq 
articles is more diffuse that in the case of the primary topics. The most 
frequently cited secondary topic, 'threat of war' was cited in only 17.8 per 
235 
cent of articles (n= 90). The schematic topic, the UNSCOM `stand-off', was 
again mentioned frequently, almost half of which (n= 30) were mentioned in 
the final 11 days of the sample, as the reporting output was once again on 
the increase (see Graph 6.1) and the pressure to make Iraq and 
(specifically) President Saddam Hussein conform to the 'international will' 
was intensifying. The intensification of this period is illustrated in the 
presence of the topic 'threat of war' as a primary topic in 24.7 per cent (n= 
20) of the articles published between 20 January - 31 January 1998 (total 
Iraq articles = 81 between these dates). 
Table 6.11: Secondary Parent Topic in Iraq articles 
Valid Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Percent Percent 
Valid Int. Relations/Politics 358 67.4 70.6 70.6 
War 116 21.8 22.9 93.5 
Business 9 1.7 1.8 95.3 
Culture/Custom 7 1.3 1.4 96.6 
Policing/Law & Order 6 1.1 1.2 97.8 
Crime 5 .9 
1.0 98.8 
Health 3 .6 .6 
99.4 
Immigration 1 .2 .2 
99.6 
Employment 1 .2 .2 
99.8 
Youth 1 .2 .2 100.0 
Total 507 95.5 100.0 
Missing System 24 4.5 
Total 531 100.0 
The secondary parent topics of the Iraq articles, again show the centrality of 
'International Relations/Politics' and 'War' in reporting Iraq. The combined 
percentage of these two secondary parent topics (93.5% of valid cases) is 
higher than their combined percentage as primary parent topics (92.8% of 
valid cases), resulting in a comparatively reduced proportion of cases for the 
remaining secondary parent topics. Table 6.11 shows that these Iraq articles 
all but completely ignore topics such as 'Culture and Custom', 'Health', 
'Employment' and 'Youth' in preference to reporting the actions and effects 
of government and the 'threat' posed by Iraq. 
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Table 6.12: Position and Nationality of the Iraq articles' primary actors 
Nationality of source 1 
Iraq Israel Kurdistan UK USA Russia 'UN' Total 
British Prime Minister 8 8 
named UK Secretary of 11 11 
State 
named Govt Minister 2 2 
generic 'Govt source' 4 4 
generic 'Cabinet source' 2 1 3 
named Diplomat 1 1 
generic 'Diplomat' 1 1 
UN 2 59 61 
EU/European Parliament 1 1 
Int. Govt. Leader 98 2 22 1 123 
Int. Govt. Member 10 2 27 13 52 
Int. Govt. spokesperson 1 1 
unnamed Int. Govt. 82 5 7 40 12 146 
member 
Illegitimate Int. 1 1 2 Opposition Leader 
unnamed illegitimate Int. 7 7 
Opposition member 
Int. Govt. /Military 2 8 10 intelligence agency 
'Terrorist 1 1 2 
'Terrorist' group 1 1 
Former Int. Govt. member 1 1 
Int. Diplomat 4 4 
Scientist/Scientific centre 3 3 
Police/Prisons/Law 1 1 
enforcement 
Armed Forces 1 9 8 18 
Media Organisations 1 1 
Business 1 1 
sector/Corporate Actors 
Adult citizen 5 1 2 1 9 
Child citizen 2 2 
Artist 1 1 
Criminal 6 6 
Charity 1 1 
Reporter 1 1 
Total 219 11 10 49 111 26 59 485 
The 'actors' cited in these Iraq articles provide another measure of their 
content. Table 6.12 gives the `primary actors' referred to in these texts, 
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crosstabulating the actors' 'job or position' and their `nationality'. The original 
table giving all the results of this crosstabulation was far too large to be 
productive, therefore Table 6.12 lists only the nations which produced a 
count of 10 primary actors or more. In limiting the table in this way, 45 
primary actors were excluded (8.49% of the cited primary actors), spread 
across 23 nations. ' Table 6.12 illustrates that Iraqi actors are well 
represented in the text of these articles: 219 of the primary actors cited in 
these articles were Iraqi (41.3% of primary actors); followed by 111 who 
were American (20.9% of primary actors); 59 actors who were from the UN 
(11.1 % of primary actors); and 49 actors who were British (9.2% of primary 
actors). 
Actors from government, both domestic and international, received 
most citation as primary actors (n= 355; 67.0% of primary actors). 'Iraqi 
government' totalled 194 primary actors (36.6%); 'US government' totalled 
92 primary actors (17.4%); 'British government' totalled 34 primary actors 
(6.4%); and the 'Russian government' totalled 26 primary actors (4.9%). The 
'job or position' most referred to was 'unnamed international government 
member' (n= 146; 27.5% of primary actors), which was the label coded when 
the texts mentioned a country as an 'active' participant: e. g. "Iraq is doing/ 
going to do/ thinking/ etc. "; The majority of these references were made to 
'Iraq' as a primary actor. The most frequently cited primary actor was 
'International government leader of Iraq', Saddam Hussein (n= 99), who 
constituted 18.7% of the text's primary actors. By comparison, the 'American 
President' was referred to as a primary actor on 22 occasions (4.2% of 
primary actors) and the 'British Prime Minister' was referred to as primary 
actor on only eight occasions (1.6% of primary actors). 
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Table 6.13: Position and Nationality of the Iraq articles' quoted primary 
actors 
Nationality of source I 
Iraq Israel Kurdistan UK USA Russia 'UN' Total 
British Prime Minister 4 4 
named UK Secretary of 8 8 
State 
named Govt Minister 2 2 
generic 'Govt source' 1 1 
generic'Cabinet source' 2 2 
named Diplomat 1 1 
generic Diplomat 1 1 
UN 2 22 24 
Int. Govt. Leader 9 2 13 24 
Int. Govt. Member 4 2 18 9 33 
Int. Govt. spokesperson 1 1 
unamed Int. Govt. member 14 3 14 7 38 
Illegitimate Int. Opposition 1 1 
Leader 
unamed illegitimate Int. 2 2 
Opposition member 
Int. Govt. /Military 3 3 
intelligence agency 
Former Int. Govt. member 1 1 
Scientist/Scientific centre 1 1 
Police/Prisons/Law 1 1 
enforcement 
Armed Forces 4 2 6 
Media Organisations 1 1 
Business sector/Corporate 1 1 
Actors 
Adult citizen 2 1 3 
Artist 1 1 
Charity 1 1 
Total 34 73 25 54 16 22 161 
When Tables 6.12 and 6.13 are compared, it is apparent that being cited as 
a primary actor in these texts provides no assurance that the actor will also 
be quoted: the 161 quoted primary actors represent 33.2 per cent of primary 
actors. In addition, quotation appears to be highly dependent on the actor's 
nationality: only 15.5 per cent (n= 34) of the Iraqi primary actors cited in the 
text were quoted; compared to 63.6 per cent (n= 7) of cited Israeli primary 
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actors; 61.5 per cent (n= 16) of cited Russian primary actors; 51.0 per cent 
(n= 25) of cited British primary actors; and 48.6 per cent (n= 54) of cited 
American primary actors. Saddam Hussein was quoted in 9.1 per cent (n= 9) 
of the texts in which he was cited as a primary actor; Bill Clinton was quoted 
in 59.1 per cent (n= 13); and Tony Blair was quoted in 50.0 per cent (n= 4) of 
texts in which he was cited as a primary actor. 
Similar results were observed across the texts' secondary, tertiary and 
quaternary actors. 
Table 6.14: Representation of Iraq and Iraqi actors, by newspaper (1) 
Newspaper 
co co ° 
F- 
cE 
0°cmE 
F= ~ 
'u ai m F= ö 
CD 
°-' ( °ý cc cc f- 
Represented as: Monolithic 1 4 7 4 16 
monolithic/diverse Diverse 1 1 2 
Total 1 5 8 4 18 
Represented as: Separate 24 22 19 20 39 9 7 140 
separate/interacting Interacting 1 1 
Total 24 22 19 20 40 9 7 141 
Represented as: Inferior 45 40 35 38 67 12 16 253 
inferior/equal Equal 1 3 1 5 
Total 46 43 35 38 67 13 16 258 
Represented as: Enemy 56 60 52 64 98 12 16 358 
enemy/partner Partner 1 1 1 3 
Total 56 61 52 65 99 12 16 361 
Represented as: Manipulative 16 23 20 22 41 2 4 128 
manipulative/sincere Sincere 1 1 
Total 16 24 20 22 41 2 4 129 
Table 6.14 shows the results for five of the coded binaried variables. The 
remaining three binaried variables, did not produce particularly significant 
results and were therefore edited out in order to make room for more 
significant findings. The percentages of 'closed' or `negative' representations 
of Iraq and Iraqis differed across the newspapers, as illustrated in Table 
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6.15. The percentages of 'negative' representations are indicated by bold 
type: 
Table 6.15: Representation of Iraq and Iraqi actors, by newspaper (2) 
jp 
E 
i F- C7 
Newspaper 
N 0. 
N Ql 
aw 
N 
I-' 
U) 
>N 
N CE 
F- U) 
m Ö 
Monolithic Col % 1.1% 3.3% 7.9% 3.3% 3.0% 
Diverse Col % . 8% 
1.1 % . 4% 
No response Col % 98.9% 95.9% 100.0% 91.0% 96.7% 100.0% 100.0% 96.6% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Separate Col % 27.6% 18.0% 25.0% 22.5% 32.2% 52.9% 36.8% 26.4% 
Interacting Col % . 
8% . 
2% 
No response Col % 72.4% 82.0% 75.0% 77.5% 66.9% 47.1% 63.2% 73.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Inferior Col % 51.7% 32.8% 46.1% 42.7% 55.4% 70.6% 84.2% 47.6% 
Equal Col % 1.1 % 2.5% 5.9% . 9% 
No response Col % 47.1% 64.8% 53.9% 57.3% 44.6% 23.5% 15.8% 51.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Enemy Col % 64.4% 49.2% 68.4% 71.9% 81.0% 70.6% 84.2% 67.4% 
Partner Col % . 8% 
1.1 % . 8% . 
6% 
No response Col % 35.6% 50.0% 31.6% 27.0% 18.2% 29.4% 15.8% 32.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Manipulative Col % 18.4% 18.9% 26.3% 24.7% 33.9% 11.8% 21.1% 24.1% 
Sincere Col % . 8% . 
2% 
No response Col % 81.6% 80.3% 73.7% 75.3% 66.1% 88.2% 78.9% 75.7% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Tables 6.14 and 6.15 show that not every text chose one or other of the 
binary characteristics to represent Iraq and Iraqi actors. Indeed only 18 of 
the 531 Iraq articles (3.4%) chose to represent Iraqis in terms of the 
'monolithic/ diverse' binary. In the overwhelming majority of the articles, 
regardless of the frequency of their appearance, negative representations 
are dominant. Articles which expressed a position argued that Iraqis were: 
'monolithic' (88.9%; n= 16); 'separate' (99.3; n= 140); 'inferior' (98.1%; n= 
253); `an enemy' (99.2%; n= 358); and 'manipulative' (99.2%; n= 128). Two 
thirds of all the Iraq articles argued that Iraq and Iraqis were 'the enemy' 
(67.4%; n= 358, see Table 6.15). The remaining four variables were cited 
less frequently, but three - 'separate', 'inferior' and 'manipulative' - were still 
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cited in significant numbers. These findings indicate a very high level of anti- 
Iraqi sentiment. 
Tables 6.14 and 6.15 and the discussion above illustrate, albeit in a 
rather disembodied way, the form and frequency of `negative' newspaper 
representations of Iraq in the sampled articles. Such representations have 
argumentative weight in reporting, acting to support themes, attitudes and 
conclusions regarding both the government and the people of Iraq. Such 
'themes' - as distinct from 'topics' - will now be analysed and discussed. 
6.3 Qualitative results and discussion 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The sampled Iraq articles were dominated by argumentation on the 
desirability or otherwise of removing President Saddam Hussein from power. 
The sampled Iraq articles employed strikingly similar supporting arguments 
for intervention, to the extent that a remarkably schematic discursive strategy 
developed. This strategy is, in essence, an argument for intervention arising 
from the claims, themes, implications and a number of presuppositions 
present in the reports. This discursive strategy is illustrated in Figure 6.1 
below: principle 
Figure 6.1: Discursive Strategy in the broadsheet reporting of Iraq 
Theme 'Saddam Hussein is defying International law' 
Warrant Saddam is a bad man International law should be upheld 
Implication We should intervene 
Presuppositions We can intervene 
Physically able to intervene Morally able to intervene 
11 
Militarily Superior 'Just' 
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The universal theme of the reporting was 'Saddam Hussein's defiance of 
international law'. This theme ran through the top four coded topics - the 
'UNSCOM stand-off, the 'threat of war', 'actions of international leaders', 
'illegal weapons' (see Table 6.8) - and others less frequently cited (e. g. 
'sanctions', 'UN', 'terrorism'), totalling over 90 per cent of sampled Iraq 
articles. Additional to this theme were the claims that 'Saddam is a bad man', 
and 'international law should be upheld'. These claims often went unstated 
in the articles - hence their being labelled as argumentative 'warrants' in 
Figure 6.1 - illustrating the extent to which they are taken as 'givens', but 
more often, evidence and argumentation were presented to back up these 
two claims. The combination of the 'theme' and claims of the reporting, 
resulted in the implication that 'We should intervene in Iraq'. However, the 
form that this proposed intervention was to take appeared to be directed by 
the presuppositions of the reporting. Necessarily, in order to suggest 'We 
should intervene', it must first be presupposed that 'We can intervene'. This 
presupposed ability takes the form of a physical ability and a moral ability, 
which is in turn based on presupposed military sophistication and a just 
cause - two presuppositions which have come to be practically inseparable, 
particularly since the development of the rhetoric of "military humanism" (see 
Chomsky, 1999,2000; Hammond, 2000). These presuppositions formed not 
only the backbone to much of the reporting, but were also argued explicitly in 
articles focusing on topics such as the 'UN', 'international law', 'diplomacy', 
'actions of international leaders' and others. 
The above discursive strategy informed the vast majority of reporting 
of Iraq and the 1997/8 UNSCOM 'stand-off. Even when reports did not imply 
that 'We' - usually the US/UK coalition - should intervene in Iraq, they were 
generally informed by the presuppositions in the lower section of Figure 6.1 
above: that 'We' are both physically and morally able to direct military 
aggression at Iraq. These presuppositions were in turn confirmed, 
legitimated and reproduced in other, more specialised reports, looking at 
amongst other subjects, the 'smart' military hardware of 'the Western 
powers', the precedence for intervention set by international law, the 
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histories of atrocities by the Iraqi regime, etc. Each element of the above 
discursive strategy will now be presented and analysed, with a view to 
discussing how it confirmed or challenged the drive towards military 
aggression taken by the American and British governments. 
6.3.2. Use of International law as an argumentative resource 
International law was regularly referred to in this sample of Iraq articles, due 
primarily to the centrality of the UN, and specifically the UN Special 
Commission (UNSCOM), to the story. The main use to which international 
law was put in these articles, was to show that the actions of Saddam 
Hussein and/or his government were 'illegal', or a infringement of previous 
treaties or agreements. In an article printed in the Telegraph (14 November 
1997: 1) for example, Bill Richardson, the American Ambassador to the UN, 
was quoted as saying "Baghdad was pushing the crisis 'to the brink' and 
violating the UN Charter". The Telegraph omitted to mention in this article 
that commentators such as Professor Francis Boyle (Professor of 
International Law and Arms Control at University of Illinois) thought that 
America was in violation of the same Charter by threatening to attack Iraq. 
The UN was distilled down and referred to in these articles as the 
'international will' -a 'will' which Saddam Hussein was consistently referred 
to as defying despite the fact that the US and the UK were practically alone 
in demanding Iraq's immediate and total capitulation of sovereignty. British 
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook was quoted as stating "no option is ruled out 
by the world community' and, in the same article, the then Defence 
Secretary George Robertson stated that the actions of Saddam Hussein are 
"simply not acceptable to the world community' (Telegraph Invincible sent 
to the Gulf, 17 January 1998, emphasis added). Madelaine Albright was 
quoted in the Guardian (17 November 1997: 12) as saying that the 'stand-off' 
is "not a dispute between Iraq and the US, but between Iraq and the law, 
Iraq and the world". Similarly, during her attempts to win support for military 
attacks from European and Gulf States, the Financial Times (29 January 
1998: 1) quotes her appeal for a "strong international response" (emphasis 
added) to Iraq. 
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Throughout the crisis, the Americans argued that the decision for 
military aggression could be made without recourse to further Security 
Council resolutions. In an article in the Financial Times headlined 'UN closer 
to tougher sanctions on Iraq'. (12 November 1997) for example, William 
Cohen, US Defence Secretary, "reiterated the US contention that there was 
'inherent authority' under existing UN resolutions for a military response" 
(emphasis added). Another article, headlined 'Defiant Saddam dares US to 
strike' and printed in the Sunday Times (2 November 1997) reported that 
"Saddam" had "given Americans working in the UN arms inspection team in 
Iraq until Wednesday [three days] to leave". The report goes on to state that 
Richard Butler, the chairman of UNSCOM, considered this latest ultimatum 
to be "a breach of the 1991 cease-fire that ended the Gulf War". The 
implications of this are not spelt out by the newspaper, other than to imply 
that it was a little strong since it "drew a rebuke from the French, who said it 
was up to the Council to consider it a violation". Should the newspaper have 
included the implications of Butler's reaction in the report, it could have 
illustrated his threatening brinkmanship and the extent to which his views 
supported the American argument for military aggression. 2 
The UN Security Council, a major 'legal' player in the inspection 
crisis, was only represented by the sampled newspapers as performing a 
legitimate role when the decisions which it produced conformed with Anglo- 
American policy. Conversely, countries like France, Russia and China who 
opposed aggressive Anglo-American policy were criticised by the 
newspapers and even blamed for the 'stand-off. The Financial Times for 
example, in an article headlined 'A win on points for Saddam Hussein' (21 
November 1997), suggests that "a damaging split" in the Security Council, 
produced "when France, Russia and China opposed a US and UK proposal 
for a small increase in sanctions to punish Baghdad's concealment of its 
weapons development", initiated the crisis. "It was that split", the newspaper 
continues, "which tempted the Iraqi dictator into his latest challenge to the 
sanctions regime". A similar point is made in a report printed the same day in 
the Independent ('Baghdad claims victory in battle of nerves with US', 21 
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November 1997) where "divisions" in "the UN Security Council over what to 
do about Iraq" were identified as contributing to the crisis. 
On the same page as the Independent report mentioned above, 
however, another article headlined 'Crisis over as Saddam lets inspectors 
back to work' contained an indication that the US were not adverse to 
creating 'dis-unity' in the Security Council should the Council's decisions not 
go their way. In response to a deal brokered in Geneva which ended the 
current stand-off, Mike McCurry, the White House spokesman is 
paraphrased as saying: "the US would use its veto on the UN Security 
Council should there be any alteration to the terms of former UN 
resolutions". This statement illustrates the commitment of the USA to return 
the UNSCOM inspections to a situation similar to the recently alleviated 
'stand-of should decisions be made that they do not agree with. This stated 
intention was allowed to stand by the journalists - Harriet Martin and Rupert 
Cornwell - without any comment, critique or contention. 
Three days after the printing of this article, the Independent reported 
that the US and UK had followed through with their commitment to veto any 
alterations to the current inspections and sanctions regime which they 
disagreed with ('Britain and US spike Saddam's guns over changes to 
arms inspections', 24 November 1997). The report stated that "Russia had 
wanted the commission to certify that Iraq had dismantled its nuclear 
programme and long-range missiles" which would thereby close the chapter 
on UNSCOM nuclear inspections. Considering that "the Vienna-based 
International Agency for Atomic Energy has officially confirmed that Baghdad 
does not possess atomic weapons, nor the means of manufacturing them" 
(Rouleau, 23 March 1998, Le Monde Diplomatique) Russia's request does 
appear acceptable. Not only did the US and UK reject such a proposal, they 
went above and beyond the requirements of SC Resolution 687 and 
demanded that Iraq "identify [the] countries which sold it nuclear technology 
before the invasion of Kuwait". Further, the article reported that the US and 
UK "were jubilant at the rebuff to Iraq and Russia, which failed to win the full 
endorsement of France and China" (emphasis added). Such celebration in 
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continuing the sanctions regime again elicited no critical response from the 
newspapers, either in their news reports or their op. /ed. columns, suggesting 
that the newspapers do not think 'dis-unity' in the Security Council is 
problematic by when it is 'Our side' who are being obstructive or imperious. 
An editorial, headlined 'Seven Year Itch' and printed in The Times 
(31 October 1997), uses international law in quite an innovative way, arguing 
that Security Council resolutions had failed to restrict Saddam Hussein's 
"grip on Iraq" or reduce "the regional threat he poses" and that military 
intervention was needed. The paper claims that the UN 'miscalculated' the 
size of Saddam Hussein's arsenal, that the terms of the resolution were "less 
than draconian" and it was this which resulted in the UN's failure to disarm 
Iraq. The 'implications' of this failure are given rhetorical prominence where 
the editorial suggests that "Iraq's illegal arsenal' includes "outlawed toxic 
weapons theoretically sufficient to kill the entire world's population four times 
over" (my emphasis), which adds additional weight to the newspaper's 
claims that the resolution did not go far enough. 
In addition, and following the approach of the 'Western' governments 
at the time and since, the newspaper not only blames Saddam Hussein for 
the sanctions regime, but presents the suffering of the Iraqi people as being 
engineered by Hussein: 
By seeing to it that some Iraqis go desperately hungry, Saddam has also 
succeeded in persuading the world that the people of Iraq, which is quite 
capable of growing enough food to supply its populace, are starving because of 
UN sanctions. 
This passage not only refutes the claims that the UN sanctions are to blame 
for the suffering endured by the Iraqi people, but also provides a 
humanitarian pretext for military intervention, in addition to the legal and 
geopolitical arguments already used. By combining these arguments the 
newspaper is enabled to state, in a forceful and emotive conclusion, that 
"[t]he West 
... must ensure that retaliation severely damages the military and 
security apparatus that underpins his [Hussein's] regime". 
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6.3.3. Negative depiction of Iraqi leaders 
Personification of the conflict was one of the main ways in which the 
complexities of the UNSCOM 'stand-off was managed by broadsheet 
newspapers. It is far easier to (re)construct 'the enemy' as an individual, or a 
select group of individuals with a negative image, than it is to make an 
enemy of a nation. Indeed the argument for intervention on 'humanitarian' 
grounds is strengthened if 'the nation' - in this case Iraq - is cast as another 
victim of the enemy's malignancy rather than his supporter or accomplice. 
With this in mind, we would expect the coverage of Iraqi actors to focus 
heavily on a few key individuals, with reference to Iraq's citizens only 
occurring in order to add weight to the central argument for military 
intervention. Reporting tended to focus argumentation and coverage very 
closely upon elite individuals in the Iraqi regime: specifically President 
Saddam Hussein and, to a lesser extent, the Deputy Prime Minister Tarik 
Aziz. Some of the methods in which these elite Iraqi actors were 
'negativised' in the sampled coverage of Iraq will now be discussed. 
The 'negativisation' of Saddam Hussein has occurred extensively in 
the pages of the Press since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Previous 
studies (Allan, 1999; Keeble, 1997; Mowlana, Gerbner & Schiller, 1992; 
Walsh, 1995) have shown that nominalisations such as 'the Arab Hitler', 'the 
Butcher of Baghdad', 'mad dog Hussein' and others are employed so 
regularly by journalists to describe President Saddam Hussein that they 
have reached the point of metonym. Examples of Saddam Hussein's 
brutality were provided by the newspapers, often in seemingly inconsonant 
articles. A classic example of this was included in an article printed in The 
Times, headlined 'Iraq faced threat of nuclear attack' (22 December, 
1997). The article retold the story of the UNSCOM 'stand-off from the 
perspective of "Pentagon Planners", who suggested that during the height of 
the crisis they considered whether a nuclear bomb should be used against 
Iraq in the event of military aggression. The rhetoric of this article is 
analysed in much greater depth later in the chapter, but suffice to say the 
report says the plan to 'nuke Saddam' was dropped. It is against this 
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background that an example of the brutality of Saddam Hussein is provided, 
3 probably intended 'by way of contrast'. The report states: 
Saddam, now 60, consolidated his power at a meeting of the Ba'ath Party in 
1979 when he pointed out people he saw as disloyal. After each was escorted 
from the room, they were shot. 
This paragraph illustrates that Saddam Hussein has been a villain from the 
outset of his rule in Iraq. The next paragraph suggests that this 
'consolidation of power' may have had an even more sinister basis, with 
Saddam Hussein appearing to take perverse delight in fear, pain and death: 
A brief video clip of the scene from CIA archives was shown. Saddam's 
behaviour was described by Anthony Lake, Mr Clinton's former National 
Security Advisor, who said: 'With a look on his face like that of a boy tearing the 
wings off a fly, he took a cigar and moved it around his subordinates, picking 
out those to be taken away on the grounds of treachery. He was enjoying every 
minute of it'. 
The "video clip" is mentioned in order to provide objective 'proof' that the 
event being described occurred. The testimony of "Anthony Lake" provides 
us with a reading of the manner in which Hussein carried out such 
barbarism: he "was enjoying every minute of it". 
It is interesting that the discussed event was meant to have occurred 
in 1979. Conspicuously absent from the report is the acknowledgement that 
Saddam Hussein was given political, logistical and financial backing from the 
USA for an additional decade after this event was meant to have occurred. 
Presumably this backing continued to be provided despite sections of the 
American government having full knowledge of this event if, as the report 
states, the "brief video clip" was taken "from CIA archives". 4 The implications 
of this are not discussed by the reporter Ian Brodie, Anthony Lake or any 
other source cited in the article. The possibility that the American 
government continued to support Iraq (see Frank, 1992) despite knowing 
that President Saddam Hussein committed murder order to "consolidate 
power' is a matter which one would have expected any quality journalist to 
have discussed in light of the material in this article. Instead of providing 
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such a discussion - which would presumably have 'muddied' who exactly 
`we' are meant to be criticising - Ian Brodie opts to uncritically accept the line 
coming out of the cited "Pentagon planners" and write an 'isn't Saddam evil' 
piece. 
Articles demonising Saddam Hussein were printed frequently across 
the sample. Less frequent, but no less interesting were articles which 
directed such animosity towards the Deputy Prime Minister Tarik Aziz. A 
Guardian editorial headlined 'Iraq: diminishing options' (12 November 
1997) for example, appeared particularly belligerent towards Aziz: 
He himself is a liar and worse than a liar, as men have to be to survive in the 
highest ranks of Saddam's regime, and he is one of the longest serving and 
most prominent members of that regime. A man in such a position has to 
prostitute his abilities - and Aziz is an able man - to defend the indefensible, to 
conceal the inexcusable and to argue the impossible. 
To suggest that Tarik Aziz is "an able man", who is "one of the longest 
serving ... members" of the regime, entails that 
he is particularly good at the 
'prostituting' himself to the "indefensible" aims and interests of the regime. 
The editorial also describes him as being "worse than a liar" and as one of 
the "most prominenf' members of the regime which seems to suggest that 
he, at the very least, collaborates in the regime's aims and interests and is 
therefore partially responsible for both their content and effects. 
The Telegraph also printed an article in which Tarik Aziz was the 
focus of criticism. `Baghdad's urbane apologist blends charm with fear' 
(18 November 1997) was printed six days after the Guardian editorial 
discussed above, appears to be written with a similar critical intent as the 
editorial, but discards the bellicose criticism of Aziz present in the Guardian 
article. The article, which appeared at the height of newspaper output on 
Iraq (see Graph 6.1) and was printed on the same page as five other 
UNSCOM articles, is a personal and political profile of Tarik Aziz, apparently 
written in order to provide 'background' to the other reports. 
The article starts by describing Aziz's role in Saddam Hussein's 
government: he "takes on the thankless task of defending Iraq in the 
succession of confrontations with the international community". Here, the 
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newspaper nominalises the transitive verb 'to confront', which acts to remove 
the exact nature of the "confrontations". This removal is almost certainly due 
to such information already being known to the readership, through both the 
co-location of the five other UNSCOM articles on the page and the ongoing 
nature of the conflict. It is interesting however, that Aziz is described as 
"defending Iraq" against such "confrontations", suggesting that the 
"international community" are the attackers in the action process. 
The article goes on to suggest the manner in which Aziz performs his 
designated role: "With his professorial look and mastery of English, Tarik 
Aziz is the most respectable face of the Iraqi regime ... 
One former Arab 
foreign minister described Mr Aziz as 'the most articulate Arab man I have 
ever met'. " Here 'respectability' is defined by the newspaper in a very closed 
and ethnocentric way: looking "professorial" and having a "mastery of 
English". His eloquence is referred to again by the unnamed quoted source, 
where the anomalous status of being an "articulate Arab man" is implied. 
The article also described Aziz as an unusual feature within the Iraqi regime: 
he "seems almost too urbane to represent a regime as repressive as that of 
Saddam", and is "a minority Christian rather than a Sunni Muslim" -a 
characteristic which the article, in contrast to the above Guardian editorial, 
suggests "may explain his survival through Saddam's bloody purges of party 
rivals". 
The article's depiction of Aziz as an intelligent and erudite man are 
put to use in the concluding paragraph, in a striking criticism: 
An exile in London said: 'Tarik Aziz bears a double guilt. Most of the Iraqi 
leaders are ignorant. But Aziz is intelligent, and he still takes part in the crimes 
of the regime. ' 
In the light of the argument in this paragraph, the afore-printed article 
appears like a 'set-up'. The newspaper has constructed an elaborate and 
subtle argument, wherein, should we accept the initial premises of Aziz 
being "respectable", "articulate", "urbane" and perhaps most importantly, a 
"Christian", then confronted with the "crimes of the regime", the conclusion 
regarding his "double guilt" appears to be indisputable. The article therefore 
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appears to be warning the Telegraph's readership of this man's dubious 
character. This is a man who is "reputedly charming to his friends and 
ruthless with his enemies" and who, despite the possible perceptions of the 
readership, should be regarded in the same way as Saddam Hussein 
himself: as a threat to Iraq, to the region and to 'world peace', and therefore 
should be removed from power. 
6.3.4. The `ideological square' in reporting Iraq 
In this section I discuss articles and excerpts from articles which are 
structured in accordance with the `ideological square'. The term 'ideological 
square' was proposed by van Dijk (1984; 1987; 1991; 1992; 1993; 1996; 
1997; 1998; 1999; 2000; van Dijk et al, 1997) in order to describe a 
discursive process, present in prejudiced talk and text, in which a strategy of 
negative other-presentation and a simultaneous positive self-presentation is 
employed. The 'ideological square' in these sampled articles on Iraq, is a 
particularly important aspect of the dominant discursive strategy since it 
provides the basis of presumed 'moral' justification for military intervention. 
The analysed texts concur with and support the dominant reading of the 
events being described - Iraqi intransigence in contrast to 'Western' civility - 
and hence favour a reading of the reported events functional to the military 
aims of the 'Western' governments. Since semantic, rhetorical and 
argumentative moves are discussed throughout this chapter, this section will 
focus on key examples of lexical and syntactic structuring of expression. 
Numerous alternative examples of lexical and syntactic structuring of 
expression exist, which will be discussed at much greater length in future 
work. 
A report, headlined `Iraq faces countdown to attack' and printed in 
the Telegraph (19 January 1998), contains several interesting textual 
features illustrating the ideological commitments of the journalist and 
newspaper. First, the article's use of noun phrases is interesting: "Saddam 
Hussein" is only called by his full name in the first line of the text; is labelled 
as "dictator" on two occasions (one in the 'overheadline'); as "the Iraqi 
dictator" on one occasion in the second paragraph; as "the tyrant" in the third 
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paragraph; as "the Iraqi leader" in the second to last paragraph; and as 
"Saddam" on ten other occasions. "Iraq" is mentioned as an actor on two 
occasions. In contrast, the actors positioned in conflict with Iraq and Saddam 
Hussein are presented more collectively and more positively. The collective 
nouns cited were: "America", (n= 3); "Britain" (n= 1); "Washington and its 
allies" (n= 1); "senior government officials" (n= 1); "UN", (n= 1); and "United 
Nations inspectors" (n= 1). Individuals cited were: "Madeleine Albright, 
Secretary of State" (n= 1); "Bill Richardson, America's ambassador to the 
UN" (n= 1); "Britain's Defence Secretary, George Robertson" (n= 1); "Sir 
Edward Heath" (n= 2); "Richard Butler, head of the UN's compliance team" 
(n= 1); and the shorter "Mr Butler" (n= 2). The contrast between Iraqi and 
non-Iraqi actors is striking. Although each 'side' were cited a comparable 
number of times (n= 19; n= 16), Iraqi actors were dominated by President 
Saddam Hussein, or more specifically by "Saddam", whilst the non-Iraqis 
were either collectivised or else were individuals given their full honourific 
titles. The consequence of these lexical choices is that the conflict appears 
to be both personalised and justified: the collective efforts of the US, the UK 
and the UN against "Saddam", "the tyrant" and "Iraqi dictator". 
Second, the way in which aggressive transitive actions attributed to 
the 'non-Iraqi side' are presented is interesting. Throughout the article, the 
"attack" mentioned in the headline is mitigated, passivised or nominalised 
(as in the headline), which effectively backgrounds or occasionally removes 
the agency of the attackers. The closest the report gets to a foregrounding of 
agency is in the first paragraph, numbered here for ease of reference: 
[1] America warned Saddam Hussein yesterday that [2] it is closer to using a 
military attack to end Iraq's efforts to block United Nations inspectors. 
In clause two, the whole of the italicised section represents one single noun 
phrase - the `object' which 'it' [America] intends 'to use. Even here, where 
the presence of `aggressive American agency' is strongest, the expression is 
structured in such a way as to provide the readership with the justification for 
the "military attack... ", qualifying the very noun phrase which proposes it: 
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"... to end Iraq's efforts to block United Nations inspectors". Elsewhere, the 
proposed American military aggression is expressed as "military force", "the 
military option", "military action", "military strikes" and "the military-based 
response", displaying the kind of over-wording indicative of an "intense 
ideological preoccupation" (Fowler et al, 1979). On two other occasions, the 
newspaper uses the terms "punitive missile strike" and "punitive cruise 
missile attacks" which again provide a justification for the military attack in a 
similar way to the numbered quotation above. The addition of the adjective in 
this case is therefore highly ideological, providing the reader with an 
objective for the 'military strike' (i. e. a punishment for "Saddam", "the tyrant"), 
and moreover, through the choice of the adjective, that this objective is a 
'just' and 'justifiable' one. 
Third, the article employs non-obligatory rhetorical devices such as 
metaphor in order that certain meanings of the reported action be 
emphasised in the minds-eye of the reader. The visit to Baghdad by Richard 
Butler, the head of UNSCOM for example is described in the article as "the 
final test of whether to unleash American cruise missiles against the tyrant". 
The choice of the lexical metaphor "unleash" to describe the launching of 
cruise missiles is attractive since it imbues the bombs with life and taps into 
the more literary metaphor '[unleashing] the dogs of war'. The attack is 
further justified through the use of the noun phrase "the tyrant" to describe 
Saddam Hussein, since the missiles are being 'unleashed against the tyrant' 
and not Iraq. This very simple structuring of expression acts to limit the 
possibilities of dissent in much the same way that the classical rhetorical 
argument 'fighting for peace' does. 
Throughout the majority of the articles reporting the UNSCOM 'stand- 
of, the sampled newspapers metaphorically employ an authoritarian 
discourse of discipline (Fairclough, 1995a: 95) to describe the reported 
action, switching between 'parent-to-child' and 'master-to-pet' relations of 
discipline. Saddam Hussein and Iraq were cast in the relationship's 
subordinate role and 'Western' (US and UK) actors are represented as 
dominant. The Financial Times (15 November 1997), for example clearly 
employ this disciplinary metaphor in an article headlined 'The US has a big 
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stick, but it can talk softly'. This metaphor is continued through the article 
in terms such as "punitive strikes" and in the evaluation that previous US air 
attacks on Iraq (e. g. January 1993, September 1996) were "too lenient". The 
article uses the `insolent animal' metaphor most clearly in the claim that the 
Clinton Administration were wondering "how to bring Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein to heel", suggesting that Hussein was somehow comparable to a 
wayward puppy. The same day the Independent stated that Iraq had "defied 
the United States" ('Last superpower defied by friends and enemies 
alike', my emphasis). Lower down in the article, where a Pentagon 
spokesman criticises Iraq's request to limit the number of US weapons 
inspectors, the disciplinary discourse shifts to a legal-penitive metaphor: the 
Pentagon official is quoted as saying "it is as though an ex-convict were 
trying to pick its own parole officer". The disciplinary image of the 'big stick' 
was also used in an article printed in the Telegraph (18 November 1997): 
first in the headline - 'Western ability to wield the big stick at Saddam is 
slipping away', and also as "the military stick" later in the article. 
Such formulations were built up across the sample, wherein Saddam 
Hussein was persistently described as a subordinate who has not 'learnt his 
lesson' and should therefore be 'punished' and 'brought back in line' with the 
'international community'. Representing the UNSCOM inspections 'stand-off' 
in such a way tends to implicitly invoke "an imperialist and indeed racist 
ideology of relations between nations, which contributes to the continuity of 
imperialist and neo-colonialist relations in practice" (Fairclough, 1995a: 102). 
With this in mind, these formulations appear highly functional to the call of 
the United States and Britain to attack Iraq. 
If we next look at lexical style across other sampled articles it 
becomes apparent that, through the journalist's choices of verb phrase, Iraqi 
action is presented as 'negative' on a far more regular basis than 'Western' 
action. For example, in the article 'Iraq faces countdown to attack' 
(Telegraph, 19 January 1998) discussed above, I showed how President 
Saddam Hussein was labelled "the tyrant" in contrast to America and Britain 
being labelled "Washington and its allies" and 'western' actors being 
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referred to by their full honourific titles. Second, the proposed 'Western' 
military action is generally euphemised in order to de-emphasise its negative 
effects. In one edition of The Times (14 November 1997) for example, the 
military attacks proposed by the American and British governments are 
labelled: "Gulf Action" (in the headline), "grave consequences", and "a 
military confrontation" in a front page article; and as a "strike", a "strike 
against Iraq", the "military option" (in a headline, p. 19), "military action", 
"further measures" and the proposal to "punish Iraq militarily" across seven 
other articles (p. 18-19). This not only illustrates the same intense over- 
wording suggested earlier, but is also highly ideological, since all but two of 
the above descriptions of 'Western' military violence conceal the 'agents' 
and 'objects' (the 'affected') of such violence. 
A classic example of the dichotomous 'ideological square' developed 
in the sampled Iraq articles between the verbs 'to warn' and 'to threaten': the 
actions of Iraq and Iraqi actors being represented as 'threats', whilst the 
actions of 'the West' and 'Western' actors were represented as 'warnings'. 
Below are a few select examples of this dichotomous representation, 
included in chronological order. Iraqi and 'Western' speech acts are 
italicised throughout: 
1. A senior Pentagon official last night gave a warning that any Iraqi attempt to 
shoot down US reconnaissance aircraft would be considered an act of war 
and be met with a military response. As Iraq renewed its threats, America 
urged the United Nations to implement tougher sanctions against Iraq. (The 
Times, 8 November 1997: 16) 
2. Clinton refuses to rule out attack after Iraq threat.... Iraq threatened to 
shoot down U-2 spy planes on UN missions. ... James Rubin, State Department Spokesman, said: 'We have made it clear that any attempt to 
shoot them down would be a serious mistake'. " (Telegraph, 8 November 
1997: 12) 
3. [... ] a senior Iraq official threatened to shoot down US spy planes if they 
resumed flights over his country. A senior Pentagon official said yesterday 
that any Iraqi attempt to shoot down a UN surveillance plane would be 
considered an act of war (Guardian, 8 November 1997: 19) 
4. William Cohen said that if Iraq acted on its week-old threat to shoot down a 
U2 plane, this would be tantamount to "an act of war". (Independent, 10 
November 1997: 1) 
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5. The United States is proposing an intensive bombing campaign against Iraq 
next month... How will Saddam respond to a renewed air war? ... His military 
options are limited. He could threaten Kuwait again, as he did in 1994 
(Independent 27 January 1998: 7) 
In each of the five examples above, American and United Nations (Kofi 
Annan) actions which could be construed as 'threats' or at the very least 
'threatening' are de-emphasised through the lexical choices of the 
journalists. In contrast, the actions of Iraq and Iraqi actors are labelled as 
'threats'. 
Moving on to the syntactic structuring of expression, the choices of 
sentence construction made in the sampled Iraq articles further highlight the 
'ideological square' discussed above. Mirroring the findings of Kress (1983), 
the use of the verb/adjective pairing "is/are likely" in the sampled 
newspapers illustrates the (ideological) presuppositions and commitments of 
those using it. The first line of an article headlined 'Israel `threatens nuclear 
reply' to Iraq germ attack' and printed in The Times (29 January 1998) for 
example, states: 
With tension mounting in the Gulf, the CIA has given a warning that Iraq is likely 
to fire scud missiles armed with non-conventional warheads at Israel if attacked 
by the Americans, according to a report in Yediot Aharonot. (emphasis added) 
The excerpt is a complex, multi-layered sentence, containing a number of 
interesting linguistic dimensions. The `factuality' of the sentence - and 
therefore of the threat - is emphasised through the journalists' use of two 
features: the action of the CIA is labelled "a warning" as opposed to 'a claim'; 
and the constructive role of the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot in the 
story is backgrounded to the final clause of the sentence. Shahak (1997) 
describes this newspaper as a "quality paper" but which "tends to include all 
views in the framework of Zionism" (p. 8). The stake of the paper in the story 
should therefore be viewed from within this ideological commitment. Second, 
it is interesting to speculate on what the motivations of the CIA were in press 
releasing such information to Israeli newspapers. What did they expect, or 
intend Yediot Aharonot and their readership would do with such information? 
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Moreover, what were they actually doing with such information in the first 
place, if UNSCOM is as uncorrupted by espionage and covert operations as 
the Americans claimed throughout the stand-off? These questions are not 
broached by The Times. 
Returning to the verb/adjective pairing "is likely", the usage in this 
case is a little more complex than the example discussed by Kress (1983). It 
is unclear whether the syntactic choice "is likely" was made by the CIA, 
Yediot Aharonot or the journalists who wrote the article, and for this reason, 
I'll sideline the issue of authorial agency and focus on the claim: Through 
using "is likely", the factual 'existence' of the proposed missile attack is 
stressed, regardless of onlooker perceptions, in a way which would not be 
possible with the alternative 'seems certain'. This syntactic choice increases 
the 'threat' posed to Israel by Iraq. In addition, the use of the culturally 
consonant phrases "Scud missiles" and "non-conventional warheads", 
combined with the "warning" speech act, result in the newspaper presenting 
an especially threatening sequence of events. 
By way of comparison, the alternative verb/adjective pairing 'seems 
certain' was adopted in other Iraq articles. 5 In the Telegraph article 
headlined 'Clinton refuses to rule out attack after Iraq threat' (8 
November 1997) for example, the journalist Hugh Davies wrote: 
Experience has proven that in disputes with UN inspectors, the Iraqis have 
backed off only when military action seems certain. (emphasis added) 
Here, through the use of the verb/adjective pairing "seems certain", Hugh 
Davies suggests that the Iraqis only 'back off from a dispute when military 
action seems certain to them. This chosen syntactic construction acts to de- 
emphasise the existential, i. e. very real, threat of (US) military action -a 
threat that has been carried out on occasions before and since the article 
was printed. This entailment would have been unavailable should the 
journalist have adopted the pairing "is likely", for the reasons given above. In 
this way, Davies using this particular verb/adjective pairing encourages the 
audience to `read' the reported event as a symbolic conflict being `fought' by 
diplomats in the rooms of, amongst other places, the UN. Thus, to say that 
"the Iraqis have backed off only when military action seems certain [to them]" 
simultaneously suggests that Iraqi perception is the most important aspect of 
the crisis, whilst presuming that the decision to react militarily has not been 
already made. As such, the presentation of the reported event contained 
with the chosen verb/adjective pairing, contributes to the 'ideological square' 
mentioned above. The military threats of American and British forces are 
reframed as simple posturing, devoid of any real intent to attack Iraq. 
6.3.5 The sophistication and/or superiority of 'Our' weaponry 
Articles reporting the military vehicles, weaponry, equipment and personnel 
being sent to the Persian Gulf were common during the sampled 
newspapers. These articles almost universally focused on American and 
British military equipment being sent to the Gulf region, with few references 
to the armed forces of other 'allied' countries. When other armed forces were 
mentioned, they tended to be in the lower sections of articles. An article 
headlined "Invincible' is prepared for Gulf action' (The Times, 14 
November) for example, mentions "six Chilean helicopter technicians [who] 
will be left behind to form a skeleton staff at a UN monitoring centre" in the 
final paragraph of an article covering 325 column centimetres. The article 
above this paragraph makes no mistake of informing the readership of 
exactly who and what will be involved in the majority of the (proposed) 
attacks: a British "strike force", sent "to the Gulf to support the Americans in 
any military action against Iraq". The report includes breathless descriptions 
of "the RAF Harriers", which are "more powerful and have a longer range 
than the Sea Harriers", and which may be allocated to HMS Invincible. 
These military vehicles and personnel were being sent to the Gulf, with the 
full backing of the newspaper, to join the "US forces in the Gulf - 2,000 
personnel, 17 warships and 200 aircraft", all of whom "were on full alert". 
The same day (14 November 1997), in an article headlined 'US fine- 
tunes its military machine', the Guardian provided a list of the American 
and British "hardware" stationed in and sent to the Gulf (written here as it 
appeared): 
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United States forces have a wide choice of equipment available to do the job, 
including: 
" Tomahawk cruise missiles, both ship- and submarine-launched, which they 
say are twice as accurate as the ones used during the Gulf War 
" Anti-radiation missiles designed to home in on air defence missile radars 
" F-117 Stealth fighters and carrier-borne aircraft equipped with various 'smart' 
weapons, such as laser-guided bombs. 
To these can also be added a dozen RAF Tornadoes ... also fitted with the Tiald laser-bombing system. 
The list continues for much of the report's remaining 300 column 
centimetres, although not in the 'bullet points' seen above. The report 
mentions the "US Naval battle group" including "the [nuclear] aircraft carrier 
Nimitz", "British warships", "US combat aircraft" and the "US ground forces" 
in Kuwait, "where, coincidentally, a British infantry battalion, The King's 
Regiment, is on manoeuvres ... this weekend" 
(emphasis added). The central 
function of the article is to communicate the strength and, above all, the high 
technological sophistication of the weaponry available to American and (to a 
lesser extent) British forces to attack Iraq. The excerpt above states that this 
military hardware is "available to do the job", a "job" which the newspaper 
does not mount serious opposition to, despite the report acknowledging the 
inevitable "risk of 'collateral damage' -jargon for killing civilians". 
The technophilia of weaponry formed a significant thematic approach 
to these Iraq articles, as it did during the build-up to the bombing of Iraq in 
1991. Where the 'star weapon' bombing Iraq in 1991 was undoubtedly the 
'smart bomb', during the period of this study the bomb of choice was the B- 
61 'bunker bomb'. Several articles mentioned the power and sophistication 
of the 'bunker bomb', one of which was headlined 'Pentagon tests 'bunker 
buster' for Iraq raids' and printed in The Times (30 January 1998). The 
leader of this article states: "NEW BOMBS CAN DESTROY SADDAM'S HIDDEN 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, WRITES IAN BRODIE", again implying that such 
bombs do therefore exist. The real interest in analysing this article lies in its 
rhetoric - directed towards convincing the readership that these bombs 
should be used to "destroy" the "hidden biological weapons" referred to in 
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the leader. The first paragraph, apparently written without a trace of irony, 
reads: 
The Pentagon, which unveiled precision-guided 'smart bombs' during the Gulf 
War, yesterday promised even smarter bombs if and when America and Britain 
launch new raids against President Saddam Hussein's weapons programme in 
Iraq. (emphasis added) 
This first paragraph introduces the premise which the remainder of the 
article attempts to support: that these new bombs are "smarter" than the 
largely discredited "smart bombs" used against Iraq in 1991. It is interesting 
that the Pentagon still felt that the label 'smart' was the best way of 
mitigating the bomb's destructive capabilities, despite the acknowledged 
failures of 'smart' technology during the bombing of Iraq in 1991. The new 
name for the bomb - the "bunker buster" - also supports the conclusion that 
the bomb will destroy buildings, as opposed to Iraqis. No doubt this name 
was chosen from a list of options employing the same catchy alliteration 
guaranteed to secure good copy in the press. 
The reason for the bomb's proposed usage is supplied by Brodie, 
suggesting that "Pentagon officials are acutely aware of the moral and 
political problems that could be created if bombing raids release anthrax and 
botulism spores or poison gas into the atmosphere where they could kill 
thousands of civilians" (emphasis added). The US military, in attempting to 
prevent Iraqi civilian exposure to chemical/biological weapons, have 
"developed a weapon it is believed can vaporise the germ and chemical 
warfare agents Saddam is hiding" (emphasis added). - Note the doubt in the 
weapon's ability to destroy 'Saddam's weapons' and the accompanying 
declaration that such weapons do in fact exist. Brodie stating that the 
Pentagon is "acutely aware of the moral and political problems" suggests 
that they are keen to avoid killing civilians rather than simply acknowledging 
that such deaths would be 'problematic'. This claim is entirely inconsistent 
with the attitude of the American State Department towards Iraq during the 
inspections crisis. ' Ian Brodie does not treat this specious 'military 
humanism' (Chomsky, 1999) with such disdain however, suggesting that the 
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avoidance of civilian deaths was the primary objective of the development of 
this weapon. 
The article states that research and development has occurred in two, 
seemingly unconnected ways: "a bomb filled with rocket fuel has set off a 30 
second inferno that rose to several thousand degrees during testing" 
(emphasis added); and new "5,000lb laser guided penetration bombs or 
missiles, pencil shaped and with hardened nose cones" have been 
developed in order to "penetrate reinforced concrete bunkers as many as 
four floors underground". The article goes on to describe in breathless, 
pseudo-sexual language, the "penetration" of such "bunker busters", which 
"can scythe through layers of metal and reinforced concrete" and not 
explode "until it has fully penetrated the bunker" (emphasis added). This is 
apparently done through the use of "a new delayed fuse" (emphasis added) - 
the use of the modifier 'new' suggesting an improvement or development in 
existing delayed fuses. This 'new fuse' is central to the functioning of the 
bomb since it allows it to "count the number of floors it goes through as the 
bomb penetrates the bunkers". 
The testing of the bomb has not, however, been particularly 
successful, with the fallible nature of this new "smarter" weapon being 
exposed in two ways. The article states: 
As an example, the fuse can be programmed to detonate on the fourth floor. 
American television viewers saw Pentagon videotape of a 'bunker buster' 
smashing it's way through four walls of concrete before exploding. 
First, the obvious conclusion that we are meant to come to in reading these 
two sentences, is that they are connected: that the bomb can be 
programmed to explode after 'smashing' through four floors/walls, and that 
this is what happened in the example broadcast to the American people. But 
the two sentences, and the events they describe, are not necessarily 
connected by any causal relationship. The excerpt is an example of an 
"abbreviated syllogism", which, through omitting a premise, pushes the 
audience to create "coherence in the incomplete argument by consciously or 
unconsciously supplying the 'missing link' from the premises in their own 
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belief system" (Gill & Whedbee, 1997: 175). The suggested causal 
relationship between the two sentence does not therefore exist, but is left for 
us to infer based on the expectations for narrative coherence that we impose 
upon texts. 
Second, and related to the first point above, we must wonder why it is 
that the "bunker buster" is so fond of the fourth floor of 'the bunker'. If it can 
indeed be programmed to explode on whatever floor it wishes, why do all the 
references and examples in the article only refer to the bomb exploding after 
passing through four levels of concrete? As "Frank Robbins, research 
director at the Elgin base" is quoted as saying: "the fuse that counts the 
floors is still being tested". The image that this therefore paints, is of a 
weapon which can penetrate four floors or concrete walls, and, due to the 
incomplete nature of it's research and development always does penetrate 
four floors or concrete walls. What is therefore being described is a weapon 
of such blinding technology that it is able - with the help of a reinforced 
nose-cone and rocket propulsion - to smash through four concrete walls 
before coming to a stop. These "smarter" bombs therefore appear 
remarkably similar to the previous, more cerebrally challenged bombs, 
merely with a hard-hat welded to the front. Despite this, "Mr Robbins said it 
[the development of the fuse] is far enough along to be fitted on 'bunker 
busters' already sent to the Gulf'. This rather frank admission from the 
"research director" should have added fuel to the suggestion that this latest 
American incursion into Iraq is being used as a testing ground for military 
equipment - an arms fair of a more practical nature. This implication is 
missed by Ian Brodie. 
As mentioned at the start of this section, articles reporting the military 
vehicles, weaponry, equipment and personnel were common during the 
sampled newspapers. Through these articles' almost universal focus on 
American and British military equipment, the presumption that 'we are 
physically able to intervene due to military superiority' is supported. In 
addition to this physical ability, the way in which 'Our' weaponry is presented 
in these articles - "precision-guided", "smarter weapons" which "vaporise 
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[Saddam's] germ and chemical warfare agents" without harming civilians - 
also supports the presumed 'moral ability to intervene'. 
5.3.6 The threat of `Their' weaponry 
Accompanying the articles referred to above, in which 'Our' military prowess 
was emphasised, were the seemingly contradictory articles in which the 
threat of 'Their' weapons was emphasised. The capability or otherwise of 
Iraq to produce and launch chemical, biological and nuclear weaponry was, 
of course, a frequently cited topic of the sampled Iraq articles (n= 134; 
25.2% of Iraq articles), since it formed the crux issue of the UNSCOM 
inspections and resulting 'stand-off. The existence of these weapons could 
conceivably be thought of as threatening per se, since they are designed to 
kill in horrific and often indiscriminate ways. Further, it could be argued the 
presence of these weapons in the Middle East, an area with a particular 
reputation for 'unrest', could be construed as 'threatening' to the peace or 
'stability' (hegemony) of the region. But the fact that Israel's nuclear and 
(possibly) chemical/biological weapons programmes were not treated as 'per 
se threatening', casts doubt on both of the arguments given above. 
Within the 134 articles which mentioned 'Iraqi illegal weaponry', 
semantic, linguistic and stylistic features were employed to specifically 
highlight the threat of these weapons to 'Us'. Israel was also included in the 
position 'We', and the possibility that Iraq would launch chemical or 
biological warheads at Tel Aviv was frequently cited - particularly in the 
periods of 'peak output' in the weeks before 17 November 1997 and 31 
January 1998. The article, headlined 'Israelis prepare for attack' and 
printed in The Times (17 November 1997) for example reports that, in light of 
the threat posed by "non-conventional Scuds attacks", "as many as 6,000 
[Israeli] people a day are visiting gas mask distribution points". An article on 
the same page headlined 'Saddam given warning over Scud offensive', 
claimed that it was only "Israel's implied threat to use nuclear weapons 
... that stopped 
Saddam from launching Scuds armed with chemical and 
biological warheads against Tel Aviv" during the 1991 conflict with Iraq. 
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The head of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, also made reference to the 
threat Saddam Hussein and Iraqi weapons may pose to Israel, an argument 
which was reported by all of the sampled newspapers. The Independent for 
example, in an article headlined 'US seeks support for Iraqi airstrikes' (28 
January 1998) suggests that Butler said "Iraq had enough biological 
weapons to 'blow away Telegraph Aviv. "' Earlier, Butler had claimed that 
"Saddam is hiding about 200 tonnes of VX gas" ('Children hunger for 
peace in Iraq crisis', Independent, 27 November 1997), a claim which was 
later used by America as 'proof the 'the UN' thought Saddam both held and 
was concealing chemical weapons. 
Elsewhere, articles include rhetorical 'figures of speech' in order to 
make the argument that 'Saddam poses a threat' even more clear to the 
audience. The Sunday Times, in an article headlined 'Saddam hides secret 
arsenal behind women and children' (16 November 1997), claimed that "a 
warhead containing enough anthrax virus to kill tens of thousand of people, 
for example, need be no bigger than a suitcase" (my emphasis). In a similar 
move, William Cohen was reported by most of the sampled newspapers 
holding up a 51b bag of sugar and claiming that "such a bag filled with 
anthrax bacteria could kill half Washington's population if it were spread 
over the city" (The Times, 17 November 1997: 13). 7 
The Financial Times, based the whole of an article to William Cohen's 
allegations ('Iraq `may have huge nerve gas stockpile", 26 November 
1997). The first paragraph of the article stated Cohen's claim that "Iraq may 
possess enough of a nerve gas known as VX to kill the world's entire 
population". This claim is also rephrased lower down in the article in even 
more hyperbolic language, where Cohen is cited "stressing the danger 
posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction to humanity as a whole". This 
claimed 'threat to humanity' is supported by two additional claims (all italics, 
my emphasis): "One drop [of VX] on your finger will produce death in a 
matter of mere moments"; and "the UN believes that Saddam may have 
produced as much as 200 tonnes of VX ... theoretically enough to kill every 
man, woman and child on the face of the earth". The threat of the nerve gas 
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in Saddam's hands in driven home even further to the American public by 
Cohen stating: "The front lines are no longer overseas - it can be in any 
American city". 8 
Despite British and American claims to the contrary, the actual 
existence of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons was neither proved nor 
disproved during the sample period. This inevitably led to the rhetorical use 
of 'vagueness' in the sampled articles, used in order to produce an 
ambiguous sense of uneasiness and threat. Despite the accusatory 
declaration of the headline 'Saddam hides secret arsenal behind women 
and children' (discussed above), the article itself could only make reference 
to "a frightening amount of anthrax" which Iraq "could" produce using 
pharmaceutical fermenters. On other occasions, the claims being made 
regarding the 'threat' or Iraq were so couched, hedged and mitigated to be 
almost devoid of any real content. An article printed in the Independent 
headlined `Britain warns of Saddam's timebomb' (19 November 1997) for 
example, quoted a British "intelligence assessment" which stated: 
Provided it still has key components - and that is unclear - Iraq could within a 
few months build, with little risk of detection, missiles capable of hitting Israel 
and key targets in Saudi Arabia. (emphasis added) 
What this assessment therefore states is that Iraq may be able to produce 
missiles providing it has certain key (i. e. essential) components, the 
likelihood of which is unclear. 
Finally, an article printed in The Times, headlined 'Clinton cites 
Tokyo attack as a warning' (17 November 1997), combines several of the 
linguistic features mentioned above in the form of an especially strong 
rhetorical argument for intervention. As the headline suggests, President 
Clinton used the deaths of Japanese civilians in the March 1995 gas attack 
on the Tokyo underground in an analogous argument of `what can happen 
when these weapons fall into the wrong hands'. The first paragraph sets the 
scene of the UNSCOM stand-off in typically hyperbolic language: "The crisis 
with Iraq is not a replay of the Gulf War but a battle against organised forces 
of destruction, President Clinton said yesterday" (emphasis added). The 
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pseudo-apocalyptic language drawn upon in the opening paragraph, again 
written by Ian Brodie, lends a histrionic feel to the article. Casting Iraq as an 
example of, or perhaps possessed by "organised forces of destruction" 
negativises Iraqi action and justification. The deaths of the Japanese 
civilians in Tokyo is referred to "as an omen" of the "battle" suggested in the 
first paragraph. Clinton continues: 
Think about it in terms of the innocent Japanese who died in the subway and 
how important it is for every responsible government in the world to do 
everything possible not to let big stores of chemical or biological weapons fall 
into the wrong hands. 
The reference to "every responsible government in the world" is a barely 
concealed swipe at the governments of France, China and the Russian 
Federation who were, for whatever reason, less than enthusiastic about the 
policy being advocated by America. What Clinton is actually demanding is 
also interesting to discuss. First, he calls to "responsible governments" to 
remove "big stores of chemical or biological weapons [from] ... the wrong 
hands". Does this mean that if Saddam Hussein had a small store of 
chemical or biological weapons that would be okay? Second, Clinton is not 
calling for the total irradication of chemical or biological weapons, merely 
that large numbers of them should be kept from falling "into the wrong 
hands". This of course accords exactly with America's long-term policy on 
chemical and biological weapons, as illustrated by their refusal to ratify the 
(1986) Declaration on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their 
Destruction (see Shearer, 1994: 413-4). 9 Third, arguing that chemical and 
biological weapons should not be allowed to "fall into the wrong [i. e. Saddam 
Hussein's] hands" suggests that this is how Saddam Hussein previously 
acquired them: they 'fell into his hands'. This of course completely removes 
the very active role which, amongst others, Britain and the United States 
played Saddam Hussein's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. 
The first two paragraphs of this article therefore structure the "crisis 
with Iraq" as a battle between the "organised forces of destruction" and 
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"responsible government". The United States is firmly cast in the of these 
second positions, despite their 'ambiguous' approach to bacteriological 
weapons proliferation and very active role in the creation of the 'force of 
destruction' that is Saddam Hussein. 10 
6.3.7 President Saddam Hussein's 'removal' from power 
The presuppositions and implications of the dominant discursive strategy 
supported an argument advocating the removal of President Saddam 
Hussein from power in Iraq. In some articles reporting Iraq and the UNSCOM 
'stand-off this argument was placed in a much more central position. In such 
articles, journalists either explicitly supported the argument, wrote about the 
argument in the form of a 'for-and-against debate', or else elliptically and 
euphemistically advocated military intervention to 'solve the problem of 
Saddam'. These articles form the focus of this next section. 
The arguments for military intervention and the possible removal of 
Saddam Hussein were presented and discussed as 'options' open to 'Us' in 
resolving the 'stand-off. In an editorial headlined 'Iraq: diminishing 
options' (12 November 1997), the Guardian presents such an argument: 
Sooner or later, the Council will almost certainly have to consider military action, 
a choice which is far from satisfactory and yet may be necessary, because not 
to take it would lead to an even worse situation. 
Perhaps most interestingly, this editorial attempts to allay the presumed 
reticence of the Guardian-reader to military aggression by describing it as a 
"far from satisfactory" option, but one which "may well be necessary, 
because not to take it would lead to an even worse situation" (emphasis 
added). Here the newspaper adopts a 'consequential ist' view to the "military 
action", based on a utilitarian principle whereby punishment - in this case the 
proposed "military action" - is "an intrinsic mischief' whose use can only be 
justified by its countering "some greater mischief or evil" (Atkin, 2000: 2). In 
achieving this criterion of justification, the Guardian suggests that not 
punishing Iraq simply would lead to an intentionally ambiguous "even worse 
situation". The editorial's argument for military intervention closely mirrors 
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the view of Downing Street at that time. Prime Minister Tony Blair was later 
quoted presenting an almost identical argument: "if he [Saddam Hussein] 
isn't stopped - and stopped soon - the effects will be worse for the whole of 
the region in the long term" ('Blair joins US in warning Iraq over hidden 
weapons', Financial Times, 29 January 1998). 
The Financial Times also summarised the 'options' which may end the 
'UNSCOM crisis' in an feature article headlined 'Saddam stand-off' (20 
January 1998) - the overheadline to the article stated 'DAVID GARDNER 
LOOKS AT THE LIMITED OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH A DEFIANT IRAQI 
REGIME'. To the journalist's credit, the article argues that all "the limited 
options" will be limited in success: the American demand for "full 
compliance" is described as almost unenforceable; previous cruise missile 
attacks only served to "strengthen Mr Saddam"; and the much discussed 
"targeted attacks against ... weapons 
installations" are also dismissed since 
"there is little guarantee such strikes would hit easily concealable germ and 
nerve gas agents". The options discussed were, of course 'the limited 
options of the US and UK, presupposing that they were in the position - 
morally and physically - to take such options. Further, the article suggests 
another option: "an alternative government-in-exile to Mr Saddam, with a 
generous programme to reconstruct Iraq built around it. " This "option" open 
to 'the West' is not objected to as strongly as with the others - the journalist 
merely suggests that it "is unlikely to yield short-term results" (emphasis 
added). This implies that it may not be entirely unsuccessful, an implication 
given further weight in the following sentence: "Mr Saddam is not alone in 
realising that a lot can happen in six months". The failures of the alternative 
'options' suggested appear even more marked in light of this partial criticism. 
This, along with Gardner describing the deposition of Saddam Hussein as 
signalling 'the West's' "good intentions" suggests that the long-term removal 
of the "defiant Iraqi regime" is the "option" which he is endorsing. 
Articles that referred to military intervention without explicitly arguing 
that the assassination or deposition of Saddam Hussein should be a war aim 
were in the main printed in the more 'liberal' newspapers such as the 
Guardian and the Independent. However, due to the personification of the 
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coverage previously discussed, the proposed aggression still appeared to be 
directed at Saddam Hussein. Occasionally euphemisms, such as 'the 
regime' or 'the military', were employed by the sampled newspapers as the 
target of aggression. The headline of an article printed in the Independent 
(29 January 1998), 'Pentagon hints at blitz on Saddam's military elite', 
not only used such a euphemism but also employed the culturally resonant 
term "blitz" to describe the attack itself. Further, Tony Blair is quoted arguing 
that "if he [Saddam Hussein] isn't stopped ... the effects will 
be worse for the 
whole world". 
The 'consequentialist defence' used in a Guardian editorial discussed 
above, is also drawn upon in a column printed by the Guardian, headlined 
'Still armed and dangerous' (31 January 1998). The column, written by 
. 
Martin Woolacott, 'debates' the possible ways in which 'We' are to 'deal with 
Saddam', with the overheadline of the article illustrating its primary 
argument: 'DROPPING BOMBS ON IRAQ MAY BE THE LEAST WORST 
OPTION'. He rightly suggests that "bombing Iraq with the intention of 
destroying part of the regime's mass-destruction capacity is a risky business 
that will not bring an easy solution to the problem posed by Saddam". 
However, his evaluation that bombing "will not bring an easy solution" 
suggests that it will bring 'a solution' nonetheless. 
He then goes on to identify further "problems" with destroying "the 
regime's mass-destruction capacity": 
After four or six or 10 days of bombing, what if Saddam is still defiant? What if 
the bombing should inadvertently spread chemical or biological stocks? What if 
the bombing left intact some biological or chemical capacity? 
These problems and others are swept aside in the final paragraph however, 
where Woolacott concludes: 
There is no answer to these questions, except to say that alternative, if it is to 
let Saddam prevail, is worse. This is a deep game, and it should be played with 
the intention of denying him the advantage and not with any predisposition to 
either force or diplomacy, even if it seems likely that force, for all its manifest 
disadvantages, will in the end be needed. 
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This, I feel, is one of the most depressing passages of the sampled Iraq 
articles for three reasons. First, Woolacott is essentially arguing for war: a 
war on Iraq's WoMD; a war on Saddam Hussein. This war is justified, he 
feels, despite the appalling possibility of large numbers of Iraqi civilians 
being killed by the inadvertent "spread [of] chemical and biological stocks", 
the Iraqis who would inevitably be killed by 'allied' bombs and the Iraqis who 
would no doubt be killed by Saddam Hussein in predictable massacres of 
'treacherous' or rebellious civilians in the north and south of Iraq. Woolacott 
skips over these very real possibilities - there is, he states "no answer to 
these questions" - in favour of implying that letting "Saddam prevail" would 
be 'worse for the world'. 
Second, Woolacott suggests that the strategy towards Iraq "is a deep 
game" which should be played without "any predisposition to either force or 
diplomacy". Aside from the fact that he appears to show a very clear 
predisposition towards using "force" to solve the "problem" of Saddam, the 
very idea that "force" and "diplomacy" should be regarded as equally 
acceptable courses of action is appalling, showing an incredibly lax regard 
for Iraqi life. That this disregard can then be labelled a "game", albeit a 
"deep" one (whatever that is meant to mean) I find particularly disturbing. 
Third, the proposed violence is backed despite Woolacott acknowledging 
that Saddam Hussein may remain in power and "defiant" at the end of it all. It 
is undoubtedly the case that Saddam Hussein and his regime are both guilty 
and capable of despicable and unimaginable acts of cruelty. But it is sad that 
a columnist in a 'quality' British newspaper found himself able to argue for a 
course of action which could conceivably result in comparably pernicious 
effects, yet which also seems to offer little or no possibility of changing the 
circumstances which precipitated such action. 
The assassination of Saddam Hussein was an 'option' which, the 
sampled newspapers argued, was being backed with some vigour in the 
United States. Several of the sampled Iraq articles focused centrally upon 
the arguments being put `for' and 'against' this course of action by the 
American 'public', American politicians and American newspapers. The 
Guardian for example printed an article reporting American support for the 
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assassination of Saddam Hussein, in an article headlined 'Public opinion 
wants Clinton to `sock it to Saddam" (15 November 1997). The Telegraph 
also printed an article, headlined 'Tired of words, Americans want to end 
the `Beast of Baghdad" (13 November 1997), which argued strongly for the 
assassination of Saddam Hussein. The article opens by employing the 
openly rhetorical figure "The Average American" (capitals in original), 
representing an argumentum ad populum, or `appeal to group feeling' in 
support for the argument in the headline. The article also quotes Thomas 
Friedman of the New York Times, a quite notorious hawk, who wrote: 
Saddam Hussein is the reason God invented cruise missiles... Cruise missiles 
are simply the only way to deal with him.... So if and when Saddam pushes 
beyond the brink, and we get that one good shot, lets make sure its a head 
shot. 
A third article on this subject, headlined 'America considers how to bring 
about the death of a President', was printed in The Times (18 November 
1997). Where this article differs considerably is in the fact that it more 
accurately locates the 'ASSASSINATION DEBATE', referred to in the leader, 
with elite political commentators, such as Friedman cited above, and the 
American government. The journalist - again, Ian Brodie - quotes American 
notables who back the plan to assassinate Hussein: "George 
Stephanopoulos, formerly a close aide to President Clinton, said: 'We should 
kill him. "' To his credit however, Brodie quotes an "Executive Order' of the 
United States which shows that such a course of action would not only break 
International laws, but would also contravene American domestic law: 
Execution of foreign leaders by government agents was outlawed by Executive 
Order 12333 signed by President Reagan, It says: 'No person employed by or 
acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire 
to engage in, assassination. ' 
Unfortunately the importance of this paragraph to the options being 'debated' 
was de-emphasised through it being placed as the penultimate paragraph of 
the article. This is, of course, a significant observation. Should it have been 
placed as the second paragraph - after where the article states "A debate is 
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growing in the United States over the moral and practical issues of 
assassinating President Saddam Hussein" - then the article would have 
given a very strong implication that the assassination of Saddam Hussein 
should not even be discussed, never mind considered as a 'moral' or 
'practical' option. This would clearly undermine the 'ideological square' 
present across the sampled Iraq articles, previously discussed whereby only 
Iraqi actions are represented as 'illegal'. Needless to say the "Executive 
Order" which made it illegal for the United States to "engage in, or conspire 
to engage in" the assassination of Saddam Hussein, is conspicuously absent 
from all other sampled Iraq articles, in The Times and the other titles, both 
previous to and following its inclusion in this one article. 
Finally in this section, there were articles which did not displace the 
focus of 'the debate' on whether to assassinate Saddam Hussein to America, 
and instead argued that Britain should be involved in 'removing' Hussein 
from power. Articles based on such argumentation were predominantly 
columns, editorials and features articles, although argumentation of this sort 
was also present in an abbreviated form in other formats. A letter, written by 
Ahmad Chalabi and printed in The Times for example (14 November 1997), 
argued: "It is now time for a new Iraq policy, one that will end Saddam's 
regime". Later, Mr Chalabi states that this policy should be two-fold, first 
'removing' Saddam Hussein, then the remainder of his regime: 
Britain should take the lead in taking effective action to remove Saddam.... This 
would be followed by concerted support for the democratic Iraqi Opposition to 
work from its base in northern Iraq to oust the regime and establish a 
government that respects democracy, human rights and international law. 
Presumably Mr Chalabi, as the President of the exiled Iraqi National 
Congress, already had somebody from the "democratic Iraqi Opposition" 
(capitals in original) in mind to govern Iraq, when he wrote this letter. 
The Guardian printed a column headlined 'Weapons and oil set fire 
to UN sanctions in Iraq' (8 November 1997) which also argued for the 
'removal' of Saddam Hussein, but the most detailed plan was printed in a 
Financial Times editorial, headlined 'Clear goals on Iraq' (17 November 
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1997). The plan they proposed had three elements: "First, the US should 
make absolutely clear that if Iraq complies with UN resolutions, sanctions will 
be lifted". It is remarkable that the dropping of sanctions actually needed to 
be suggested as part of 'the plan' as opposed to a natural consequence of 
Iraqi compliance. The following line mitigates this proposed compliance 
however: "It is likely Mr Saddam will never comply. But only a clear 
statement of rewards and punishments can win broad backing [for military 
aggression]". The 'carrot' of lifting sanctions is therefore proposed as a 
'show concession' with which to garner support for bombing Iraq - the real 
Anglo-American policy. 
The proposed 'FT plan' continued. The third element suggested a 
"time limit" in which to "rebuild allied cohesion around clearly defined goals", 
but it is the second aspect of the plan which is most relevant here: "Second, 
the US and its allies should start thinking about an alternative government- 
in-exile to Saddam, and design a programme to reconstruct Iraq around it". 
This is a remarkable statement, which, should it have been adopted, would 
quite obviously transgress the most basic and fundamental notions of state 
sovereignty. That the Financial Times could actively and openly propose 
what can only be described as a state-sponsored coup as the 'best option' to 
adopt, not only shows the extent to which geo-political interests are able to 
side-step international law when expedient, but also the way that such 
illegality can be transformed into 'virtue'. 
To summarise: the discursive strategy featured in Figure 6.1 (see 
page 242) formed the principle thematic feature of the sampled Iraq articles. 
The presuppositions and implications of this strategy supported an argument 
which firstly advocated military intervention in Iraq and secondly, but less 
frequently, advocated the assassination - or the more euphemistic 'removal' 
- of President Saddam Hussein from power. 'We' can only (metaphorically) 
'unleash' this (euphemistic) 'military action', if 'We' are actually able to do so. 
'Our' physical and moral ability to bomb Iraq is presupposed in most articles 
and forms a central argumentative claim in others. It appears from the 
articles discussed, that the reporting of the UNSCOM 'stand-off' constitutes a 
'type' -a 'Discourse of Military Intervention' - in which the lexical, syntactic, 
274 
semantic and structural choices in the texts are functional to their pragmatic 
role: justifying bombing Iraq and 'removing' Saddam Hussein. 
6.3.8 Articles contesting the dominant discursive strategy 
There were articles which dissented from the discursive strategy analysed 
and presented. Such articles were very much in the minority, and tended to 
be concentrated in columns and readers' letters. They contested the 
dominant discursive strategy at all levels, but tended to focus on three 
points. Examples of each will now be discussed. 
The first dissenting strategy of the sampled articles, was to argue that 
Britain and the US do not propose to attack all countries which break 
international law. This entails an inconsistency on the part of Britain and the 
US, which in turn implies that their actions towards Iraq are unjust. A 
reader's letter, written by Cathy Aitchison and printed in the Guardian (15 
November 1997) makes this point quite forcefully. The whole of the letter 
reads: 
How dare the US strut around the world, insisting on complete compliance with 
UN resolutions which suit it and ignoring those which don't? 
Arguments from this strategy were clearly intended to undermine the 
presupposed 'moral basis' for the attacks. 
Israel was the country most frequently referred to as 'escaping' the 
criticism of the UN and the military wrath of 'the West'. A Guardian column, 
written by Paul Foot and headlined 'State terrorism unpunished by the UN' 
(17 November 1997), makes such an argument. The first paragraph sets the 
scene, purposefully not mentioning the country whose "terrorism" has gone 
unpunished in order to highlight the hypocrisy of the American position 
toward Iraq: 
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Senior UN officials have looked on helplessly as angry UN resolutions have 
been repeatedly ignored. Murderous invasions of a neighbouring country, all of 
them banned by the UN Charter and overwhelmingly condemned by the 
General Assembly, have been carried out with impunity. At the same time there 
has been mounting oppression, torture and house-bombing against opposition 
forces, and secret stockpiling of a nuclear arsenal. The regime concerned in Tel 
Aviv. No state on earth has shown such cynical disregard for the UN as has 
Israel. 
Much of what is written in the above paragraph is unquestionably correct. It 
was however referred to only very rarely in these Iraq articles, and nowhere 
in language as emotive as in Paul Foot's article. The rhetoric is particularly 
powerful: UN officials are 'helpless'; UN resolutions are "angry" but are 
"repeatedly ignored"; Israel does not just 'invade' but does so 'murderously' 
and "with impunity" and has used "oppression, torture and house-bombing 
against opposition forces". In fact, so emotive is the language that the reader 
may be persuaded into thinking that Foot is 'biased', 'unobjective' or else 
has an agenda in criticising Israel. 
Further down the article he quotes Geoff Simons from his "recent 
book on the United Nations" where he states: "Israel is currently in violation, 
to a greater or lesser extent, of UN resolutions 338,465,476,672,673 and 
681. " In addition he argues: "In 1996 Israel bombed south Lebanon again, 
targeting a UN base and killing hundreds of refugees who were sheltering 
there". This section provides particularly compelling evidence of the extent to 
which Israel 'defies' international law, and perhaps goes some way to 
supporting the rhetorical accusation of "State terrorism" in the headline. But 
in answer to the question "Will the UN go in? ", Foot concludes: 
No it won't. ... Ignoring UN resolutions and building up nuclear arsenals only become matters for armed intervention when the regime concerned is 
(temporarily) hostile to the United States and cheap oil supplies are in peril. 
Here not only is the hypocrisy of the proposed anti-Iraqi attacks exposed, but 
a reason for these attacks is also given: the geo-political and economic 
interests of America. This accusation of base American self-interest goes a 
long way to undermining the presupposed 'moral' basis to the military 
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intervention. As stated above, such arguments were rarely made and never 
with such ferocity. 
Second, some articles questioned the alleged 'precision accuracy' of 
'Western' military hardware. These articles based their criticisms on the low 
success rate of weaponry used in the 1991 attacks on Iraq, and occasionally 
attempted to derail the claim that such weapons could be used as part of an 
'ethical' bombing strategy. One article, headlined Can America match its 
mouth with its muscle? ' and printed in the Independent (15 November 
1997), presented a wealth of evidence taken from "a highly critical report by 
the [US] General Accounting Office (GAO)", to support the argument that 
"American air power was nothing like as accurate or effective in the Gulf War 
as was claimed by the Pentagon. " The report from the GAO, reproduced in 
part by the Independent, "systematically deflates the claims, made by 
manufacturers and the US Department of Defence alike, for the 
effectiveness of most weapons systems. " For example, the ability of the "air- 
to-ground Maverick missile, costing $100,000 (£61,000) each, to hit anything 
was impaired or sometimes made impossible by clouds, haze, smoke and 
dust. " Further, the US-led coalition was only able to hit: 
multi-story buildings and other large immobile targets with accuracy. Thus, US 
planes hit telecommunications towers, the oil refinery and power station at 
Doura on the capital's southern outskirts as well as bridges spanning the Tigris. 
But it could not destroy smaller mobile targets such as tanks and artillery 
pieces. 
What this therefore means is that the "civilian infrastructure is easy to hit, but 
not the security and military apparatus. " This argument enables the reader to 
infer that Iraqi civilians were not and hence probably will not avoid being hurt 
or killed by the proposed 'Western' attacks. 
The third dissenting argumentative strategy argued against the whole 
basis for military intervention. By this strategy, the claims offered by the 
dominant strategy were generally accepted - Saddam Hussein was defying 
the international will; He was a bad man; and international law should be 
upheld - but the implied conclusion, that we should therefore intervene 
militarily, was rejected in favour of non-violent action. A series of five 
277 
readers' letters, printed in the Guardian (17 November 1997) made such an 
argument, although the headline that they were placed under -'Let America 
fight its own battles' - appeared to suggest that they were actually 
objecting to British involvement in bombing Iraq rather than opposing the 
bombing of Iraq per se. One of these letters even criticised the decision of 
the Guardian to include 
a big picture of an American warplane on the front page... Printing the picture 
can only arouse the atavistic conviction that war is exciting, which is the last 
thing the world needs in a time of international tension. This week, please give 
us a picture of diplomats working hard to keep war at bay. 
Leonard Pepper, Oxford 
By far the most significant of these five letters, in terms of size (it was the 
largest), placement (it is positioned first), content and political importance, 
was written by four Members of Parliament - Tony Benn, Tam Dalyell, Ken 
Livingstone and John McDonnell - accompanied by Ron Huzzard and Rae 
Street. The approach taken in this letter is to shift the role of the 'aggressor' 
towards the American and British governments, which in turn helps to 
negativise the 'Western' approach to Iraq. This is illustrated in the letter's 
opening paragraph: 
We note with concern the growing threat by the United States of yet another 
military attack on Iraq, backed by the British government. ... There is no justification for bombing Iraq yet again, almost seven years since the end of the 
Gulf War. 
Lower down, the letter attacks the stated reason for America's continuing 
support for military attacks on Iraq, and suggests an alternative theory for 
this proposed aggression: 
We suspect that Washington's continued belligerence towards Iraq has little to 
do with saving the world from destruction and much to do with protecting US 
domination of the world's oil supplies. 
Here the mitigation of the claim - "We suspect" - is counteracted by the 
rhetorical strength of the claim itself - "continued belligerence" and 
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"protecting US domination". Their dismissal of the US stated war aim is 
enabled by the letter's use of hyperbole - "saving the world from destruction" 
ridicules the US in its self-appointed role of protector. 
The derisory tone of the letter is heightened by its claim that perhaps 
"the safety of the world would be better served if weapons of mass 
destruction were removed from ... countries like the US and Britain". 
What 
this sentence does is quite cleverly redefine the American 'war aim' of 
"saving the world from destruction" into meaning 'removing weapons of mass 
destruction'. This definition enables the authors to allege an inconsistency 
on the part of the US: 
Israel is known to be a nuclear weapons state and has been defying UN 
resolutions for years. Yet the US does not threaten to bomb it, nor should it. 
Likewise, Turkey's recent military incursions into the north of Iraq in pursuit of 
the Kurds have gone unchallenged. 
Therefore, the authors are using an example of the first dissenting strategy 
discussed above - alleged inconsistencies - in order to contest the US 
argument for military aggression. This constitutes a strategic rhetorical use 
of the topic potential on offer to the authors of the letter, since to argue 
inconsistent adherence to a principle does not refute the applicability of the 
principle in the case discussed. However, the letter aims to show how the 
arguments offered by the US and Britain - weapons of mass destruction, 
international law - do not justify bombing Iraq since these same arguments 
apply in the case of Israel and Turkey. There must therefore be an 
alternative reason why the US wants to bomb Iraq - which the letter suggests 
is the US desire to maintain its "domination of the world's oil supplies", an 
argument which is immoral and therefore unacceptable. 
A column, written by Joan Smith and headlined 'Can six slighted 
Americans be worth a war? ' (Independent on Sunday, 16 November 1997), 
combined the three dissenting strategies introduced above. The first 
paragraph picks up on the theme of 'military superiority' present in articles 
reporting the UNSCOM `stand-off': 
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Pictures in newspapers of men carrying missiles. Sketch maps of the Middle 
East accompanied by lists of weaponry. Agency photos of an American airman, 
Jamie Downey, washing `an EA-6B Prowler' aircraft of USS Nimitz in the Gulf. 
Whether or not the Western allies intend to go to war ... one thing 
is clear: 
rampant technophilia has broken out again. 
Smith's distaste at journalism's preoccupation with military equipment is 
clear from this excerpt. This "technophilia", she continues lower down, 
continues in the pages of newspapers despite the widely acknowledged 
"truth about the bombardment of Iraq" in 1991 where despite "excited reports 
of the astonishing accuracy of new weapons systems, ... most of 
it failed to 
reach its target". The section concludes by stating: 
Perhaps the technology has improved dramatically in the five-and-a-half years 
since the war ended. It seems equally likely that the same old propaganda is 
being pumped out again. 
Smith's suggestion that the technology would have to "improve dramatically' 
emphasises her point that the weapons used were incredibly inaccurate. Her 
use of the term "propaganda" again highlights her great distaste at the use of 
the newspapers in promoting such material - and indeed the participation of 
the newspapers in this promotion. Her reference to "five-and-a-half years 
since the war ended" is itself either widely inaccurate or extremely 
subversive, since it suggests that the war did not end until March 1992. 
suspect this was an error of addition on her part. 
In the second section of the column, Smith moves on to ask the 
question which had seemed to escape discussion for much of the sampled 
Iraq articles: "Why, in any case, are we considering further military action 
against Iraq? " The inconsistency of the argument for military attacks when 
compared with American inaction over Indonesia and Israel - "only two 
examples [who] have ignored UN resolutions without facing the threat of 
military action" (my emphasis) - and the seeming insistence of "successive 
British governments ... to sell arms to the 
[Indonesian] regime" is exposed. 
These examples are used in the same way as they are in the letter from 
Tony Benn et al discussed above - as evidence that arguing for aggression 
on the ground of Iraq breaking international law simply doesn't hold any 
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water. In its place, Smith offers an alternative argument which had started to 
gain in popularity: 
This may play well in the United States, where Bill Clinton's troubled presidency 
requires a series of distractions, but it looks to me more like posturing than a 
principled response by the international community to the long-term problem of 
how to deal with Saddam's thoroughly unpleasant regime. (emphasis added) 
The unfortunate effect that the prepositional 'to me' has, is to root the claim 
in the subjective opinion of a columnist as opposed to objective 'fact'. This is 
true of the vast majority of articles discussed in this last section - indeed only 
one of these articles is not the 'opinion' of either a reader or a columnist. 
As suggested above, the lack of dissent in the sampled Iraq news 
reports may be partly the result of the space required to support a claim 
which contests the dominant discursive strategy. On the other hand, should 
the news reports have been more critical regarding the claims made by US 
and British officials, not providing column space for them to 'warn Iraq not to 
make their threats', and approached the proposed military aggression as an 
intrinsic evil which must be used with restraint and only where no other 
option could bring possible success, then dissent would have been possible 
in the most abbreviated of reports. The decisions of journalists and 
newspapers to accept, and in most cases support, the argument to direct 
military aggression at Iraq for the crimes of its government, must be viewed 
in light of this. 
6.3.9 The importance of UNSCOM to 'unconnected' Iraq articles 
The story of the UNSCOM weapons inspections and 'stand-off dominated 
the articles reporting Iraq. There were however a few articles which, on the 
surface at least, appeared to report Iraq and Iraqi actors from a different 
frame of reference that that provided by the UNSCOM crisis. One story, 
reported by the sampled newspapers on 6 November 1997, involving the 
sentencing of six Iraqi men for the hijack of a civil aircraft appeared to 
provide an opportunity for archetypal 'crime' reports. In a report headlined 
'Lenient sentence for Iraqi hijackers' printed by the Guardian, it was the 
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hijackers themselves who appeared to be given more sympathy than the 
victims of the ordeal: 
Acknowledging the horrors the men had suffered in their homeland, and a plea 
by the jurors for lenience, the judge said the men had carried out an offence of 
the greatest possible gravity and that he had to jail them in order to deter 
others. (emphasis added) 
The journalist, Allison Daniels, appears to feel so strongly that these Iraqi 
men represent "worthy victims" of an enemy regime (see Herman & 
Chomsky, 1994: 37-87) that the victims of the crime itself are almost 
forgotten. The Iraqi men's actions are described as "an offence of the 
greatest possible gravity"; the third paragraph states that the passengers 
and crew "had all been terrified"; and three paragraphs later it states in an 
almost cursory way that "an air hostess was taken hostage and a passenger 
was stabbed". No other mention of the distress or injuries to passengers or 
crew are made for the remaining 103 centimetres of column space. This, 
compared with the repeated references made to the "horrors", the 
"unimaginable torture" and the "20th century hell" experienced by the men in 
Saddam Hussein's Iraq. 
One would perhaps expect the Telegraph, as a traditionally 
conservative newspaper, to take a different line on the (lenient) sentencing 
of these hijackers than that taken by the Guardian. And indeed they did, but 
the sympathies of the newspaper were still firmly placed with the hijackers, to 
a degree which they were not in, for example, the more recent case of the 
Afghani jet hijacking at Stansted airport. These sympathies are suggested in 
the headline to the article: 'Asylum-seekers jailed for jet hijack' (6 
November 1997). This headline foregrounds the 'victimhood' of the Iraqi men 
in a way which alternative headlines focusing on their criminality, such as 
'Muslim hijackers seek asylum', wouldn't. In the fourth paragraph, the report 
states that the hijackers, 
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gave evidence of the brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime, the deaths, 
disappearance, torture and sexual abuse of members of their families and 
friends. Several had been sentenced to death for refusing to join the Iraqi army 
to fight against fellow Shi'ites. (emphasis added) 
By contrast, the victims of the hijacking are mentioned in the seventh 
paragraph, where the judge states that they "must have been 'reduced to 
abject terror' by the threats and were not to know that the men brandishing 
knives and fake grenades were not fanatical terrorists" (emphasis added). 
This very effectively acknowledges the distress which the passengers and 
crew were no doubt in, but at the same time reduces it, by stating that they 
were never in any 'real' danger since these men "were not fanatical 
terrorists". 
This report, and the previous report from the Guardian, are therefore 
functional to the dominant discursive strategy present across much of the 
Iraq articles reporting the UNSCOM 'stand-off. The claims and explanations 
of the Iraqi hijackers' actions are all related directly to the "horror", the 
"terror", the "death" and "torture" which is seemingly routine in Saddam 
Hussein's Iraq. The claims of these articles therefore support the argument 
for military aggression on the grounds of 'humanitarian need' - the Iraqis 
want us to bomb their country and rid them of their dictator - and are perhaps 
all the more persuasive precisely because they appear, at first reading, to 
'be about' a completely different event. 
The sampled newspapers displayed a particularly low level of interest 
in Iraqi civil society, as indicated by the topics of the sampled Iraq articles in 
Tables 6.8,6.9,6.10 and 6.11. Moreover, most of these articles are written 
from a position in which the 'threat of Iraq' - militarily, civilly and socially - is 
emphasised. This can be illustrated quite clearly if we examine, for example, 
two articles which coded 'travel' as their primary topic. Both of these articles 
are on the same subject -a British national, Phil Haines, visiting Iraq as a 
tourist in order to complete his personal ambition to visit every sovereign 
country on Earth - but interestingly, they are published over two months 
apart and by different newspapers. 
The first story was headlined 'Last stop for the man who has been 
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everywhere' and was printed in the Independent on Sunday (23 November 
1997). The primary aim of the text was to present the actions of Mr Haines 
as an "achievement". What the text therefore presents throughout is an 
argument to the effect that: 
'The travels of Phil Haines form a great achievement' 
The journalist provides two supports for this claim: 
1. 'Mr Haines has been to all 192 sovereign countries' 
2. 'The latest countries read like a list of war zones' 
How this story is connected to Iraq is in the textual realisation of the second 
supporting reason, wherein Iraq is cited as the latest in this "list of war 
zones: Afghanistan, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia and now Iraq". 
The threat of these war zones to Mr Haines' personal safety must 
necessarily be emphasised in order for the text to remain coherent. The 
threat posed by Iraq was achieved via alluding to the familiar, high-profile 
UNSCOM story. In fact, the audience's familiarity with the ongoing saga of 
weapons inspections is relied upon, since, without either direct reference or 
explanation, the journalist derives claims of the unaccommodating nature of 
Iraq directly from this recent history. This is noticeable in the first paragraph 
(numbered here for ease of reference), where both the action and the actors 
are identified without any further contextualisation of the nature and 
relevance of the surrounding events: 
[1] Not even the threat of war, nor nuclear attack, [2] could have stopped Phil 
Haines from going on holiday to Iraq last week. [3] While US and British forces 
menaced the Gulf, [4] he and a few friends were cheerfully speeding towards 
the almost deserted Karameh border post [5] - and a remarkable record. 
Here, the journalist is simply presenting Iraq as a dangerous place to be. 
The mention in clause 4 of the "US and British forces menac[ing] the Gulf' 
must also be read in connection to instrumental aim of the text to represent 
Iraq as a war zone. Thus, although it is novel to see 'the Allies' represented 
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as "menac[ing] the Gulf', the sentence supports the argument that the Gulf is 
'a generally threatening place to be', and as such remains functional within 
the text. Indeed, describing the "forces" (interesting that they are not Armies) 
in such a way, without the luxury of being informed of their motivation, 
perhaps increases the perceived threat, since such threats seem undirected, 
open-ended and unexplained. 
In summary then, in order for the second supporting reason - 'The 
latest countries read like a list of war zones' - to be accepted, the journalist 
needs to provide a concise example of a war zone. The easiest way to do 
this is to provide an archetypal 'war zone' which Mr Haines has visited. 
Thus, Iraq is offered in such a way, as intellectual shorthand for 'war zone', 
drawing upon perceptions of the country which it can be assumed were fairly 
well inscribed in the imagination of the public at that time. 
The second article, headlined 'Fancy a trip to Iraq? ' and printed in 
the Telegraph (31 January 1998), prefers to adopt the more familiar travel 
writing genre. The use of the headline shown above, and the adoption of 
some of the formal features of travel writing - the recommended company, 
centred around a 'package deal', suggestions of excursions and sites of 
interest - so soon after 'the UNSCOM stand-off had received such a detailed 
and extended coverage, are clearly intended to be read as ironic. The 
situation in Iraq with regard to weapons inspections would be well known to 
anyone with a passing interest in current affairs, and this knowledge is 
alluded to in the first paragraph of the article: 
[1] With a task force gathering in the Gulf, [2] diplomats shuttling furiously, [3] 
and Saddam Hussein growling defiance, [4] one man is still determined to take 
his Easter holiday in Iraq. [5] And for £1,350 you can go, too. 
Once again, we see the assumptions of the journalist coming to the fore. The 
above passage is written on the assumption that the audience will know who 
the actors referred to are, and the relations between them: who constitutes 
the 'task force', what the diplomats are attempting to achieve with their 
'shuttling', and most importantly who Saddam Hussein is and to whom he is 
'growling defiance'. But just in case the reader did not know the exactitudes 
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of the crisis, the sentence is structured in such a way to imply an unattractive 
situation regardless of details. The whole of the first three clauses, with the 
addition of the adverb 'still' in [4], function as a adverbial phrase contingent 
to the central fourth clause. Other adverbs signalling contingency include 
'although', and 'despite', thus an alternative way of writing the sentence 
could have been: 
[1-3] Despite [this], [4] one man is determined to take his Easter holiday in Iraq. 
This alternative version would have functioned adequately, communicating, 
as it does, that the man in question is determined to holiday in Iraq, 
regardless of the obstacles placed in front of him. What this stylistic variant 
doesn't offer, however, is the sense of drama which results from placing 
such emphasis on the word `still': thus, "[despite all this] one man is still 
determined to take his Easter holiday in Iraq" - an invitation which is 
extended to the reader in exchange for the rather princely sum of £1,350. 
Thus, evidence is provided to show that Iraq is, depending on your 
point of view, somewhere between a rather dubious choice for a holiday and 
a potential death-trap. The journalist seems to sense that not enough 
evidence has been provided to prove the undesirable nature of Iraq, and the 
second paragraph acknowledges this, stating: 
[6] It may not be everybody's idea of the perfect package, [7] but Phil Haines, 
[8] the director of Live Ltd, [9] a travel company he runs from his home in 
Twickenham, Middlesex, [10] is determined to go ahead with it. 
At this point in the article, the only information provided for the reader on 
which to base a decision of whether or not this is their "perfect [holiday] 
package", is that which is alluded to regarding the general nature of Iraq: the 
gathering task force, shuttle diplomacy and the 'canine' (cf. "growling") 
Saddam Hussein. It is highly doubtful that this would appeal to very many 
people at all, and hence the use of 'not everybody' (line 6) is clearly 
intended to be ironic, transgressing, as it does, the Gricean maxim of 
'Quality' (1967: 53). But there are some people to whom this holiday - with 
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it's fair share of adrenaline - may appeal, so it become necessary, in the 
third paragraph, to further pervert the travel writing genre through citing 
some of what the journalist calls the 'highlights' of the holiday: 
[11] A gruelling journey overland from Jordan, [12] an Aids test at the border, 
[13] and a room at a hotel where you are invited to wipe your feet on a mosaic 
of George Bush [14] are among the highlights. 
The choice of the three elements given as "the highlights" (clauses 11-13) is 
interesting, and deserves further examination. First, the choice of the 
adjective "gruelling" provides Iraq with a very obviously negative frame of 
reference from the onset. Second, each of the three cited "highlights" are 
signifiers of stereotypical representations of the Middle East and, by 
association, Iraq. Taking each one in turn: 
1. "A gruelling journey overland from Jordan": peripheral nation; substandard 
transportation [cf. gruelling]; 
2. "an Aids test at the border": unclean/unhealthy; intrusive; suspicious; 
3. "wipe your feet on a mosaic of George Bush": grudge-bearing; anti-western 
As such, these elements - considered by the journalist to characterise the 
holiday - must be viewed as part of the greater stylistic register from which 
they are drawn: the Middle East as socially and culturally un(der)developed. 
Lastly, the three elements are mentioned as being among the 
highlights, implying that there are others. What this means is that the 
journalist has played a visibly active role in the choice of what to single out 
as worthy of particular reference, as opposed to alternate options. Three of 
these 'other', presumably less illustrious, highlights, are backgrounded in the 
text, relegated to the latter half of a sentence, two thirds of the way down the 
article: 
Visas are arranged through an agency in Baghdad, and stops will include the 
souks in that city, the Hanging Gardens of Babylon and the ziggurat at Ur. 
This structuring of information is highly significant, since foregrounding 
information in this way encourages a reading in which the three stereotypical 
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elements (in clauses 11-14) are granted a higher significance than that 
accorded to one of the Wonders of the Ancient World. The mention of these 
tourist sites appears almost as a concession to the main argument of the 
article, that 'Iraq is an undesirable place to visit'. But the added information 
cannot be regarded as a concession in the truest sense of the word since 
despite the introduction of this new contestive material, the article continues 
along much the same lines as it did previously. In this sense, the information 
operates as another "show concession", ostensibly providing "evidence that 
the speaker appreciates the other side's point of view, displaying to listeners 
that the speaker is not wholly blind to other's positions" (Antaki & Wetherell, 
1999: 24). The article gains a sense of 'objectivity' through the inclusion of 
the concession, and the argument being presented about Iraq being an 
undesirable place to visit becomes all the more convincing because of it. 
To summarise: what function do these texts play? Gill and Whedbee 
(1997) try to encourage critics to "view texts as pragmatic: a rhetorical text 
responds to or interacts with societal issues or problems, and it produces 
some action upon or change in the world" (p. 161). Adopting their approach, 
it is instructive to bear in mind that these texts were originally printed during 
or immediately following large peaks in the number of articles reporting Iraq - 
23 November 1997 and 31 January 1998 (see Graphs 6.1 and 6.2). It 
therefore seems highly suspect that the only two `travel' articles covering 
Iraq in the sample, occur in close proximity to these large peaks in reporting. 
The UNSCOM stand-off is present in the two articles in the form of a 
assumed threat: it is cited as a reason for not visiting, and hence learning 
about the nation and its peoples. This lack of understanding is highly 
functional to the interventionist aims of the sampled newspapers' dominant 
discursive strategy, a point also made by Traber and Davis (1991): 
Ignorance of the affairs of a nation's ordinary people is useful in the 
construction of the image of an enemy. The less we know of the enemy the 
easier it is to create the image that we wish. The mass media have built up or, 
at least, reinforced a social cosmology which divides the world into angels and 
devils, the good and the bad (Traber & Davis (1991: 9) cited in Keeble, 1997: 
59). 
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Since the research chose to take a comprehensive sample of newspapers 
within a limited time frame, as opposed to a selective longitudinal sample, I 
cannot draw any further conclusions regarding the frequency with which this 
happens. It could be argued that the UNSCOM stand-off was ongoing for the 
whole of the four month sample, and as such, would form the assumed 
backdrop to any article regarding travelling within Iraq. However, as I have 
attempted to show above, the two articles in question can hardly be 
regarded as conventional examples of the 'travel writing' genre. Rather they 
seem to be developing a 'stay at home' genre when it comes to travelling to 
'threatening Iraq', an agenda which seems highly functional to the broader 
concerns of reporting the UNSCOM stand-off. 
Notes: Chapter 6 
The nationalities of primary actors not cited in Table 6.12 were: Bosnian (n= 1); 
Egyptian (n= 3); Iranian (n= 1); Jordanian (n= 5); Kuwaiti (n= 2); Libyan (n= 1); 
Pakistani (n= 1); Turkish (n= 4); Yemeni (n= 1); Palestinian (n= 2); Kashmiri (n= 1); 
'Arab' (n= 1); French (n= 3); German (n= 3); Canadian (n= 1); Australian (n= 6); 
Chinese (n= 1); Irish (n= 1); Icelandic (n= 1); 'EU' (n= 1); 'multiple non-Muslim 
countries' (n= 1); 'unknown' (n= 2); and 'western' (n= 2). 
2 The seeming concordance of views between the head of UNSCOM and the US 
drew criticism from some quarters. Eric Rouleau (French Ambassador to Turkey, 
1988-1992) for example, said that Richard Butler was at that time acting "less like 
an official observing proper diplomatic discretion than a spokesman for US views" - 
views which he "spread ... about 
in public meetings and the media in alarmist terms 
which were not borne out in his reports to the Security Council" (Le Monde 
Diplomatique (English Ed. ) 23 March 1998). These criticisms became more 
widespread later in the UNSCOM crisis. After the American bombing of Iraq on 16 
December 1998, representatives from the Russian Federation attacked Richard 
Butler, claiming that he had "artificially created" the crisis which preceded the 
bombings (UN Security Council Press Release SC/6611,3955th meeting (night) 16 
December 1998). Going further, the Russian representative claimed that "Richard 
Butler had presented a distorted picture of what was taking place in the country", 
that he had "grossly abused his authority" and that "his actions led to the sharp 
deterioration of the situation in the country" (Ibid. ). The content of Russian (and to 
a lesser extent Chinese) criticisms were not published in the press. 
3 By way of aside, I think it is interesting that this article was included for publication 
during one of the 'lulls' in coverage, when Iraq appeared to be co-operating with 
the UNSCOM inspections and all seemed well in Iraq. 
4 It is of course 'possible' that the CIA only came into possession of the tape post- 
1990, when Saddam Hussein became persona non gratis. 
5 The analysis which follows is not meant as a direct comparison with the previous 
article printed in The Times. The two articles are not offered as representative 
examples of the lexical choices made by the two newspapers across the sample 
and as such, any direct comparison is invalid. Rather, the analyses are meant to 
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illustrate the effect(s) which syntactic choices have upon representation and 
therefore understanding of the reported event. 
6 In 1996 for example, during Madelaine Albright's time as US Ambassador to the 
UN she appeared on the American programme'60 Minutes' and was asked about 
the child deaths in Iraq. Asked what she felt about the effects which the sanctions 
were having on Iraq she replied, "I think this is very hard choice, but the price we 
think is worth it" (quoted in Washington Post 17 December 1998). For the record, 
infant mortality was estimated to have increased six-fold since the onset of 
sanctions (WHO, March 1996) due in part to "one out of every four Iraqi infants 
[being] malnourished.... Chronic malnutrition among [Iraqi] children under five has 
reached 27.5 per cent" (UNICEF, May 1997). I do not think it unwarranted to 
presume that Albright would be party to statistics such as these. 
This rhetorical strategy in which everyday objects were used to 'illustrate' the 
threat posed by Saddam Hussein, specifically the ease with which he would 
apparently be able to kill large numbers of 'Us', reached a peak in the now 
infamous articles published by the British tabloid newspaper the Sun on and 
around 18 March 1998. The Sun reported that the Home Office had given an all- 
ports warning, claiming that "Iraq may launch chemical and biological attack using 
material disguised as harmless fluids. Could officers therefore be alert for any 
items which might contain harmful substances". According to the Sun, Iraq planned 
to target Britain in revenge for any military strikes. Possible containers in which 
such "harmful substances" could be found were "duty free good, including spirits, 
cosmetics, cigarette lighters and perfume sprays". The following week however, the 
alternative news agency South News quoted "former UN weapons inspector Col. 
Terry Taylor' as saying: "If it were really being sent in like this, in bottles, it's quite 
difficult to keep alive and to get it out in a form that might actually kill somebody. 
... It would only affect the person opening 
the bottle and possibly people nearby. It's 
not something that would kill hundreds of thousands of people". (South News 
Commentary, 23 March 1998). 
$ In a remarkable denial of US chemical, biological and nuclear weaponry, William 
Cohen puts Iraq's chemical and biological weapons proliferation down to a "rogue 
regime" seeking "unconventional ways of countering the vast US preponderance of 
conventional arms". Here, the term "rogue regime" is presumably used to indicate a 
stronger dislike than the usually preferred "rogue state". Cohen continues his 
deception when the Iraqi "rogue regime" is expanded to include North Korea, a 
country which he describes as being an "unpredictable and increasingly desperate 
regime armed with a very large chemical arsenal". The fact that America used 
bubonic plague against North Korea in the 1950s (see South News Commentary, 
23 March 1998), an episode which would have provided a little context to the 
article, is absent from his criticisms. 
9 This refusal is possibly due to the criticism which the United States drew from the 
General Assembly (1968-69) on their use of "defoliants", "non-lethal tear gases" 
and "other chemical agents" in the Vietnam conflict (see Shearer, 1994: 509). 
10 That Clinton chooses to use the Tokyo sarin gas attack as an analogy is also 
interesting, since Japan was another member of the Security Council during the 
UNSCOM crisis who were less than eager to launch military attacks at Iraq. 
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Chapter 7 
Division and Rejection of Muslims: the `ideological square' in 
international reporting 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises a sub-sample of reports, located in countries other 
than Britain, Iraq and Algeria. The chapter focuses predominantly on the 
reporting of Palestine, Israel, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, and draws 
occasionally on reports from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. 
The choice to concentrate on reports from these countries was based on a 
desire to analyse not only the more frequently reported nations but also a 
range of reports located both inside and outside of 'the Middle East' in which 
Islam or Muslims were presented as important factors in the reported action. ' 
I argue that these reports are founded upon a structuring of presuppositions, 
themes and arguments indicative of van Dijk's ideological square, and 
dominated by a twin process of 'division and rejection' of Muslims. In 
discussing this conclusion, the chapter is structured in three parts: the first 
introduces and discusses the quantitative data produced by content analysis 
of the selected texts. This provides a contextual base for the conclusions 
offered in the remainder of the chapter. 
The second part of the chapter (sections 7.3 - 7.4) analyses how 
'Their negativity' is constructed and represented. Four archetypal 
argumentative topoi used to depict 'Their negativity' are then discussed in 
greater detail: the military threat of Muslim countries; the threat of Muslim 
extremism; the (internal) threat to democracy posed by Muslim political 
leaders and parties; and the social threat of Muslim gender inequality. The 
third part (sections 7.5 - 7.6) analyses selected items of coverage in which 
'Our' civilising influence on or over Muslims is either implicitly assumed or 
else explicitly stated. The rhetorical conclusions of such articles represent 
an attendant implication of the ideological square's effect upon reporting: the 
positive representation of 'Our' social action. I suggest that the position 'We' 
is mutable, and often expanded to include individuals and nations which in 
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other contexts are represented as 'foreign'. This expansion of the inclusive 
'We' has significant political implications given that, under the ideological 
square, 'Our' actions are represented as acceptable and/or positive. The 
actions of the Israeli government, specifically their attempted assassination 
of Khaled Meshal, the head of Hamas' politburo, are discussed in light of this 
argument. 
7.2 Quantitative Results 
The geographical locations of recorded items analysed in this chapter are 
given below2: 
Table 7.1: Primary Country in the selected international articles 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Israel 238 15.8 15.8 15.8 
Iran 136 9.0 9.0 24.9 
Egypt 125 8.3 8.3 33.2 
Pakistan 119 7.9 7.9 41.1 
Indonesia 100 6.6 6.6 47.7 
USA 82 5.5 5.5 53.2 
Turkey 79 5.3 5.3 58.4 
Saudia Arabia 62 4.1 4.1 62.6 
Palestine 52 3.5 3.5 66.0 
Malaysia 51 3.4 3.4 69.4 
Afghanistan 43 2.9 2.9 72.3 
UK 34 2.3 2.3 74.5 
Jordan 31 2.1 2.1 76.6 
Bosnia 27 1.8 1.8 78.4 
'Arab' countries 25 1.7 1.7 80.1 
Lebanon 21 1.4 1.4 81.4 
Libya 21 1.4 1.4 82.8 
Kashmir 17 1.1 1.1 84.0 
Yemen 16 1.1 1.1 85.0 
France 16 1.1 1.1 86.1 
Bangladesh 15 1.0 1.0 87.1 
Somalia 15 1.0 1.0 88.1 
'EU' 15 1.0 1.0 89.1 
Morrocco 12 .8 .8 89.9 
UAE 12 
.8 .8 90.7 
Total 1504 100.0 100.0 
292 
Table 7.1 shows the count of primary countries for the 1504 articles 
discussed in this chapter. 3 This chapter's qualitative analysis focuses on 
items of recorded output in which Israel (n= 238; 15.8%), Palestine (n= 52; 
3.5%) or Iran (n= 136; 9.0%) are the cited primary countries (i. e. the 
geographical location of the reported action). In addition, the chapter draws 
to a lesser extent on items in which Pakistan (n= 119; 7.9%) or Turkey (n= 
79; 5.3) are the primary countries; and finally, occasional articles located in 
Saudi Arabia (n= 62; 4.1 %), Afghanistan (n= 43; 2.9%) and Jordan (n= 31; 
2.1%) are also drawn upon as illustrative examples. In this way, the later 
qualitative analysis aims to be representative of both the more frequently 
cited primary nations as well with a range of nations inside and outside of 
'the Middle East'. However, the content of all 1504 international articles will 
be summarised in the following discussion of quantitative results. 
The ratio of 'hard' to 'soft' news formats between the newspapers is 
shown below: 
Table 7.2: `Hard' and `soft' international articles, by newspaper 
Format: 'hard' or'soft' news Total 
c 
Ü 
'Hard' news 
30ö 
ýU 
c 
U 
'Soft' news 
3ö 
ýU 
Ü Ü 
Financial Times 307 92.2% 23.0% 26 7.8% 15.3% 333 100.0% 22.1% 
Guardian 329 86.1% 24.7% 53 13.9% 31.2% 382 100.0% 25.4% 
Independent 196 86.0% 14.7% 32 14.0% 18.8% 228 100.0% 15.2% 
Telegraph 211 91.7% 15.8% 19 8.3% 11.2% 230 100.0% 15.3% 
The Times 249 90.5% 18.7% 26 9.5% 15.3% 275 100.0% 18.3% 
loS 15 68.2% 1.1% 7 31.8% 4.1% 22 100.0% 1.5% 
Sunday Times 27 79.4% 2.0% 7 20.6% 4.1% 34 100.0% 2.3% 
Total 1334 88.7% 100.0% 170 11.3% 100.0% 1504 100.0% 100.0% 
Table 7.2 illustrates that, despite the differences in Table 7.2, the daily 
broadsheets all produced a similar level of 'hard news' coverage of the 
countries in Table 7.1. Only the two 'liberal' broadsheets, the Guardian and 
the Independent, returned a slightly lower proportion of hard news coverage 
(86.1 % and 86.0% respectively). The two Sunday newspapers dedicated a 
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much higher proportion of their coverage to 'soft news' formats, a finding 
which was to be expected given the editorial priorities of these publications. 
The proportion of articles written by staff journalists varied across the 
different newspapers to a much greater extent. 
Table 7.3: Summarised by-line in the selected international articles, by 
newspaper 
Proportion of Staff to Agency articles Total 
Staff Press No source All other 
Journalist Agency given sources 
a3 
(0 ( 0 0. 
Financial Times 309 92.8% 19 5.7% 4 1.2% 1 
. 
3% 333 100.0% 
Guardian 247 64.7% 99 25.9% 22 5.8% 14 3.7% 382 100.0% 
Independent 134 58.8% 47 20.6% 35 15.4% 12 5.3% 228 100.0% 
Telegraph 185 80.4% 34 14.8% 5 2.2% 6 2.6% 230 100.0% 
The Times 202 73.5% 64 23.3% 6 2.2% 3 1.1% 275 100.0% 
loS 19 86.4% 1 4.5% 2 9.1% 22 100.0% 
Sunday Times 33 97.1% 1 2.9% 34 100.0% 
Total 1129 75.1% 264 17.6% 72 4.8% 39 2.6% 1504 100.0% 
The Financial Times dedicates significantly more staff journalists to reporting 
(92.8%; n= 309) than the remaining daily broadsheets, the lowest of which is 
the Independent with only 58.8 per cent (n= 134) of printed items being 
written by staff. The Sunday papers, presumably less constrained by time 
pressures, also showed a high proportion of articles written by staff 
journalists. Discounting 'news in brief', 100 per cent of the 'news' printed in 
both Sunday papers (Independent on Sunday, n= 13; Sunday Times, n= 27) 
was written by staff journalists - the highest proportion in the daily papers 
was the Financial Times with 98.7 per cent (n= 222) and the lowest was the 
Independent with only 73.2 per cent (n= 104) of 'news' reports written by 
staff journalists. 
Moving on to the content of the recorded items of coverage, an 
important indicator of the inclusion of 'Muslim voices and opinions' is the 
proportion of Muslim actors who are quoted in broadsheet newspaper 
articles. 4 
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Table 7.4: Crosstabulation of 'Muslim' and 'Quoted' Primary Actors 
Is Actor 1 Muslim? 
Yes No Unknown Total 
Is Actor 1 Yes Count 157 
quoted? Expected Count 179.7 
277 
243.6 
70 
80.7 
504 
504.0 
No Count 377 447 170 994 
Expected Count 354.3 480.4 159.3 994.0 
Total Count 534 724 240 1498 
Expected Count 534.0 724.0 240.0 1498.0 
Table 7.5: Crosstabulation of 'Muslim' and 'Quoted' Secondary Actors 
Is Actor 2 Muslim? 
Yes No Unknown Total 
Is Actor 2 Yes Count 92 168 66 326 
quoted? Expected Count 122.6 147.4 56.0 326.0 
No Count 449 482 181 1112 
Expected Count 418.4 502.6 191.0 1112.0 
Total Count 541 650 247 1438 
Expected Count 541.0 650.0 247.0 1438.0 
Immediately noticeable from Tables 7.4 and 7.5 are the differences between 
the observed and expected values in the cells: in both tables, whilst the 
observed number of quoted Muslims is lower than the expected values, the 
observed number of quoted non-Muslim actors is higher than expected. The 
chi-squared test, the standard test for statistical independence, was 
performed on both crosstabulations and the results were statistically highly 
significant: p<= 0.001 for Actor 1, and p= 0.000 for Actor 2, across all 
statistical measures (see Appendix 5). Crosstabulations for the third and 
fourth cited actors produced similarly significant results. What this shows is 
that there is a clear statistical relationship between being Muslim and being 
quoted in news reports, with quoted Muslims being significantly under- 
represented. 
The argumentative positions of journalists towards Muslim actors are 
equally important variables when considering the representation of Islam in 
broadsheet newspapers. Table 7.6 below crosstabulates the evaluative tone 
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of the recorded items of coverage, with the variable which recorded whether 
Islam was presented as an important factor in explaining or understanding 
the reported Muslim social action. 
Table 7.6: The evaluation of Muslim social action in the selected 
international articles 
Is Islam cited as a factor? Total 
Yes No 
Count Col % Count Col % Count Col % 
Article's Lauditory 2 . 2% 6 1.0% 8 . 
5% 
evaluative Favourable 156 17.7% 101 16.2% 257 17.1% 
tone 
Neutral 320 36.3% 351 56.3% 671 44.6% 
Critical 393 44.6% 162 26.0% 555 36.9% 
Abrasive 10 1.1% 3 . 5% 13 . 9% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Table 7.6 shows that articles in which journalists present Islam as an 
important factor in understanding the activities of Muslim social actors are 
predominately more negative than those which do not: 44.6 per cent of 
articles citing Islam as influential adopt a critical tone, compared with 26.0 
per cent of articles in which Islam is regarded as `uninfluential'. These 
results are represented graphically below: 
Graph 7.1: International articles in which 
Islam is not cited as influential 
C 
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O 
U 
Graph 7.2: International articles in which 
Islam is cited as influential 
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Article's evaluative tone Article's evaluative tone 
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As the graphs illustrate, articles in which Islam is regarded as uninfluential 
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are 'normally' distributed, whilst articles in which Islam is cited as having an 
influential role are much more skewed towards a critical evaluation of Muslim 
social actions. Thus when the actions of Muslims are represented as 
especially 'Islamic', they are subject to a level of criticism which Muslims who 
keep their religion out of the 'public sphere' are not. In this way the sampled 
output operates as a 'discourse of spatial management' (Hage, 1998). 
The negative representation of Islam in these 1,504 items of recorded 
output is also revealed in the position the newspapers took with regard to the 
binaried argumentative positions suggested by the Runnymede Trust (1997). 
Table 7.7: The argumentative representation of Islam, by newspaper 
Newspaper Total no. of 'open' Total no. of 'closed' Index of 
representations of representations of 'Islamophobia' 
Islam Islam (open : closed) 
Financial Times N 333 333 
Sum 145 354 
Mean 0.44 1.06 2.41 
Guardian N 382 382 
Sum 99 650 
Mean 0.26 1.70 6.54 
Independent N 228 228 
Sum 82 466 
Mean 0.36 2.04 5.67 
Telegraph N 230 230 
Sum 45 522 
Mean 0.20 2.27 11.35 
The Times N 275 275 
Sum 111 494 
Mean 0.40 1.80 4.50 
Independent on N 22 22 
Sunday Sum 6 44 
Mean 0.27 2.00 7.41 
Sunday Times N 34 34 
Sum 10 106 
Mean 0.29 3.12 10.76 
Total N 1504 1504 
Sum 498 2636 
Mean 0.33 1.75 5.30 
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Table 7.7 shows the total number of 'open' and 'closed' binary 
representations of Islam and Muslims, and the mean number per article for 
each newspaper. The table shows that all newspapers' 'closed' means were 
substantially greater than 'open' means, with items printed in The Sunday 
Times displayed the highest mean number of 'closed' representations of 
Islam, at an average 3.12 per article. Items with the lowest number of 
'closed' representations were printed in the Financial Times (mean 1.06 per 
article), whose articles also included the highest number of 'open' 
representations (mean 0.44 per article). The prominence of 'closed' 
representations of Islam and the wide divergence between the mean number 
of 'open' and 'closed' representations are represented in Graph 7.3 below: 
Graph 7.3: Mean occurrence of the Runnymede Trust's (1997) binary 
representations of Islam and Muslims 
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From these means, a ratio of 'open' to 'closed' representations can be 
calculated: this 'Index of Islamophobia' is listed in the far-right column of 
Table 7.7. On the basis of this ratio, the sampled articles from the Guardian 
and the Independent are more prejudicial than those in either The Times or 
the Financial Times. The Telegraph is significantly more 'Islamophobic' than 
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the remaining broadsheets, with a ratio of 11.35 'closed' representations of 
Islam to 1 'open' representation. It is also interesting to note that, by this 
index, the Sunday newspapers (average 9.08) are more 'Islamophobic' than 
the daily newspapers (average 6.09). The greater length of articles in 
Sunday newspapers (the mean length of items in Sunday newspapers was 
340cm compared to 173.8cm in daily newspapers) provides little explanation 
for an increase in this ratio, since increasing the size of newspaper reports 
could produce equal increases in the number of 'open' and 'closed' 
representations of Islam. In fact, the average number of 'open' 
representations is actually slightly. less in Sunday newspapers (average 
0.31) than it is in daily broadsheets (average 0.33), whilst the average 
number of 'closed' representations is significantly more (2.56 and 1.77 
respectively). I therefore suggest that the greater degree of anti-Muslim 
prejudice in Sunday newspapers may be directly attributable to the inability 
of these journalists to write, at length, about Islam and Muslims without 
recourse to 'closed' stereotypical representations. Whilst this is a rather 
disheartening finding, it does appear to suggest that the more objective, 
'hard' news formats prevalent in daily broadsheets - and especially the 
Financial Times - provide a more 'open' forum for the representation of 
Islam. This implication of my findings deserves to be researched in much 
greater depth at a later date. 
Finally for the quantitative section of the chapter, the Recorded 
Words and their Synonyms (RWS) are summarised. Table 7.8 below is the 
first of two tables crosstabulating the occurrence of six RWSs with the 
variable which recorded whether Islam was represented as a significant 
factor in understanding the reported Muslim social action. 
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Table 7.8: Lexical representation of Islam in the selected international 
articles (1) 
Is Islam cited as a factor? Total 
o 
U 
Yes 
ö 
o 
U 
c 
0 
0 
No 
ö 
ö 
0 
6 
0 0 
alz 
0 
Threat included? Yes 295 33.5% 111 17.8% 406 27.0% 
No 586 66.5% 512 82.2% 1098 73.0% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Unthreatening Yes 55 6.2% 25 4.0% 80 5.3% 
included? No 826 93.8% 598 96.0% 1424 94.7% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Violence included? Yes 648 73.6% 236 37.9% 884 58.8% 
No 233 26.4% 387 62.1% 620 41.2% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Peace included? Yes 260 29.5% 150 24.1% 410 27.3% 
No 621 70.5% 473 75.9% 1094 72.7% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Villainy included? Yes 504 57.2% 159 25.5% 663 44.1% 
No 377 42.8% 464 74.5% 841 55.9% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Heroism included? Yes 58 6.6% 46 7.4% 104 6.9% 
No 823 93.4% 577 92.6% 1400 93.1% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Table 7.8 shows that all the negative RWS were included more frequently in 
reporting and/or representing Islam than their positive antonyms - 'villainy 
and/or acts of villainy' (n= 663) were referred to over six times more 
frequently than its recorded antonym 'heroism or acts of heroism' (n= 104; 
synonyms included 'virtue' and 'justice'). Further, the occurrence of the 
negative RWSs increases in articles in which Islam is cited as being 
influential. So, whilst 58.8 per cent of articles mentioned 'violence or acts of 
violence', this figure rises to 73.6 per cent in items which cited Islam as 
being influential. This compares with only 29.5 per cent of items citing Islam 
as influential which also mention 'peace or acts of peace'. Table 7.8 also 
shows that 'Heroism' and 'virtue' are perceived to have a negative 
relationship with Islam, being mentioned in proportionately less articles 
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which cite Islam as influential (6.6%; n= 58) than those which do not (7.4%; 
n=46). The same can be said of `modernity' in Table 7.9 below: 
Table 7.9: Lexical representation of Islam in the selected international 
articles (2) 
Is Islam cited as a factor? Total 
c 
> o 
U 
Yes 
ö 
- 
0 
c 
> 0 
0 
No 
ö 
- 
0 
0 
U 
I. R 
ö 
U 
Fundamentalist/ism Yes 326 37.0% 23 3.7% 349 23.2% 
included? No 555 63.0% 600 96.3% 1155 76.8% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Liberal/ism Yes 160 18.2% 39 6.3% 199 13.2% 
included? No 721 81.8% 584 93.7% 1305 86.8% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Terrorist/ism Yes 285 32.3% 68 10.9% 353 23.5% 
included? No 596 67.7% 555 89.1% 1151 76.5% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Ambassadorial Yes 120 13.6% 68 10.9% 188 12.5% 
included? No 761 86.4% 555 89.1% 1316 87.5% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Traditional Yes 158 17.9% 23 3.7% 181 12.0% 
included? No 723 82.1% 600 96.3% 1323 88.0% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Modern/ity included? Yes 57 6.5% 64 10.3% 121 8.0% 
No 824 93.5% 559 89.7% 1383 92.0% 
Total 881 100.0% 623 100.0% 1504 100.0% 
Table 7.9 shows that `Modern and/or modernity' are mentioned in less 
articles which cite Islam as influential (6.5%; n= 57), both numerically and 
proportionately, than those which do not (10.3%; n= 64). The antonym 
`traditional' on the other hand, is mentioned over four times more regularly in 
articles citing Islam (17.9%; n= 158) than those which do not (3.7%; n= 23). 
Table 7.9 also shows that 'terrorism' and 'fundamentalism' are regularly 
mentioned, being present in 32.3 per cent (n= 285) and 37.0 per cent (n= 
326) of articles citing Islam as influential respectively. Their recorded 
antonyms are included far less regularly. 
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To summarise the findings of the preceding quantitative section: the 
way in which broadsheet newspapers represent Islam and Muslims in the 
sample under review is predominantly both degrading and prejudicial. 
Muslims are quoted far less - both numerically and proportionately - than 
non-Muslim actors, a relationship which is shown to be highly statistically 
significant (see Appendix 5). This removes Muslims from occupying a 
position as a definer of Muslim social action, and effectively paves the way 
for the generalising and essentialising argumentative representations of 
Islam which I argued dominate broadsheet coverage. Although differences 
do exist between the newspapers, on average, Islam and Muslims are 
represented as 'diverse' or as 'partners' or 'interacting' or 'sincere' (etc. ) only 
once in every three published items of newspaper coverage. In contrast, 
over 5 'closed' representations of Islam -'monolithic', 'the enemy', 'separate', 
'manipulative', etc. - were included for every three published items. The form 
and function of these argumentative stereotypes forms the focus of the 
remainder of this chapter. 
7.3 Division and Rejection 
The twin process of division and rejection (Martin-Rojo, 1995) runs 
throughout the reporting of non-British Islam and Muslims. The broadsheet 
approach to division and rejection suggests that its success is based upon a 
three part process: first the identification of a 'space' - which can be social or 
physical - separate from 'Our own' space; second, explaining the workings or 
composition of this space in contrast to 'Our own'; and third, placing a 
(negative) social value on both this space and its composition. This third 
'stage' in the process often occurs simultaneously with one or other of the 
preceding 'stages' since value judgements are often implicit in the very 
process of naming and describing. For example, in a rather derisory article 
(Her Majesty the Terminator, Independent on Sunday 12 October 1997), 
Robert Fisk argues that the "preposterous theory" that Princess Diana was 
intentionally killed - possibly by the Queen - in order to stop the Royal 
Family being infiltrated by Islam is directly attributable to its origins "in the 
Arab world, where the moamarer - the plot - is an essential part of all 
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political discourse". Going further Fisk argued: "my banker friend had no 
right to transfer this ruthless way of life on to the tragedy of the Pont de 
I'Ama". Here, Fisk suggests a `space' - "the Arab world" - where he believes 
such ruthlessness is more characteristic, and perhaps more appropriate. 
In an article headlined Pakistan TV bans the shampoo set (Sunday 
Times, 9 November 1997), reporting censorship and "modesty requirements" 
on Pakistani television, 'Islamic values' are presented as culturally 
backward, illiberal and therefore inferior to 'the West'. In an introduction 
which suggests authoritarianism and the imposition of "Islamic values and 
culture", the article states that "images of women tossing their hair to 
promote shampoo and smiling seductively to sell toothpaste have been 
banned in Pakistan as politicians have bowed to pressure from the mullahs". 
Further, the article makes it quite clear that the newspaper views a move 
away from Pakistan's secular values - in place "since its foundation in 1947" 
- "towards Islamic fundamentalism" as an undesirable shift: 
Some of Pakistan's more liberal thinkers have condemned the restrictions as 
draconian [... ] Some critics have even likened the authorities' attempts to turn 
back the cultural clock to those of the Taliban regime in neighbouring 
Afghanistan, where women are banned from public life. 
Here 'Islam' is contrasted with 'liberalism', and labelled 'backward' ("turn 
back the cultural clock"), repressive (from "regime") and sexist through the 
suggested comparison with the Taliban's repressive (gendered) social 
practices. This (re)presentation - where 'Pakistani censorship is Islamic' and 
'Islamic is repressive' - is expanded lower down the article 5: 
[... ] the limitations imposed in the media reflect a general increase in 
repression. While women in Pakistan's main cities face pressure to dress 
modestly, those in the countryside have been confronted by a rise in domestic 
violence which the authorities seem reluctant or unable to check. 
The rise in domestic violence in Pakistan is unquestionable (see Rumsey, 
2000); the link between this violence against women and `Islamic values', 
which the article suggests, is much more questionable. In the final 
paragraph, the article finally quotes a source who draws attention to the 
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questionable link which the journalist, Stephen Grey, is suggesting between 
the politically inspired actions of the Pakistani government, Islam and 
repression: 
Shehnaz Bokhari, leader of the Progressive Women's Association which 
campaigns against domestic violence, said [... ]: "Islam says women should be 
covered but it never said anything about covering the face. In fact, during the 
pilgrimage to Mecca, women are actually prohibited from wearing the veil. I 
don't understand what this government is up to. " 
An argument based upon a schema of 'Islam vs. the West' in which 
'the West' is civilised and 'Islam' is repressive, backward and barbaric, forms 
the gist of an article printed in the Guardian (A deadly divide, Saturday 
'Weekend' supplement, 4 October 1997). This article is ostensibly about the 
social and ideological divisions between rich, "modernised" Egyptians and 
poor "Islamic extremists": 
[... ] is Egypt in danger of losing it's identity? Is the schism that divides society - 
on the one side the Islamic extremists, on the other the modernised, Western- 
influenced Egyptians [... ] now so wide that it cannot be repaired? 
In discussing this split, the Guardian focuses on a district of Cairo called 
Imbaba, thereby following the first stage of the three part process suggested 
above - the identification of a 'space'. The journalist suggests that this 
location, "known as the Islamic Republic of Imbaba [is] a breeding ground for 
Islamic fundamentalists" (emphasis added on the metaphor: animals or 
germs). The article continues: Imbaba is so Islamic that "Everyone is robed, 
and all the women are veiled. According to the World Health Organisation, 
85 per cent of the women are not only veiled they have undergone genital 
mutilation". By citing these two WHO pronouncements together, the article 
appears to be implying that genital mutilation is Islamic in the same way that 
being veiled is presupposed to be. In doing so, the journalist begins to 
demarcate the negative ('Muslim') values of the identified space. This 
negative representation continues throughout. The article suggests that the 
growing popularity of "Islamic fundamentalists" in Imbaba is due to the 
leniency which Egyptian ex-President Sadat originally showed the Muslim 
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Brotherhood - an approach which, in a neat combination of orientalist 
imagery and the `force of nature' metaphor, is described as "like opening a 
bottle and letting a genie out". 
Lower down, the article quotes two rich Muslim "non-fanatical" girls 
who appear to have inadvertently provided the journalist with the 
metaphorical up-shot of the whole article: 
"Our society is split. One has to choose which way to go - either ahead, 
forward, into the future and with the West, or backwards in time with the 
fundamentalists. " Oddly she does not see the irony of her own situation [the 
ignorant native... ]: that even though she is dressed in jeans and eating a 
hamburger, she, too, by entering into an arranged marriage is going backwards 
in time. 
Here the Egyptian girl employs a common 'every day' metaphor (Lakoff and 
Johnson, 1980), in which time is treated as a spatial relation: forwards = the 
future; backwards = the past. This progression through time, in turn, forms a 
metaphor of progress from 'the traditional' - here rhetorically labelled 'the 
backward' - to 'the modern'. In the excerpt, this progression to 'the modern' 
is presupposed to entail choosing 'the West', which in turn places 'the non- 
West' in the pre- or perhaps sub-modern position of 'the backward'. The 
'choices' which the quoted Egyptian girl is seen to have taken - "dressed in 
jeans and eating a hamburger" yet "entering into an arranged marriage" - are 
represented by the journalist as being so incongruous that her Western 
commodities appear to have been 'trumped' by her planned arranged 
marriage - an 'Islamic' and therefore backward social practice. The 
journalist's conclusion that her "going backwards in time" is "ironic" is purely 
the result of this string of metaphors and presuppositions. 
Finally for this section, I will analyse an article which attempted to 
contextualise and comment upon the mass murder of 60 tourists at Luxor on 
17 November 1997. The article in question, a news feature entitled In the 
name of Allah (The Sunday Times, News Review section, 23 November 
1997), was based upon a rhetorical question, posed in its by-line: 
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Are the killers of Luxor a lunatic fringe, or a murderous symptom of the inability 
of Islam to live with the modern world, asks Walter Ellis. 
It is interesting to note that the newspaper asks whether Islam can "live with 
the modern world", not in the modern world. This suggests that Islam is first, 
not part of the modern world but rather exists in parallel with it (and 'Us') and 
second, that modernity is something which Islam is (unsuccessfully) 
attempting to come to terms with. By referring to "Islam" rather than 
'Muslims', the question further implies that Muslims are similarly unitary in 
this "inability" to live with (cope with; reconcile themselves with) modernity. 
In the last three paragraphs of the article, a lengthy quotation from 
David Pryce-Jones fully articulates the implications of the argument which 
Walter Ellis forwards throughout the article, and in doing so provides the 
rhetorical upshot of the text: 
"The Arab world - indeed the Muslim world generally - is unable to form pluralist 
societies" he says. "They claim they are in favour of democracy but the reality is 
an endless power struggle between competing absolutisms. [... ] What does it 
mean to be Muslim and to be modern? That's what it comes down to. It must be 
possible but at the moment they have got their wires all crossed. [... ] If they do 
not solve the problem of living with themselves and their neighbours, someone 
else is going to have to do it for them. " 
Here we see a single terrorist incident blamed on 'Muslim extremist'; placed 
within an "endless" historic continuum of Arab-Muslim violence, terror and 
extremism; (re)presented as the history of the 'Arab world'; expanded 
concentrically to include the 'Muslim world'; and applied as an argumentative 
warrant to the conclusion that Muslims are "unable to form pluralist 
societies". The possibility (however unlikely according to Pryce-Jones) of 
Muslims reconciling themselves with modernity is acknowledged, but only in 
order to suggest that this is a "problem" which "at the moment" they are 
unable to solve themselves: "someone else" - i. e. 'not-them', or 'Us' - "is 
going to have to do it for them. " The similarities between this argument and 
Orientalist paternalism, so characteristic of British justifications for colonial 
rule, is quite striking (see Said, 1978: 33-4). The implication is that Western 
democracy is that 'special something' which the 'Muslim world' lacks. This 
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implication is more explicitly argued in the articles analysed below, in section 
7.5. 
7.4 Their negativity 
Often the implicit assumptions of news reports, as opposed to their explicit 
argumentation, illustrate anti-Muslim prejudice. For example, the negative 
characteristics which Muslims are presupposed or implicitly argued to 
possess are clearly indicated in the referential strategies used to represent 
them. An Independent editorial commenting on Iran's successful entry into 
the finals of football's World Cup 1998 (All the world's a pitch; the fixture 
is friendly, 6 December 1997) for example, argued: 
The idea of a nation peopled entirely by fundamentalist mullahs and women 
deep in purdah taking to the turf in studded boots, shorts and shirts covered in 
advertising logos is enough to give the popular imagination pause. 
The prejudice is clear in the above excerpt. Further, the newspaper needs to 
draw upon this prejudicial identification of Iranians - "fundamentalist mullahs 
and women deep in purdah" - in order to ensure the success of its argument, 
since the idea of Iran "taking to the turf' would not have appeared so 
discrepant without this representation of 'what Iranians are' and, therefore, 
'what Iran is'. 
Similarly, in a letter to the editor entitled Israeli peace with 
neighbours not answer to Iraq/Iran threat (Lord Stone of Blackheath, 
Financial Times, 25 November 1997), the author's negative perceptions of a 
homogenous 'political Islam/Muslims' are illustrated in the choice and 
description of social actors, illustrated first in the header's unification of Iran 
and Iraq in common threat. The gist of Lord Stone's argument is: even if 
Israel "achieved peace with all of its neighbours, the dictators in Iraq would 
not be transformed into liberal democrats", and neither would "the religious 
zealots who rule Iran", nor "the fundamentalists who oppose the reforms of 
Hosni Mubarek [... ] by killing tourists". Here, actors are rhetorically 
positioned in order to achieve the success of the letter's argument: a highly 
functional "cast of villainsi6 are selected; who are first, presupposedly 
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villainous, as illustrated in their being labelled "dictators", "fundamentalists" 
and "zealots"; second, are homogenous - their equivalency implicitly 
suggested by their being offered in the form of a list (Fairclough, 2000: 161- 
2); and third, intransigent, since their negativity is maintained despite 
"peace" being "achieved". This "cast of villains" is then set against Israeli 
social action - (re)presented here as an attempt to 'achieve peace'. This 
antithesis works to further emphasise the (presupposed) intransigent threat 
to Israel posed by the 'Muslim world'. 
This negative labelling of 'Muslim' social actors reaches its peak when 
reporting countries in which the politics and 'policies' of the ruling regime are 
almost universally decried. Afghanistan is one such country. One article 
printed in The Times (A kingly gift lost in a war zone, Saturday Sports 
section, 29 November 1997) questioned the whereabouts of a luxury Rolls 
Royce car "given to the King of Afghanistan by George V", now lost in 
Afghanistan. Following general 'place-setting' rhetoric (Afghanistan as a war 
zone), the article cites "Taliban militia"; "mad mujahidin driver"; "black 
bearded Taliban zealots"; "reactionary mullahs"; "tribal revolt"; 
"fundamentalist"; "wild-eyed Mujahidin fighters"; "mud huts" and other 
negative references drawn from the lexical style register of 'backwardness, 
incivility and barbarity' which are then linked, by virtue of their co-location, to 
Islam. 
In other articles, the characteristics which individual Muslim actors are 
presupposed to possess draw upon similarly negative stereotypes. For 
example, a feature article written in response to the 50th anniversary of 
Israel's independence and profiling "the scholar-militant" Edward Said 
(Spectre at the feast, Independent Magazine, 24 January 1998), 
simultaneously disputes and draws upon stereotypical representations of 
'the Arab' in the contrast it establishes between Said and Yasser Arafat. 
Following a complementary introduction and discussion of Said's 
contributions to both literary criticism and political activism, the author, 
Stephen Howe, argues that Said confounds "those who dislike [him] or his 
message", since "his very charm and urbanity are [... ] far too unlike their 
stereotypes of `the Arab"'. By contrast, Yasser Arafat - possibly the only 
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"voice of Palestine [... ] better known" than Said - is given a far less 
complimentary appraisal: 
[... ] in many ways Said is the chairman's anathema - elegant as against Arafat's 
calculatedly bristly unkemptness, massively fluent as against Arafat's 
inarticulacy in English, a civilised aesthete in contrast to Arafat's bloody past 
and shifty present. 
The contrasts which Howe establishes between Said and Arafat draw, in 
equal measure, on their faith and their residency: both men are Palestinian 
Arabs, but where Said is a Christian, Arafat is a Muslim; whereas Said lives, 
works and resides in 'the West', Arafat, with his "bloody past and shifty 
present", lives (and belongs? ) in the 'Muslim world'. The two men therefore 
become the embodiment of their origins and beliefs: Said as the "elegant", 
"fluent" and "civilised" West; and Arafat as the 'unkempt', 'inarticulate', 
"bloody" and "shifty" 'Muslim world'. The articulation of such stereotypes in 
an article which aims at illustrating Said's academic and political influence - 
loosely defined as the realisation that "almost all contemporary writing about 
the Middle East, is deeply implicated in the histories of European and US 
racial arrogance" - is highly ironic. 
Articles such as those analysed above are premised on the 
presupposed 'Differences' between Muslim and non-Muslim, Islam and the 
West. Such presuppositions are not benign however, but instead are usually 
marked by 'Their' inferiority, negativity and threat. I have shown that the 
negative characteristics which Muslims are presupposed to possess can be 
revealed through studying the appellations and adjectives used to represent 
'Them', and the figures of contrast used in antithesis to Muslims. In the 
articles analysed across the remainder of the chapter, 'Our' positive 
characteristics are positioned more prominently than in the above section, 
either in the form of a more explicit figure of contrast between 'Us' and 
'Them' or, on occasion, as part of an argumentative structure which is both 
based upon and defends the 'civilising influence of the West' over Muslims. 
The following sections of the chapter analyse arguments, based on 
stereotypical and prejudicial topoi, which broadsheet newspapers use to 
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'divide and reject' Muslims in greater detail (Karim, 1997). Four schematic 
arguments are discussed: that Muslim pose an external military threat to 
countries other than their own; the threat of Muslim extremism, and its 
manifestation as 'Muslim violence' and 'terrorism'; that Muslims pose an 
internal threat to the democracy of their own countries; and the repression of 
women in 'Islam' and in 'Muslim countries'. These arguments are used to 
simultaneously divide and reject the social practices and values which 
allegedly organise and characterise 'Muslim social space' from 'Our' social 
space in 'the West'. 
7.4.1 Military threat 
As illustrated in Chapter 6, the military threat posed by 'Muslim' countries is 
an argumentative strategy which the broadsheet press frequently uses in 
order to convey a sense of 'Their' negativity. Often, articles employing such 
arguments are based on barely concealed prejudices, whereby Muslim 
countries are represented as threatening simply because 'They are Muslim' 
and 'They have weapons'. The three items analysed in this section are taken 
from a sub-corpus of recorded items which present the (alleged) non- 
conventional weapons programme of Iran - the archetypal 'Muslim country' - 
as inherently threatening. 
The first article, printed in the Sunday Times, flags the newspaper's 
negative assessment of Iran's weapons programme in the sub-editor's 
choice of metaphor in the headline: Britain at heart of Iran nuclear web (18 
January 1998). The presupposed threat of Iran developing such weapons is 
also illustrated by the manner in which the gist of the article is presented: 
"Some Foreign Office officials have warned that Iran is becoming a daunting 
military force in the region" (emphasis added). Here, the verb phrase "have 
warned" is highly ideological, placing a negative frame on the remainder of 
the predicate in a way which alternative verbs ('have revealed'; 'have 
suggested'; `believe') would not. This negativity is continued in the 
suggestion that Iran's military prowess is "daunting" as opposed to (for 
example) 'consequential' or 'significant'. The presupposed military threat 
posed by Iran is continued lower down, where the article suggests that 
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Experts fear that with the new technology, Iran may be less than two years from 
building the first Islamic nuclear bomb. 
Here, by labelling Iran's potential nuclear ordnance an "Islamic nuclear 
bomb", the journalist imbues the device with a (Muslim) ideological agenda. 
And, in case the reader does not automatically associate this 'Muslim 
nuclear bomb' with 'threat', "a Whitehall official" is quoted as saying that Iran 
"has become a far bigger threat" to 'the West' than even Iraq. 
Returning to the previously discussed reader's letter entitled Israeli 
peace with neighbours not answer to Iraq/Iran threat (Financial Times, 25 
November 1997), in addition to his prejudicial representation of social actors, 
Lord Stone argues that even if Israel "achieved peace with all of its 
neighbours": 
[... ] Regional problems would remain the same. Powerful states, driven by 
hegemonic ambitions, would continue to threaten their weaker neighbours and 
build up their non-conventional arsenals, while the international community 
dithered over appeasement. 
Exactly which "Powerful states" Lord Stone is referring to here is unclear, 
but, given the letter's conclusion - that the "arming of Iran and Iraq with 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons under any circumstances does not 
bare thinking about" - we can safely assume that Iran and Iraq are two of 
them. The ongoing negativity of these (unnamed) states is made clear by 
Lord Stone asserting that they both "continue to threaten" and "continue [... ] 
to build up their non-conventional arsenals" - note these are not 'weapons' 
but "arsenals", suggesting a variety of non-conventional weapons. Finally 
"appeasement" is mentioned in order to allude to Britain's initial approach to 
Nazi Germany and Chamberlain's guarantees of Hitler's benign intentions - 
'and we all know what happened there... '. 
The growing threat which Iran, and specifically Iranian weaponry 
represents, forms the central argument of the third and final article of this 
section -a column headlined Time to untangle from containment 
(Guardian, 3 January 1998). As the headline suggests, this column 
311 
essentially argued that America should discontinue its economic and political 
"containment" of Iran -a policy which the column argues is both illogical and 
unworkable. In such a context, it is possible that a reader may not perceive 
Iran as threatening, and therefore, with little reference to evidence, David 
Hirst declares: 
As well as international terrorism and a violent opposition to the peace process 
[Iran] is taxed with developing the same kind of non-conventional weapons that 
have earned Iraq its international quarantine. 
These presumed crimes of the Iranian regime go unsupported, and rely 
solely on (prejudicial) 'common-sense' knowledge of Iran to remain coherent: 
the references to "international terrorism" and "violent [not 'vocal' or 
'obstinate'] opposition to the peace process" are cases in point. There is, 
after all, a significant difference between supporting a defensive guerrilla 
group, however 'violent' - which is what Hizb Allah, (presumably the terrorists 
which Hirst has in mind) are - and supporting international terrorism. 
Secondly, although Iran does 'oppose' the peace process - and that is their 
right as a sovereign state - there is little evidence to suggest that such 
opposition is 'violent' in the way suggested. 
In contrast to the claims of the three items discussed above, an 
editorial printed in the Financial Times (Iran comes in from the cold, 9 
December 1997) quite rightly pointed out: 
Tehran is signed up to international treaties on nuclear and chemical weapons 
proliferation while Israel - possessor of the region's sole nuclear arsenal - is not. 
As for the peace process, Iran's criticisms are beginning to sound moderate in 
comparison to those now heard in Egypt and Jordan, which have signed 
treaties with Israel. 
Similarly, a second Financial Times editorial (Talking to Iran, 12 January 
1998) argued that of course 
[... ] Iran must be dissuaded from supporting terrorism and from acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction. But terrorism should be distinguished from 
resistance to Israeli occupation in South Lebanon, and regional arms control 
efforts cannot ignore Israel's own nuclear weapons. Likewise, Iran should not 
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obstruct the Arab-Israeli peace process, but should not be blamed for echoing 
the same criticisms as Washington's Arab allies. 
Such balanced assessment of Iranian foreign policy was notably infrequent: 
indeed the two editorials quoted above were two of only a handful of 
recorded items based on such argumentation. They are included in order to 
illustrate the paucity of the remaining newspapers' (and, to be fair, the 
majority of the Financial Times') coverage. 
In light of the above analysis: when viewing the 'military threat' which 
Iran allegedly represents to the region and to the (Western? ) world, it 
appears that broadsheet journalists base their conclusions more on the 
presumed `threat' which `Islam' poses to 'Us' than the actions and intentions 
of Iran. 
7.4.2 Extremism and terrorism 
References to religious extremism and acts of terrorism committed by 
individuals and groups calling themselves 'Muslim' are legion when the 
broadsheet press 'cover' Islam. As Table 7.9 illustrated, 'terrorism and/or 
acts of terrorism' were mentioned in 32.3 per cent of international articles 
which highlighted an 'Islamic influence' on Muslim social action (n= 285). 
Despite this preoccupation, this section of the chapter will be brief since 
broadsheet news items reporting 'Muslim extremism and terrorism' formed 
part of the analysis in sections 7.3 and 7.4 and significant aspects of both 
the preceding chapters on the reporting of Algeria and Iraq. I start with a 
discussion of several interesting articles, before moving to an analysis of two 
articles, printed just before Christmas 1997, reporting the 'persecution' of 
Christians in the Palestinian Authority (PA) controlled town of Bethlehem. 
Taking extremism first, a report printed in the Telegraph (23 January 
1998) foregrounded a representation of rural Pakistani Muslims which drew 
on both social and religious 'backwardness' in order to condemn their violent 
civil disobedience. This is clearly illustrated in the headline of the report: 
Tribesmen threaten holy war over demand to pay power bills. This 
rhetorical reference to "holy war" is repeated lower down the report, where 
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the journalist states "tribal leaders shouted 'Death to WAPDA' [the Water 
and Power Development Authority] and promised to launch a jihad to protect 
their rights. " It is unclear from this account whether the "tribal leaders" were 
actually calling for a "holy war", or whether "jihad' was being (more properly) 
used to refer to a 'struggle' to protect rights. Regardless, the headline's 
announcement of a "threaten[ed] holy war" (re-)presents the "promised [... ] 
jihad' as a dangerous prospect. 
The incivility, perhaps even barbarity, of the protagonists forms the 
major premise upon which their presumed 'danger' rests. This incivility is 
flagged in both the naming of the protagonists - as "Pathan tribesmen", 
"tribal leaders", "bearded tribesmen", and a tribal "Chief' - and the 
contextualising description - they have "threatened to blow up the Warsak 
dam" and have already "burnt customs posts, government offices and official 
vehicles. " The second paragraph for example, describes "Hundreds of 
bearded tribesmen, clad in black turbans and heavily armed". In choosing 
such a representation - arming and `darkening' the men ["black turbans"], 
and the use of "clad", a more forceful and dramatic adjective than 
alternatives such as 'clothed' or'dressed' - the journalist employs the historic 
notion of 'the Muslim horde' in their negativisation. 
A news article printed in the Guardian headlined Ripples of fear 
through the Arab world (17 November 1997) forwarded a more aggressive 
argument that the pan-Arab rhetoric of Jordanian Islamist politicians, 
inspired by the increasingly threatening American policy towards Iraq, posed 
a threat to the "stability" of the Middle East region. Julian Borger's choice of 
the Jordanian Islamic Action Front (IAF) to illustrate such an argument is 
significant since the Party's call for suicide attacks against American targets 
in Jordan, in the event of American attacks against Iraq, mark "a dramatic 
departure for the normally placid IAF - one of the most moderate Islamic 
opposition movements in the region. " Borger provides additional material in 
order to argue that the IAF's previous 'moderatism' now appears to be 
slipping: the Party 
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boycotted this month's elections in protest at electoral and press laws which it 
claimed were anti-democratic, and Jordanian observers are [now] worried that 
[this] extra-parliamentary Islamic opposition could be rapidly radicalised by the 
combination of a failed Israeli-Palestinian peace process, perceived US bias 
towards Israel and the renewal of hostilities between US-led forces and Iraq. 
[emphases added] 
Aside from the italicised sections of the above quotation7, the above 
argumentative reasoning of Borger is interesting since it is based on a single 
defining principle: the (violent; threatening) political actions of Islamist 
politicians are wholly explainable in reference to 'Muslim' struggles in the 
Middle East. This reasoning is then used by Borger, in conjunction with other 
authoritative sources (the "Crown Prince Hassan" for example, is quoted 
saying "If there's going to be an attack against Iraq and if there's going to be 
an outcry, presumably an anti-Western outcry, it's going to be extremely 
destabilising") to argue against the proposed US bombing of Iraq. The 
possibility that the actions of the IAF are explainable in relation to internal 
Jordanian politics - particularly since the IAF is now excluded from a position 
in parliamentary debate and due political process - is passed up in favour of 
a homogenised and simplified 'Muslim threat' argument, albeit an argument 
targeted against the greater evil of bombing Iraq. 
The lengths to which broadsheet newspapers occasionally go in order 
to press home an argument foregrounding the evil of 'Muslim terrorists' is 
quite remarkable. A frequently used rhetorical method is antithesis - the 
positioning of individuals, groups, ideologies, etc. in opposition to each other 
in an argument, in order to highlight their 'differences' for rhetorical effect. A 
model example of this was included in a three page article headlined Terror 
by degree, (The Times Saturday Magazine, 18 October 1997) which profiled 
"Ramsi Yousef", a suspect in the bombing of the World Trade Centre, and 
focused in particular on his time spent studying engineering at Swansea 
Institute of Higher Education. In order that the activities of this "Muslim 
fundamentalist", "murderer" and "international terrorist" are made even more 
malign, the article suggests that Yousef, along with Osama Bin Laden, 
plotted against several "moderate governments" in the Middle East - which is 
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quite a surprising description given that the list was said to include "Algeria" 
and "Saudi Arabia". 
Antithesis forms the very basis of the final article in this section: a 
review of a book on the Iranian revolution, entitled 'The Priest and the King' 
by Desmond Harney, headlined The Holy Terror (Sunday Times Books 
supplement, 18 January 1998). The 'Priest' of the book title, and "The Holy 
Terror" referred to in the headline, "is, of course, the Ayatollah Khomeini, the 
dour, ruthless cleric whose followers overthrew the Shah of Iran, the 
hesitant, unhappy autocrat who was one of the most powerful allies of the 
West in the Middle East for almost four decades". This antithetical 
representation of the revolution (which, to a certain extent is invited by the 
title of the book) continues to be developed throughout the review: the 
"ruthless cleric" versus the reluctant, "unhappy autocrat". 
As part of this (re-)presentation of the revolution, the Shah is 
transformed into a beneficent leader who had "tried to give his country 
aspects of 20th century life" (emphasis added). The details of which aspects 
of 20th century life the shah supported - capitalism, cronyism, spiralling 
economic inequality but without popular or democratic involvement of the 
Iranian public in the political system - are not included. Further, whilst the 
review suggests that it was the Shah's attempts at "liberalisation" which had 
"enabled the first of the demonstrations to start", there is very little about the 
atrocities and torture committed by the Shah which fermented this popular 
resentment. Even when the review refers to one 'massacre' of "scores of 
demonstrators", it is introduced as an exception to the rule and therefore in 
order to praise the Shah: "It is to the Shah's credit that he was not prepared 
to suppress the revolution by brute force, killing thousands, as he probably 
could have done. " 
Khomeini on the other hand is described as "Grim and unbending", 
"the intransigent priest" and the bringer of "a most savage revolution". 
Controlled by Khomeini and his exiled helpers, the mullahs in Iran, whom the 
Shah had hitherto scorned [... ] crept out and suddenly began to assume more 
and more power [... ] turning the people towards the ayatollah and against 
everything western [emphases added] 
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Iranians, in both the excerpt above and elsewhere, are represented as 
stupid, 'childlike' - swayed by "the professionalism of the propaganda" - 
"enraged, bitter and vicious". And here, suggests the review, lies "the awful 
problem posed by autocracy: the alternative is almost always worse, if only 
because of the repressed bitterness and frustration" of the revolutionaries 
(emphasis added). We do well to remember that similar arguments have 
been drawn upon to justify repression throughout history - not least in 
reference to the black communities of apartheid-era South Africa. 
The upshot of the review reads: 
the revolution was complete. And deeply brutal and unpleasant it has been too. 
The abuses of human rights ordered by the mullahs at home or through 
terrorism abroad have been far, far worse than any that took place under the 
Shah. 
Running through the review, and present most notably above, is an 
argument for `the greater good': atrocities under the Shah (for the greater 
part deleted) were committed with a view to maintaining the western friendly 
status quo; those under Khomeini (in general cited and directly criticised) 
were committed in support of Islamic theocracy. The presupposition of the 
author therefore appears to be that Western-style, or capitalist friendly, 
societies are just and therefore qualify for the right to commit human rights 
abuses in their name (for the `greater good'). On the other hand, the broadly 
'Islamic' society brought in by Khomeini is inherently unjust, thus any 
revolution fought to introduce such a society - even one claiming the majority 
of public support - could never be for 'the greater good', and therefore "far 
far worse". 
7.4.2.1 Palestinian Authority controlled Bethlehem, at Christmas 
Two articles, printed in separate broadsheets within three days of each 
other, appear intent on illustrating the negative effects which Muslims can 
have upon `Western', or in this case Christian lives. The first of these news 
articles, Tensions darken festive mood in Bethlehem, (The Times, 22 
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December 1997) was stridently critical of what it labelled the "unceasing 
persecution [of Christians] under the Palestinian Authority", occurring at 
Christmas and in (of all places) "the town at the heart of the story of Christ's 
birth. " The report states that such conclusions were the product of a "report 
published two months ago by the Israeli Prime Minister's Office" but the 
journalist, Christopher Walker, does not question the veracity of the report's 
claims despite the possibility that the Israeli government may be motivated 
by factors other than either the welfare of Christians or the 'pursuit of truth'. 
Throughout, the article makes repeated mention of Bethlehem's 
demographic profile of Muslim-to-Christian residency. For example, the 
article quotes 
[... ] Ranna Najjar, another Christian housewife in the West Bank town where 
the Muslim birth-rate far outstrips that of the Christians. "The city is not ours 
anymore. We gave up the city" she said. [emphasis added] 
Such a preoccupation with 'numbers' of racial/ethnically defined 'others' - 
what Hage (1998) has called a "numbering pathology" (p. 123) - is a 
benchmark of white racist talk and text (also see Daniels, 1997). The article 
also suggests that the majority Muslim population has brought a new sense 
of 'decay' to Bethlehem, stating that under Muslim rule, houses and streets 
have become "scarred with intifada slogans", and that some Christians are 
now scared to openly celebrate Christmas: "I do not dare to go out on 
Christmas Eve any more. The Muslim boys call me and the other Christian 
girls whores [... ] said Lina Attallah". The possibility that the low numbers of 
Christians living in Bethlehem may be attributable to their treatment under 
Jewish rule is backgrounded in order to facilitate the success of the article's 
principle argument of 'Muslim repression': 
Decimated by emigration and for the past two years living under the Muslim- 
dominated Palestinian Authority, Bethlehem's Christians now make up less that 
a third of the 39,000 population, compared with 80% during the period of the 
British Mandate which ended in 1948. 
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Here, the proportion of Christian emigration occurring under Israeli rule is 
notably absent. Indeed, it states lower down that Ms Lina Attallah "regrets 
returning from Texas to Bethlehem after the 1993 peace treaty which ended 
27 years of Israeli military rule" (emphasis added), suggesting that it was the 
Israeli rule which originally forced her to leave. 
The article goes on to state that the majority Muslim population has 
resulted in the greater Islamicisation' of Bethlehem, to the disadvantage and 
even exclusion of Christianity. "Manger Square, the area in front of the 
Church of the Nativity", for example, is now "packed with Muslim worshippers 
every Friday because there is no longer enough room for all of them to pray 
inside the imposing Mosque of Omar" (emphasis added). Similarly, whereas 
"Greater Bethlehem, [... ] only had 5 mosques in 1970, there are now 72. " 
How this affects Christian worship is unclear. What it suggests however, is 
that Walker believes that the 'rightful' status of Bethlehem's public space 
should be Christian. A similar attitude runs through a second article devoted 
to reporting Bethlehem at Christmas: Tough and tawdry times in Manger 
Square (Guardian, 24 December 1997). Here Bethlehem is described as "a 
city where the wail of the muezzin [now] drowns out the peal of church bells", 
where "more than half the citizens are unemployed; [and] almost all are 
Muslims. " However, the real focus of the article is on the sorry state of 
Christmas festivities under the rule of the Palestinian Authorities rather than 
the religious and cultural demography of the city: 
Two Christmases ago the birth of Jesus Christ was hijacked by the Palestinian 
leader Yasser Arafat, and turned into a political celebration of new found 
freedom [... ] The nationalistic atmosphere prevailed again last year, with 
pilgrims grimacing in Manger Square when a dance band struck up as Midnight 
chimed. [emphasis added] 
The excerpt above implicitly contrasts the unfavourable 'Palestinian 
Christmas past' with that experienced under Israeli control: the 'hijacking' (a 
significant verb for describing Palestinian action) of Christmas under the 
auspices of Arafat's PA is represented as an innovation or a departure from 
normal practice. The implication that 'things were better' under Israeli rule is 
reiterated and contextualised lower down the report, where "Salim Lahhamm, 
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a Christian Arab who organises pilgrim tours to the holy land", is quoted 
explaining why he believes that "this Christmas is the worst for business 
since the height of the intifada": 
"It's a double whammy effect", he explains. "Sixty percent of it has to do with 
what happened in Luxor (in Egypt, where Islamic fundamentalists massacred 
60 tourists last month). The other 40 percent is about the peace process and 
the lack of confidence after the suicide bombs. The irony is that before the 
peace process we would not really have suffered from Luxor. " 
To be clear: although Lahhamm does not appear to be supporting a return to 
Israeli control, his remarks certainly appear to facilitate this argument, given 
that Christians, and perhaps (given the unemployment rates) even Muslims 
'had it better' "before the peace process". Further, it is interesting to note 
that the poor state of Bethlehem's tourism industry is apparently the worst it 
has been since "the height of the intifada" - another instance when 
'Palestinian activities' defined the public space. 
The report concludes by stating that this year, following the 
deficiencies of the past two Christmases, "Bethlehem's Roman Catholic 
mayor, Hanna Nasser" has decided that "Christmas will get its religion back": 
"We want only those who are willing to pray to be present in the square this 
year. " The presence of this Palestinian-Authority-backed Christian public 
figure in the report is significant, since it goes some of the way to refuting the 
"unceasing persecution [of Christians] under the Palestinian Authority", 
alleged in The Times' report. The contrasting picture of Bethlehem which 
develops through the Guardian report is one of Palestinian incompetence 
rather than prejudice; of poor motivation rather than Muslim extremism; but 
overwhelmingly that Bethlehem's "tough and tawdry times" are attributable to 
Muslim activities - internal PA and external "Islamic fundamentalist" - rather 
than, for example, the hardships characteristic of all the Palestinian 
bantustans, provoked by Israeli economic blockades and 'border controls'. 
The silence of the journalist, David Sharrock, on this most elementary of 
contextualising factors is quite deafening. 
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7.4.3 Despotism: threat to democracy 
The following items of broadsheet reporting are all based, to varying 
degrees, on the assumption that Muslims and, in some cases `Islam' in 
general, poses a threat to the internal stability of (Muslim) countries. This 
assumed threat usually takes the form of a `threat to democracy', and 
corresponds closely with the enduring theme of 'Islamic despotism' (see 
Daniel, 1960, for extensive discussion of this 'heritage'). 
The reporting of Turkey in broadsheet newspapers draws significantly 
upon the presupposed 'threat' which Islam poses to democracy. A report 
headlined Turkey seeks Blair's backing over EU entry for example, 
(Telegraph 10 December 1997) argues that Turkey is strategically very 
important, since it "stands on Nato's front-line, at a time when the threat 
comes no longer from the Soviet bloc but from militant Islam. " In addition, the 
Telegraph suggests that since "Turkey offers the Middle East a unique 
example of a secular Islamic country that is a democracy" it should be 
granted EU membership. It is worth noting that the majority mandate given 
Necmettin Erbakan's Islamic Welfare Party in the Turkish general election, 
the military coup which ousted this government only months prior to this 
report being printed, and the ruthless suppression of Kurdish civil rights must 
necessarily be ignored in order to represent Turkey as a "democracy". 
Similar information was deleted or (re)presented in reports printed in 
other broadsheets covering the possibility and desirability of granting Turkey 
membership to the EU. Robert Cornwell for example, in an Independent 
column headlined Put diplomatic niceties aside and tell Turkey the truth 
(11 December 1997), wrote: 
More serious still [than removing the chance of resolving 'the Cyprus issue'] if 
Europe spurns it anew, this strategically vital NATO country may turn it's back 
on the West in favour of the Islamic world. This in turn, it is argued, would 
weaken it's fragile democracy and offer a fresh opening for theocratic Islam: 
only six months ago, after all, the Islamic leaning Government of Necmettin 
Erbakan was eased out, under immense pressure from the Turkish military. 
This passage is interesting for three principle reasons. First, the argument 
that without EU membership Turkey "may turn it's back on the West in favour 
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of the Islamic world" suggests not only the standard ontological opposition 
between 'the West' and the `Islamic world' but also that there is no other 
option, or 'middle ground' for Turkey. The use of the noun phrase 
"strategically vital NATO country" underlines the argumentation of the piece, 
illustrating the importance of keeping Turkey 'on our side'. 
Second, that Turkey's turn towards "the Islamic world", "it is argued 
would weaken it's fragile democracy". This active subject deletion (- argued 
by whom? ) is a standard argumentative strategy, which tends to be adopted 
when a journalist's own position could not be concealed in the words of a 
quoted source. The potentially dubious status of the argument is exposed by 
simply asking: 'Who is this argued by? ' It is also interesting to speculate on 
the use of the term "fragile democracy": what does this term suggest? It 
should be remembered that 'democracy' is a defining ontology for the 
majority of Western journalists (see van Ginneken, 1998). Thus a "fragile 
democracy" is one which should be protected -a kind of political china cup 
which should be shielded from the destructive influence of it's own bovine 
nemesis. The use of such a term is especially ideologically significant when 
viewed in the light of the next point. 
Third, the excerpt suggests that "the Islamic leaning Government of 
Necmettin Erbakan was eased out, under immense pressure from the 
Turkish military. " This structuring of expression conjures a representation of 
the event akin to a bed-ridden grandparent helped to his feet by the 
philanthropic Turkish military rather than the coup d'etat which it arguably 
was. Under circumstances other than those of Turkey -a "strategically vital 
NATO country" - would the actions of the military have aroused more 
criticism in the broadsheet press? Lower down the column, Cornwell does 
state that "the ousting of Mr Erbakan [was] at basic odds with the civilian, 
democratic heritage of the EU", yet even this retelling of the event still avoids 
the term 'coup' and the attendant implication of a military dictatorship. 
It is interesting to compare the representation of Turkish `democracy' 
with the constitutional crisis which occurred in Pakistan at the end of 1997, 
developing from tensions between the three centres of political power in 
Pakistan - President Farooq Leghari; the judiciary, specifically the Chief 
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Justice Sajjad Ali Shah; and the legislature, under the control of Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif. The 'crisis' can be summarised at three levels: 
generally, as Nawaz Sharifs attempts to centralise power in the 
democratically elected Parliament; more specifically, in Sharif's attempts to 
strengthen the position of the Prime Minster; and particularly in response to 
two events: the repeal of Article 58(2) of the constitution which enabled the 
President to fire an elected Prime Minister at will8, and Prime Minister 
Sharifs criticisms of the Chief Justice for holding up legislation passed by 
Parliament, which resulted in him being charged for contempt of court. 9 The 
right-wing broadsheet press represented the political dispute in a different 
light: 10 
That such chaos has come during a government with a record majority has 
merely hardened the impression that democracy and Pakistan do not mix. 
(Pakistan on brink of army rule, Telegraph, 1 December 1997) 
Pakistan has moved a notch closer to becoming a failed state and some argue 
it already is one. Islamic extremists sense their time may be coming as the 
nation staggers towards one of its greatest financial crises (Sharif wins all as 
Pakistan state crumbles, The Times, 3 December 1997) 
And previous to the resolution of the stand-off on 3 December 1997, an 
editorial printed in The Times (2 December 1997) read: 
Islamabad on the brink: when the military may be the least worst option. 
[... The conflict] can only encourage opportunists and embittered tribal factions 
to violent action under the guise of defending democracy. Pakistan is a country 
in urgent need of reform, stability and clean government. [... ] an army take-over 
might be the least worst option. 
It is interesting to note that democratic "reform" and "stability" were arguably 
two of Nawaz Sharifs intentions in removing the President's ability to 
dismiss the Prime Minister: presumably, they were also considerations of the 
Army, since it did not "take-over" political power. 
Central to the conclusion that the crisis 'proved' that Pakistan and 
democracy do not mix, was the representation of Prime Minister Sharif as 
dictatorial, authoritarian and motivated by self-interested pursuit of power: 
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Though the immediate crisis has passed, Pakistanis will be watchful that Mr 
Sharif does not try to erode further Presidential and judicial powers and so 
concentrate power in his own hands. (Sharif victory as Pakistani president 
quits, Telegraph, 3 December 1997) 
Mr Sharif now looks unassailable, his authoritarian tendencies well established 
[... ] No elected leader has enjoyed so much power. With so few restraints, 
there will be overwhelming temptation to move towards a more dictatorial style 
of government. (Sharif wins all as Pakistan state crumbles, The Times, 3 
December 1997) 
Other reports drew upon the specifically 'Muslim' character of Sharif and his 
party in order to either criticise or derogate his (and their) political influence 
in Pakistan. One report argued that Sharif was acting like a "Mughal 
Emperor" ('Emperor' Sharif savours victory, Telegraph, 4 December 
1997), whilst in an earlier report headlined Sharif supporters riot outside 
court (Telegraph, 18 November 1997), the alleged impudence or perhaps 
illegitimacy of Sharifs political power is clearly illustrated: "In a brazen 
attempt to demonstrate its political clout, Mr Sharif's Pakistan Muslim 
League mobilised thousands of supporters outside the white marble 
Supreme Court building. " The 'Muslim-ness' of Sharif's supporters is 
reiterated in the next sentence of this report, and related directly to notions 
of fanaticism, threat, and actual violence: 
As Mr Sharif entered the court, women party members read verses from the 
Koran and chanted wildly. "Sharif will win. God is with him". As the hearing 
dragged on for three hours, the crowd became restless and began to stone the 
police, who retaliated with baton charges. [emphasis added] 
The journalist shows that a 'cult of personality' surrounds Sharif, inspiring a 
'wild' fanaticism in his followers which, when unchanelled, can result in acts 
of violence and civil disobedience which need to be contained by security 
forces. It is also interesting to note that the 'wild', chanting Muslim party 
members inside the courtroom are identified as being women. Whether this 
facilitates the general argumentative line of an 'emotional' Muslim response 
is unclear. 
In both of these brief case studies - Turkey and Pakistan - broadsheet 
newspapers appear wary or, particularly when reporting Turkey, scared of 
the prospect of Islamic-leaning democratically elected political parties. This 
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aversion to democratically elected Muslim governments resulted in the 
backgrounding and, in some cases, the deletion of the Turkish coup d'etat, 
and the support for a similar course of action in the case of Pakistan. 
Whether this antipathy is in response to the expression of 'Muslim values' in 
the political sphere, the democratic empowerment of (broadly) Muslim 
populations, the democratic empowerment of 'third world' populations, or 
some other unidentified cause is unclear. What the brief discussion above 
has helped to illustrate however, is that broadsheet newspapers - 
particularly right-wing newspapers - believe 'Muslim government' and the 
election of 'Muslim political parties' to be disadvantageous to the 
'democracy' of Muslim countries. 
7.4.4 Sexism: social threat 
Citing 'sexism' or, more specifically, the subjugation and repression of (often 
but not exclusively Muslim) women at the hands of either Muslim men or 
'Muslim' value/social systems, are argumentative strategies frequently used 
to disparage 'Islam'. Examples cited in previous sections suggest that 'Islam' 
and 'illiberal gendered social practice' are tied together by broadsheet 
newspapers via two principle methods. First, the social position of Muslim 
women is described in negative terminology, using stylistic registers of 
repression and constraint, or else simply labelled as backward, 'un-Western', 
illiberal and hence undesirable. The representation of the 'veil' is a case in 
point, and the input of both Islamic and more broadly Muslim feminism (see 
Haddad, 1998; Hijab, 1998; Keddie, 2000; Mernissi, 1991; Yegenoglu, 1998) 
is conspicuously absent because, I believe, they would prove too 
problematic for the simplistic 'East vs. West', 'Muslim vs. Modernist' 
dichotomous representation of gender relations chosen in broadsheet 
reporting. 
Second, through fallacious argument from part ('Muslim') to whole 
('Islam'), negative acts against women by 'Muslims' are uncontroversially 
ascribed to being carried out by Islam - either 'in the name of... ' or 
'sanctioned by... '. Although these more prejudicial (racist? ) generalisations 
are observed more frequently in the reporting of the 'conservative' 
325 
broadsheet press - in particular the Daily Telegraph - they are also 
recognisable in the reporting of the more 'liberal' broadsheets. 
The alleged inferior status which women - Muslim and otherwise - 
have to endure whilst in 'Muslim' countries formed a presupposition in many 
of the recorded items of reporting. A news-story printed in the Independent 
for example, reporting the celebrations in Tehran following Iran's successful 
entry to the 1998 World Cup finals (Crowds hail hand of God in World 
Cup Triumph, 4 December 1997), was based on the same presupposition of 
"women in deep purdah" present in the editorial discussed earlier in this 
chapter (All the world's a pitch; the fixture is friendly, see section 7.4). 
The article reads: "As for the people, they went mad for joy. A few ladies, it 
was said, even joined their menfolk in the street" (emphasis added). The 
perceived discrepancy between how the journalist expects Iranian women to 
act and their reported celebrations, is illustrated in the use of "even" -a 
scalar implicature marking the highly deviate nature of the reported action 
and hence exposing the presupposition upon which such implicature is 
based: 'Iranian women don't do this kind of thing'. 
On other occasions, to adopt and slightly adapt the cliche, journalists 
did not let the facts get in the way of a good opportunity to associate `Islam' 
with 'sexism'. When Lucille McLaughlan, one of the British Nurses found 
guilty of murdering Australian Nurse Yvonne Gilford, got married whilst in a 
Saudi Arabian jail, the broadsheets' descriptions of her dress couldn't have 
been more different: 
The bride is reported to have worn a traditional Arabian dress and veil at the 
ceremony. (Nurse weds in `unforgettable' ceremony, Independent, 1 
December 1997) 
As two Saudi police officers looked on, McLaughlin, aged 32, exchanged rings 
with Mr Ferrie, aged 30, a tyre fitter. She wore traditional Arabian dress. (Nurse 
weds in Saudi jail, Guardian 1 December 1997) 
McLaughlan wore a smart Western-style dress, not the black abeya and veil 
that women in the conservative Islamic kingdom have to wear in public. (Murder 
case nurse is given Saudi wedding with Western touches, Telegraph, 1 
December 1997; emphasis added) 
In the Telegraph report, the (alleged) actions of McLaughlin - her decision to 
wear a "smart Western-style dress" - are represented as full virtued: an act 
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of liberty in a land of Islamic repression of women. In this way, the 
Telegraph's representation of the marriage fits with the 'typology of hijab 
representation' suggested by Hage (1998): for the conservative press, the 
veil often represents "the subjugation of women to a non-national patriarchy. 
The desire to remove it is the desire to ensure that all women within the 
nation are subjugated to the dominant national patriarchal order" (p. 251). 
The Telegraph's removal of the veil from McLaughlin's marriage could 
therefore illustrate the potentially disruptive influence which (the paper 
believes) non-national patriarchy represents to the 'Western marriage', and 
the corresponding ideological importance that the image of the bride is 
(re)presented as one of the "Western touches" mentioned in the report's 
headline. 
The Muslim veil, and the political significance of veiling on and for 
gender relations, also form the focus of the following two articles, both 
printed in the Guardian. In the first, headlined `Coffee, tea or a headscarf? ' 
(5 December 1997) Kathy Evans describes the "austerity aboard the world's 
most Islamic airline" - IranAir. The first paragraph sets the tone for the 
remainder of the article: 
"You will please to put on your headscarf" [sic], said the matronly, heavily 
covered air hostess. This was not a request but an order to all women 
passengers, regardless of nationality, to adopt Islamic dress. 
In this excerpt, Evans skilfully combines several of the principle discourses 
within which the veil is located: the pressure to wear the veil comes solely 
from 'outside', rather than from the internalised (admittedly social) values of 
Muslim women; women are 'ordered' not 'requested' to wear the veil; and the 
(Iranian) veil is restrictive and burdensome, since it "heavily" not 'completely' 
covers the women. These discourses are also drawn upon lower down the 
article, where the Iranian actresses staring in the inflight films are similarly 
"heavily covered" and "IranAir's regulations are enforced even while its 
aircraft are parked in British airports" (emphases added). 
Further, Evans' exact transcription of the "matronly" air hostess' 
inarticulate "order" is interesting. Here, by (allegedly) recalling exactly what 
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the hostess said, Evans manages to obfuscate both the meaning and 
function of her statement - here framed as either a "request" or an "order". 
Once the speech act is made ambiguous in this way, Evans is able to 
explicitly disambiguate the meaning of the statement in favour of her own 
argument: it was "not a request, but an order". However, the air hostess did 
say "please", and the inclusion of this word appears to undermine the 
certainty in Evans' claim that the statement was an outright "order". Due to 
the (allegedly) verbatim quotation of the air hostess, Evans produced a 
statement whose meaning was ambiguous - primarily due to the co-location 
of the imperative "You will" and the solicitary "please". In this way, the 
statement could have been presented and interpreted simply as the hostess' 
inarticulate attempt to politely request Evans to don her headscarf. This 
more generous interpretation of the statement would not, however, have 
produced a meaning so functional to, and supportive of, the broader 
argument of the article: the Iranian airlines' enforcement of the veil. 
The final article of this section (Fashion statement lands `fatwa', 
Guardian, 3 December 1997), combines the disparaging discourse of 
'sexism and social threat' with that of `extremism and Muslim violence' 
previously discussed. The first paragraph reads: 
A young Roman designer who put on a fashion show combining nudity with the 
Islamic chador was last night recovering under police guard from a beating at 
the hands of unidentified assailants. 
The journalist, John Hooper, states that the attack followed "a string of 
threatening phone calls from callers with foreign accents" and "visits at his 
boutique from Middle Eastern callers showing particular interest in his 
nationality" (emphases added). These contextualising details are interesting, 
since, while they follow the "global homology" of the news-media - wherein 
violence will be "presented as ethnic or foreign in its origins" (Hartley & 
Montgomery, 1985: 244) - they are located in Italy, itself a 'foreign' country, 
at least to a British readership. The 'angle' of foreign-domestic violence is 
further highlighted in the excerpt above, through describing the designer, 
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"Farhan Rahbarzadeh, the Italian born son of Iranian parents", as a "young 
Roman designer". 
Rahbarzadeh's "fashion statement" referred to in the headline, 
designed to create as much publicity as possible at the "opening of his 
boutique", was certainly incendiary. The designer dressed three models 
in black chadors, which [during the show] they let fall to the ground. One of the 
models turned out to be a man wearing nothing but a chastity belt. The other 
two were women, one wearing nothing but a live python, the other a skimpy 
dress held together in such a way as to reveal a padlock at the crotch. 
Continuing, 
Mr Rahbarzadeh said he had wanted to make a statement in favour of the 
liberation of Middle Eastern women. To symbolise their entrapment, he used a 
special fabric containing leaves and flowers encased in silicon. 
Rahbarzadeh's "statement" therefore presupposes that "Middle Eastern 
women" (note the euphemism: these are not Israelis we're talking about) are 
both unliberated and trapped, and that the way out of such an entrapped 
state is to accede to the ('Western') commodification of the female body. 
In the upshot of the report, and echoing the reference in the headline, 
the journalist suggests that Rahbarzadeh's approach "seems to have made 
him the object of fashion's first unofficial fatwa. " The use of "fatwa" to 
describe the attack against the designer, illustrates the journalists desire to 
present the story, and the issues which surround it, in as inflammatory a 
style as possible. An "unofficial fatwa" is an oxymoron, since a fatwa is a 
wholly official edict: a legal ruling given by a mojtahed - an individual 
qualified to interpret Islamic jurisprudence and if necessary draw new (at 
times different) understanding from it - something which the reporter is tacitly 
acknowledging in his use of the modifier "unofficial". The term only makes 
sense if we adopt the same prejudicial definition of a fatwa as that offered by 
Wynford Hicks (1998): "a death sentence". 
The report therefore offers a series of negative argumentative 
propositions, which suggest that 'Islam', in extremis, poses a threat to the 
enlightenment project of 'the West': Presupposing that (Muslim) "Middle 
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Eastern women" are unliberated - metonymically represented here as the 
chador - the journalist reports an the event in which a 'Western' man 
(significantly, an assimilated Iranian) attempted, albeit symbolically, to 
'liberate' Muslim women. Faced with this challenge, "foreign" men with 
"Middle Eastern" accents attacked the designer - an attack which, despite 
being perpetrated by "unidentified assailants", is tied to 'Islam' through being 
described as a "fatwa". This in turn grants further support to the designer's 
original motivation for the 'fashion show': that 'Muslims' and perhaps 'Islam' 
as a whole, are in desperate need of the civilising influence of 'the West'. 
This argumentative conclusion is developed further in the analysis of articles 
included in the next section. 
7.5 The civilising influence of `the West' and `Westernisation' 
Van Ginneken (1998) suggests: 
Most citizens of major Western nations - and that includes most journalists - are 
deeply convinced that their society not only represents the very apex of 
civilisation, but is also willing to do all it can to help others reach this stage as 
soon as possible (p. 62) 
These convictions are occasionally observable in the casual, rather 
extraneous editorialising which peppers even the most objective reporting. A 
model example of this, included in an otherwise rigorously objective report in 
the Financial Times (Ataturk's legacy, 20 January, 1998) reporting the 
banning of Turkey's Islamic Welfare Party, reads: 
Mr Erbakan has appealed to the European Court of Human Rights. Thus even 
the most Islamically minded Turks are discovering the value of European 
institutions. [emphasis added] 
The scalar implicature present in "even the most Islamically minded Turks... " 
illustrates the presupposed cultural distance between European institutions 
and those who are "Islamically minded". By suggesting that it is the "value" 
rather than the 'presence' of these institutions which is being 'discovered', 
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the report further implies that "Islamically minded Turks" are being 
enlightened by this contact with European politico-legal institutions. 
Other reports suggest that the social values of Muslims are being 
improved by contact with 'the West'. An article headlined Islamic dream 
wife proves elusive in today's Kuwait (Guardian, 17 December 1997) for 
example, argues that "bred by decades of exposure to Western culture, 
travel and television", Kuwaiti women are now convinced by the superiority 
of the `western marriage'. The by-line reads: "Western ideals of equality held 
by Muslim women can make marriage difficult - if not out of the question"; 
and the journalist, Kathy Evans, holds onto this conclusion despite including 
material in her article which could result in a different interpretation. 
The evidence Evans presents to support her argument is certainly 
interesting. She states that there are an estimated "40,000 spinsters in 
Kuwait today, a figure unprecedented in the country's history. " A manager of 
a mosque's marriage committee, is quoted as saying "Kuwaiti men just do 
not trust the liberated girls", and the only quoted woman of the article, 
"Miriam, a 26 year old graduate working in a government ministry", says: 
No way am I going to obey my husband or allow him total control in my 
marriage. I want a western style marriage like you see on television where the 
responsibilities are shared. 
On the basis of this evidence, Evans' conclusion - Western values are 
raising Kuwaiti women's aspirations for marriage, resulting in their becoming 
less attractive to Kuwaiti men with their Islamic values - appears quite 
plausible. Yet the article also includes two observations which cast doubts 
on the accuracy of this conclusion. First, the article holds up the account 
which "Mohammed, a young government clerk" gives of his "key 
requirements of his wife-to-be" to be representative of the problems of 
organised marriage in Kuwait. Mohammed wants "someone, er, like Cindy 
Crawford - but of course she must have an Islamic ideology". The 
photograph which accompanies the article is a photomontage of Cindy 
Crawford wearing a hijab, and the caption suggests Mohammed's 
"requirements" are representative: "Kuwaiti men want the face of Cindy 
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Crawford but the ideology and veil of Islam". Evans' choice to focus on (and 
celebrate) the 'unrealisable' goal of a modern Kuwaiti wife with "an Islamic 
ideology" down-plays not only her accompanying observation that Kuwaiti 
men's aspirations for a Muslim Cindy Crawford are unrealistic, but also that 
they are similarly attributable to "decades of exposure to Western culture, 
travel and television". 
Second, the article includes an observation which suggests that the 
high number of Kuwaiti spinsters may be attributable to a different set of 
forces altogether: 
With the majority of Kuwaiti women now working or choosing to study up to 
graduate level, many delay marriage until their mid-twenties or later. 
So perhaps the "unprecedented" number of Kuwaiti spinsters may be 
attributable to changes in the personal ambitions of Kuwaiti women to work 
or complete their education and therefore to marry at a later age. Kuwaiti 
women are unquestionably changing their personal goals and aspirations, 
but to explain this purely by reference to the influence - and implied 
superiority - of Western values, belies extreme ethnocentrism. 
The improving influence which 'Western values' have on the 'Islamic 
world' also forms a central argument in an news article headlined Welcome 
to the new Iran (Independent on Sunday, 7 December 1997). In this article, 
the by-line announces, "Robert Fisk found Tehran to be an efficient and 
tolerant city. Until the veil slipped and the old order was revealed". This "old 
order" is one in which: "Ayatollah Khomeini's massive portrait would glower 
down"; "Death to America" would ring "throughout the airport's black painted 
arrivals lounge"; "visitors to the grotty Laleh hotel [... ] would have to wipe 
their shoes on a doormat depicting the American flag"; and Iranian official- 
dom was characterised by "bearded civil servants, ladies in chadors [... ] dirty 
cups on the desks, papers on the floor; no explanations. [... ] More bearded 
men, [and] more dirty cups. " Fisk's preoccupation with 'dirt' and particularly 
the 'amenities' in the "grotty" hotel are commonplace ways to cast 
aspersions when describing Muslim countries. 
332 
In contrast, when Fisk describes the (good) `new Iran' he uses terms 
of description which praises the country according its acceptance of values 
identified as being more 'Western'. It is clean, articulate, deferential, 
increasingly high-tech and (interestingly) "efficient". Following an afternoon 
of being passed 'from pillar to post' in search of his press pass, Fisk 
describes how he "found an office of spotless hygiene where a young woman 
with immaculate English apologised effusely for my problems. A brand new 
govt Mercedes was purring at the door ... 
[and] more polished young men 
promised me a press pass in hours" (emphases added). In contrast to its 
previously austerity, "the arrivals lounge was [now] painted a gleaming 
white"; "The young man at immigration was clean-shaven and wanted to talk 
about Iran's 2-2 draw with Australia"; and "gone is the grubby doormat [of the 
Laleh hotel]; in its place lies a massive, finely stitched Tabriz carpet of 
crimson and green gardens". 
In summarising the report, Fisk asks: are these changes "a sign of the 
times? Or just a brief fling with reality now that Mohamed Khatami [... ] is 
President". The presupposed superiority of Western values is clearly 
illustrated here in Fisk's `question': under Khatami, the "new Iran" is coming 
to its senses and recognising "reality". In this "new Iran", "there is a feeling 
that President Khatami can present the human face of the revolution, where 
women's equality and youth are more important than punishment and 
suspicion". The 'Westernising' position of President Khatami in the reporting 
of Iran is developed further in the next section 
7.5.1 `Pluralism' in Iran 
This section of the chapter analyses articles taken from a sub-corpus of 
recorded items which reported the events and declarations of the 
Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) conference which took place in 
Tehran (9 December 1997). Broadsheet newspapers used this occasion to 
discuss civil and political pluralism in Iran and, in particular, the potential for 
'positive change' - described as 'modernisation' by some, or 'Western i sati on' 
by others - which they argued the election of President Khatami represented. 
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Using the OIC conference as a case study, the broadsheets 
presented Iranian political life as a power struggle rarifiable between actors 
representing two polarised political camps: the 'moderates' and the 
'conservatives'. Although this 'two party split' does, to some extent, represent 
current Iranian ideological debate on issues such as civil society, citizen's 
rights and (in particular) political representation, it is, as Boroumand & 
Boroumand (2000) have illustrated, a gross simplification "epistemologically 
based on the 'good guy/bad guy dialectic"', which "precludes an 
understanding" of Iran (p. 307). Within this simplified dialectic, President 
Khatami is good "moderate", wishing "to liberalise the Islamic regime from 
within. He enjoys the support of the masses, but is challenged by the 
conservatives, who are violent, corrupt and unpopular" (Boroumand & 
Boroumand, 2000: 306-7). In other words, President Khatami is represented 
as the supporter of people's sovereignty (democratic; 'Western') and the 
Supreme Leader Khamenei, along with a homogenised corps of 'clerics', are 
the defenders of the Shari'a (autocratic; 'Islamic'). Accordingly, a perverse 
mutation occurs whereby the broadsheets report internal Iranian politics 
according to the recurrent manichean representation of 'Islam vs. the West'. 
A Telegraph editorial headlined Ayatollah greets Satan (18 
December 1997), argued that the political ground "is shifting in the hitherto 
rigidly antagonistic relationship between Iran and the United States", 
changes which 
stem from the election last May of Mr Khatami, a moderate who trounced the 
candidate favoured by the conservative clerics. His support came largely from 
women and young people, for whom 18 years of an Islamic republic had offered 
little encouragement. [emphasis added] 
The editorial's primary argument is that, since Khatami is someone who the 
US find easier to deal with, he is closer to a 'Western' way of thinking than 
the "conservative clerics". This is supported by Khatami's syntactic 
opposition to the "clerics" who are presupposedly non-Western, by virtue of 
their 'Islamic-ness'. " This opposition is given greater weight by the second 
sentence of the excerpt which reveals that Khatami's electoral support came 
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from "women and young people" dissatisfied with "an Islamic republic": a 
sexist, traditional and parochial country. This not only suggests that Khatami, 
being a "moderate", intends to move Iran away from being an Islamic 
Republic, but also implies that he played no part in governing the Islamic 
Republic - quite a startling suggestion given that President Khatami is a 
hojatol-eslam and served as the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance for 
more than 10 years. 12 
Similarly, an editorial printed in The Times (Welcome to Tehran, 9 
December 1997) posits another value-laden figure of contrast: the occasion 
of the OIC conference, it suggests, "provides clues to the continuing struggle 
between modernisers and the Islamic die-hards for the soul of the country" 
(emphasis added). Although Khatami is only described as "the relatively 
reasonable new president" (emphasis added), the newspaper's antipathy 
towards his opposition - the "anti-Western revolutionary Iran" - is openly 
declared. The alternative to Khatami, The Times suggests, is an "ignorant 
and corrupt clergy attempting to sabotage cautious moves to liberalise the 
economy and the social climate". Whereas Khatami has "people power on 
his side" (democratic; 'good') 
He will not attempt a volte-face over Middle East peace, anti-Americanism or 
Islamic zealotry [violence; fanaticism; 'bad'] so long as he and his allies are 
unable to confront the religious police [tyrannical; 'bad'] or question the 
obscurantist [dubious; unenlightened; 'bad'] legal code. 
In a similar way to the Telegraph, The Times chooses to suggest that 
Khatami desires to bring about legal change in order to reposition both 
Iranian foreign policy and (seemingly) diminish the centrality of Islam to 
Iranian internal politics. This, presumably, is the result of the newspapers' 
inability to reconcile the notion that Khatami can be both 'moderate' and 
'anti-American', someone who supports both the ("ignorant and corrupt") 
shi'a clergy and the liberalisation of the economy, or, most tellingly, that he 
can be both 'Muslim' and 'moderniser'. 
The presupposed antithesis between Islam and reform is also present 
in the reporting of the 'liberal' broadsheets. So for example, when Robert 
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Fisk suggests: "If President Khatami does create pluralism, his will be the 
only democratic nation in the Muslim Middle East" he presupposes that 
pluralism does not currently exist in Iran (The Iranian political football is 
passed to the adults, Independent, 9 December 1997; emphasis added). A 
contrasting, and slightly paradoxical Guardian news feature (After the Shah, 
an endless dance of revolution, 3 January 1998) appears to find difficulty 
in concluding that the landslide election victory of President Khatami 
suggests that Iran is democratic: 
Iran still falls short of any synthesis between its religious and its liberal 
traditions, while managing to maintain, it must be said, a system that has a 
genuine democratic dimension. 
The journalist's recognition of Iran's "genuine democratic dimension" 
appears to be more a grudging admission than a ringing conclusion. Further, 
the journalist's structuring of the sentence reveals the distance he 
presupposes between, not only religion and liberalism, but also between 
religion and democracy -a system which Iran is "managing to maintain" 
despite its religious and liberal contrariety. 
This 'difficulty' in reconciling Islam and liberalism/modernity is cast in 
a much more confrontational light in another Guardian article (Top clerics 
enter the fray in the fight for the soul of Iran, 10 December 1997). Here, 
Kathy Evans posits "a conflict" between 
the vocal and violent radicals and the silent majority of liberals and modernists 
struggling to produce a new vision of Islam seemingly at ease with, not 
threatened by, globalisation and modern technology. 
In addition to the usual 'Islamists vs. the Modernists' schema, this passage 
also contains suggestions of the dictatorial and non-representative nature of 
Iran's leaders, at clear odds with the democratic nature of the Iranian 
system. Higher order themes of the incommensurable nature of Islam and 
modernity are also present, since the "liberals and modernists" are said to be 
"struggling to produce a new vision of Islam" reconciled with modernity, here 
represented as technology and the ideology of globalisation. The use of the 
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adjective "new" implies that such an undertaking has not done before and as 
such this "vision" of Islam is, in fact, a 'revision'. The use of the verb 'to 
struggle' in its present tense reiterates the ongoing nature of this task, 
suggesting that such a scheme is perhaps not that straightforward. There is 
something, this implies, in the nature of 'Islam' and/or 'modernity' that 
restricts their union. 
Further to the suggestion that 'Islamism' and 'modernity' are 
exclusive, even incommensurable, this Guardian article suggests: Iranians 
can be placed exhaustively in either one of these ideological groupings; that 
despite the fact that "two thirds of the voters want the government to adopt 
more liberal social policies", those in the minority, (dogmatically) retaining 
loyalties to radical Islamism, dominate political debate; and thus whilst 
'Liberalism' and 'Modernity' (antithetical to Islam) are the choices of the 
people, they are repressed by "the vocal and violent [Islamic] radicals". In 
this way, a global homology is suggested: 
Modernity : popular support:: Islam : dictatorship 
The actors included in this report are subsequently offered in personification 
of this homology - the Supreme Leader Khamenei as 'Islam'; President 
Khatami as 'modernity' - as indicated by the content of their respective 
speeches to the OIC. The report argues that the speech given by Ayatollah 
Khamenei "contained echoes of the language of the early days of Iran's 
Islamic revolution. [... ] and urged Muslims to be more united against 
Western cultural invasions. " President Khatami, 
in contrast, spoke about human rights, the need for democracy in Muslim 
countries, and dialogue with the West. Muslims, he said, had to use the West's 
scientific and social achievements to advance. [emphasis added] 
As suggested above, political and public debate in Iran is currently 
dominated by an ideological and social struggle, broadly the result of 
tensions between `reformist' and 'conservative' religious coalitions. For 
British broadsheet newspapers, this contest for political power was variously 
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interpreted as the efforts of the moderate President Khatami to 'reform' or 
'liberalise' or 'modernise' or 'Westernise' Iran, in the face of an illiberal, 
intransigent Islamic dictatorship. This representation is first, inaccurate, 
since in contrast to the journalists' inability to conceive of a model of 
'development' other than secular western democracy, President Khatami is 
not attempting to 'Westernise' Iranian democratic politics. In contrast, 
Khatami suggests Iran 
must wage a war on two fronts: against its own extremists and against the 
attraction of the humanistic West. To survive, according to Khatami, the Islamic 
regime needs modern religious thought, capable of attracting the youth and 
responding to the challenge of Western humanism, and a people ready to 
participate actively in the social and political life of their country. (Boroumand & 
Boroumand, 2000: 312). 
Second, the dominant (schematic) representation of Iran is unhelpful since it 
suggests that the only criticisms of theocratic rule in general and of the 
Velayet-e faqih in particular, come from 'liberal' ('Westernised') politicians 
and scholars. Far reaching social and political critique employing complex 
and technical Islamic argumentation is regularly printed in the Iranian press - 
particularly the women's press which has become "both a profession and a 
rallying point" (Keddie, 2000: 417) for Iranian women. Using gender 
inequality as a case example, Azadeh Kian-Thiebaut (1999) has argued that 
the reformist role of the women's press cannot be ignored in any analysis of 
contemporary political debate in Iran: 
Women's magazines [... ] are playing a critical role in [Iran's] transformation. [... ] 
The editors of these publications unanimously maintain that the inequality 
between men and women springs not from the Qur'an, but from religious 
authorities' misinterpretation of divine laws. [... ] They also highlight 
contributions from reformist clerics, who are increasingly attentive to women's 
claims that Islamic laws must be adapted to the realities of contemporary 
Iranian society, in which women's social, economic, political and cultural 
activities have become integral. (Kian-Thiebaut, 1999: 15, cited in Keddie, 
2000: 424) 
It is lamentable that such important sites of social criticism and debate are 
ignored by the broadsheet press, seemingly because their ontological 
framework of 'Islam = backward; the West = progress' precludes the 
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possibility that a 'progressive' argument could originate within and orientate 
itself towards an 'Islamic' value system. 
7.6 Normalisation of Israeli aggression 
Integral to the 'ideological square' which I suggest characterises broadsheet 
representations of Islam and Muslims, is the complimentary representation of 
'Our' social action in contrast with the negative representation of 'Their' 
social action. It is worth bearing in mind that the pronouns 'Us' and 'Them', 
'Our' and `Their', and even 'Self and 'Other' do not have any meaning other 
than their immediate application: their meaning is constantly negotiated and 
renegotiated in the context of specific reports, and actors included as 'We' 
and 'Our' of some reports (for example, the French government whilst 
bombing Serbia) are positioned as 'They' and 'Theirs' in others (for example, 
the French government whilst debating the EU or the Euro). When analysing 
news reports in which it is not immediately clear who are being included in 
the position 'Us', it is possible to work backwards from this ideological 
double strategy, identifying whose opinions and social activities are 
represented positively and whose receive criticism. The negotiated status of 
the position 'Us' is clear in a number of articles discussed earlier in the 
chapter, not least in the book review The Holy Terror (Sunday Times Books 
supplement, 18 January 1998; see section 7.4.2). 
When reporting Israel and Palestine, the sampled broadsheet 
newspapers predominantly positioned Israel and the Jews as 'We', thereby 
assuring their positive representation; and conversely, Palestine and Arabs - 
and not only the Muslim Arabs - were positioned as 'They', prefacing a 
negative representation. 13 This schematic representation of Palestine has 
been touched upon in the examples discussed earlier in this chapter - 
specifically the reporting of Bethlehem at Christmas. This final section 
explores this (re)negotiation of 'Us' and 'Them', in the context of reporting 
Palestine, in greater depth. 
The acceptance of Israeli argumentation is clearly noticeable in the 
symbolic annexation of illegally occupied land. What this means is that 
'illegally occupied Arab land' is very rarely so labelled, with the broadsheet 
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press preferring to label such occupation as 'Israeli settlements'. For 
example, when Binyamin Netanyahu approved plans to build in Jabul Abu- 
Ghneim -a move illegal under both the UN convention and the Oslo Accord - 
the broadsheet press unerringly used the Hebrew name for this area of East 
Jerusalem: Har Homa. In one report the Independent went so far as to 
describe the annexation as "the Jewish neighbourhood planned for the 
outskirts of the city" (11 December 1997), providing the kind of euphemistic 
gloss that the Israeli government would no doubt consider to be very useful. 
In other articles, explicit Israeli plans to consolidate lands taken 
through violent conquest are uncritically accepted. For example, a report 
headlined Likud politician calls for Palestinian state (The Times, 28 
November 1997), shows a characteristic lack of critical insight into the 
reported claims of Likud chief whip Meir Sheerit, the Israeli politician central 
to the story. The opening paragraph of the story, written by Christopher 
Walker, reads: 
A leading member of Binyamin Netanyahu's ruling Likud party yesterday 
backed the creation of a limited Palestinian state in a new challenge to the 
policy of the embattled right-wing Israeli Prime Minister. 
This excerpt clearly suggests, through the use of "new challenge", that the 
proposed "limited Palestinian state" represents a change in direction, or 
perhaps a move forward, for the previously obstructive Likud party. This 
argumentative line is reiterated in the paragraphs which followed, 
suggesting, for example, that Netanyahu was stalling the 'peace process' in 
line with the demands of "extreme right-wing Jews, furious that he plans to 
hand back more West Bank land to Palestinians". Against this party policy, 
Sheerit's "challenge" is described as a "surprise conversion" towards the 
objectives of the Oslo agreement. 
On face value, Sheerit's comments do indeed appear to be quite 
radical. He is quoted as saying: "I think it is possible to achieve peace with 
the Palestinians"; and that "The most important thing is to initiate the 
establishment of a Palestinian state while we are still in power. " However, 
lower down the article, details are given which should have cast serious 
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doubts on the equity of Sheerit's planned "final settlement peace offer". 
Walker writes: "Under his proposal, Jerusalem would remain under Israeli 
sovereignty, the Jordan river would remain Israel's border and Israel would 
annex most of the 144 Jewish settlements. " This plan would, of course, 
result in the legitimised expansion of Israel to include most of the land 
illegally occupied since 1967: East Jerusalem, the whole of the West Bank 
(in line with a border at the Jordan river) and 144 other 'settlements' which, 
although unspecified, must logically lie in territory other than the West Bank 
- perhaps in Lebanon. Not only does this plan go unexplained, 
uncontextualised and uncriticised, by presenting it in contrast to Netanyahu's 
"uncompromising" stance, Walker's report quite logically implies that it 
represents a compromise. This in turn supports Israel's claims to being the 
conciliatory party in the dispute, further undermining the Palestinian 
objections to the legalised theft of land which would inevitably arise from this 
proposal. 
Violence proposed by Israel against sovereign (Muslim) states often 
goes similarly uncriticised by the broadsheet press - take the report Israel 
steps up plans for air attacks on Iran (The Times, 9 December 1997) for 
example. As the headline suggests, the article, again written by Christopher 
Walker, reports the "options" available to Israel in forming their "military 
contingency plans to neutralise Iran's Russian-backed missile and nuclear 
weapon programme". The 'need' for such a plan, already hinted at in its 
description above, was clearly articulated by the Israeli Defence Minister, 
Yitzhak Mordechai: 
"A country like Iran possessing such long range weaponry -a country that lacks 
stability, that is characterised by Islamic fundamentalism, by an extremist 
ideology that is striving to become a superpower in the Middle East - is very 
dangerous. " 
Such an accusation represents the classic approach of the propagandist, as 
illustrated by Ellul (1965: 58): "He who wants to provoke a war not only 
proclaims his own peaceful intentions but also accuses the other party of 
provocation. [ ... ] He who wants to establish a dictatorship always insists his 
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adversaries are bent on dictatorship. " Israeli foreign policy, Shahak (1997) 
suggests, is not driven by "the `wish for peace', so often assumed as the 
Israeli aim" (p. 3); rather, like all states, Israel has "hegemonic aspirations. A 
state aspiring to hegemony in an area cannot tolerate other strong states in 
that area" (Ibid. ). Should Iran have made similar argumentative claims about 
the hegemonic political ambitions of Israel - claims which Israel Shahak 
(1997) shows would be well founded14 - they would no doubt be presented 
as either laughable or another example of Iranian belligerence. 
The greater part of the article is dedicated to describing "the two main 
options" that "Military planners are studying" as part of this anti-Iran plan. 
Either: "hitting Iranian missile plants in the cities of Shiraz, Kuramabad, 
Farhin and Semnan with the 'long arm' of its airforce, or targeting foreign 
scientists at the facilities rather than the buildings themselves. " The further 
details of Walker's breathless descriptions of "advanced F151 fighter planes" 
and "surgical air strikes" can be skipped over since they are identical to the 
well trodden rhetoric discussed in Chapter 6. Conspicuously absent from the 
discussion is any recognition of the intrinsic illegality of the plan, Israel's 
blind contempt for human life in proposing to bomb another nation without 
making any consideration for the welfare of Iranians, and the uncritical 
acceptance of Israel's seeming right to act accordingly on the part of Walker. 
Such a tacit support for the proposed Israeli offensive could only be 
achieved after Iranian human life is degraded to a point where it is thought to 
be disposable. 
7.6.1 Attempted assassination of Khaled Meshal 
A similarly nonchalant attitude towards state-sponsored terrorism (at least 
when it's directed towards Muslims) characterise the last few articles of this 
section, all of which reported the attempted assassination of the leader of 
Hamas' politburo, Khaled Meshal, by Mossad. The exact details of the attack 
are still somewhat obscure, but this much is clear: on 26 September 1997, 
as Mr Meshal was entering his office building in the Jordanian capital 
Amman, two men approached him from behind and pressed a device to his 
ear. Meshal heard a loud noise, fell to the ground and immediately started 
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shaking uncontrollably. The two men escaped in an awaiting car containing 
a further two men, but were arrested later in the day by Jordanian police at 
which point they produced Canadian passports and were identified as Sean 
Kendall and Barry Beads. However, when the two men refused to see the 
Canadian diplomat, their passports were discovered to be forgeries and the 
remaining two assailants took refuge in the Israeli embassy, suspicions gave 
way to an Israeli admission of guilt. Canada withdrew its ambassador; Israel 
brokered a deal to release Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of 
Hamas, and, in what King Hussein called a "gesture of peace", deport him to 
Jordan; and Israel was forced to send an antidote to the Jordanian hospital 
where Meshal was recovering, fuelling speculation that the device was a 
chemical or biological weapon. 
The leniency-verging-on-flippancy with which the broadsheets 
approached this story is characterised a Guardian article headlined Mossad 
own goal rebounds on PM (4 October 1997) - the sporting metaphor of the 
headline already diminishing the significance of the reported action. The 
attempt on Meshal's life resulted in hardly a word of criticism: the failed 
assassination is described as a "bungled attack" which has set "a bizarre 
new benchmark" in Mossad's "colourful history", the facts of which "are 
reminiscent of a paperback thriller. " The reporter, Julian Borger, preferred to 
focus on the potentially negative effect which the failure of the mission will 
have on Netanyahu's credibility and political career. For example, a bold, 
closed captioned quote read "There is a growing feeling this government 
can't get it right - it just goes from screw-up to screw-up", drawing attention 
to the failure of the attack rather than its legality. Any mention of international 
law, of 'terrorism' or the implications of a sovereign state assassinating its 
political and/or criminal opponents was carefully avoided. Indeed the 
attempted assassination is located within a list of Mossad's "daring exploits" 
(emphasis added) such as "the raid on Entebbe and the abduction of Nazi 
war criminal Adolf Eichmann" thereby minimising the opportunities to object 
to the attack - these are, after all, the dashing boys of Mossad. 
The report in the Independent, although arguing that "the attempted 
assassination" (also described as "zany") showed that Israel was 
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"responding to political challenges in a very primitive way", also chose to 
frame the attack as a(nother) failure of Netanyahu's government rather than 
as a terrorist act (Bibi flounders in sea of troubles after Hamas fiasco, 4 
October 1997). The Telegraph also avoided any suggestion that the 
"botched assassination attempt" amounted to terrorism, although they did 
make repeated and extended reference to Meshal's involvement in Hamas' 
terrorist actions, despite his working for the party politburo rather than its 
armed wing (Hamas leader tells how he survived murder attempt, 4 
October 1997). Similarly The Times labelled the attack as the "botched 
Mossad secret service operation in Jordan", and further suggested that "the 
Israeli public [had] expressed concern that the already fading image of 
Mossad's invincibility has suffered a severe blow" (Calls for inquiry over 
Mossad plot, 4 October 1997). Somewhere along the line, the fact that a 
state had attempted to assassinate a man was somehow lost. 
The Sunday broadsheets were equally prone to normalising the attack 
on Meshal. In a report headlined Netanyahu censored by Hamas truce 
offer for example (The Sunday Times, 19 October 1997) the assassination 
attempt received the standard description of a "bungled" operation. In 
addition, the report lower down stated: 
Netanyahu points to polls showing support for his decision, made after a suicide 
bombing in Jerusalem on July 30, to eliminate senior Hamas figures. But critics 
say the risk to the delicate relationship with Jordan should have ruled out 
carrying out any assassination attempt on Jordanian territory. 
Note that it is not the plan to "eliminate senior Hamas figures" which "critics" 
balked at, but rather Netanyahu's decision to allow it to occur on Jordanian 
territory. The simple illegality of Netanyahu's plan, not to mention the 
scandalous possibility that the Israeli government may have developed an 
explicit 'shoot-to-kill' policy in 'dealing with' its political (albeit terrorist) 
opponents, are concerns which the journalist neither acknowledges nor 
criticises. 
Finally, in an article providing an epilogue to the attack, the Sunday 
Times reported that an Israeli committee set up "to investigate a bungled 
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attempt by Mossad agents to assassinate one of the leaders of Hamas, the 
Islamic fundamentalist group, is expected to recommend the dismissal of 
Danny Yatom, the head of the service" ('Arab hunter' bids to control 
Mossad, 9 November 1997; emphases added). The favourite successor to 
Yatom was Meir Dagan - "a man who knows no fear" who, during the intifada, 
formed two "hit squads, codenamed 'Cherry' and 'Samson', to carry out 
assassinations in the West Bank and Gaza". Other than this obvious 
qualification to head Mossad, Dagan is said to have "established a covert 
death squad called 'Rimon' (grenade)" which "gunned down dozens of 
terrorists"; "helped to establish a unit of about 30 soldiers acting as a hit 
squad in southern Lebanon"; and is regarded as "one of the army's leading 
'Arab hunters'. " The possibility that this man could head Mossad does worry 
the reporter, Uzi Mahnaimi, who states that his appointment "could seriously 
threaten Middle East stability" since he "is known to favour an increase in 
assassinations of those deemed subversive to Israel. " 
In contrast to the "gifted but uncontrollable" Dagan, Danny Yatom is 
represented as a reliable choice to lead Mossad, despite "the debacle in 
Amman". In the only evidence which Mahnaimi provides in support of Yatom, 
taken from his own testimony "before the security services committee of the 
Knesset", Mahnaimi suggests that Yatom "opposed the attack on Meshal, 
preferring a plan to kill another target on a different continent. " That such 
arrogant, scant regard for human life could be included in a broadsheet 
news report, not only without criticism but also in support of Yatom's 
suitability in leading Mossad, is particularly disturbing. 
More disturbing is the realisation that the whole episode, reporting the 
attempted assassination of Khaled Meshal by Mossad, was characterised by 
an equally low estimation of (Arab-Muslim) life on the part of the 
broadsheets, and their simultaneous acceptance of Israel acting with such 
murderous impunity - with some reports implying that Israel were justified in 
attempting to kill Meshal and other opponents. In this way, the reporting of 
the attempted assassination represents an archetypal example of the 
ideological square: whilst the terrorist acts of Hamas ('Meshal's 
fundamentalist group') are condemned, the equally terrorist act of Israel in 
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attempting to assassinate him ('or perhaps they should have killed someone 
else') with a chemical/biological weapon, are implicitly accepted since they 
attracted no significant criticism. 
Notes 
1 Items located in Indonesia and Malaysia focused almost predominantly on the 
economic collapse of these countries and were characterised by the near complete 
inattension to 'Islam' and the predominantly Muslim faith of their populations. By 
these criteria, items reporting Indonesia and Malaysia were therefore excluded 
from the analysis of this chapter. 
Z The remaining primary countries, representing a total 140 items (9.3%), were 
removed from this table due to requirements of space. They are: Kosova (n= 11); 
India (n= 8); Sudan (n= 8); Multiple Muslim countries (n= 8); Germany (n= 8); South 
Africa (n= 8); Azerbaijan (n= 7); Italy (n= 7); Kurdistan (n= 6); Sri Lanka (n= 5); 
Kuwait (n= 4); Turkmenistan (n= 4); Cyprus (n= 4); Syria (n= 3); Tunisia (n= 3); 
Serbia (n= 3); Kazakstan (n= 3); Portugal (n= 3); Russia (n= 3); Philippines (n= 3); 
Oman (n= 3); Chechnya (n= 2); Netherlands (n= 2); Croatia (n= 2); Japan (n= 2); 
South Korea (n= 2); 'Unknown' (n= 2); Bahrain (n= 1); Uganda (n= 1); Sierra 
Leonne (n= 1); Uzbekistan (n= 1); Tajikistan (n= 1); Norway (n= 1); Denmark (n= 
1); Singapore (n= 1); Australia (n= 1); Greece (n= 1); Belgium (n= 1); East Timor 
(n= 1); Luxembourg (n= 1); Hong Kong (n= 1); African countries (n= 1); 'Western' 
countries (n= 1). 
3 These 1504 articles constitute the remaining sample following the removal of both 
domestic articles (n= 276; see Chapter 5) and articles citing either Iraq (n= 531; 
see Chapter 7) or Algeria (n= 242; see Chapter 6) as a primary country. Although 
these frequencies do not appear to add up (the total sample = 2540 articles) this is 
because 13 domestic items also constitute part of the Iraqi and Algerian sub- 
samples due to their being cited as a secondary or tertiary country. 
4 'Actor' is used here to denote all individuals and groups referenced and/or quoted 
in the sampled articles. The relationship of the individual/group to the reported 
event was also coded - as 'Actor'; 'Minor Actor; 'Commentator'; 'Victim'; etc. - but 
such findings are irrelevant to the current discussion, which focuses purely on the 
differential quotation of Muslim and non-Muslim Actors. Tables 8.5 and 8.6 give the 
results for Actors 1 and 2, who were quite simply the first two individuals/groups 
cited in the text. 
5 The 'repression of Muslim women' is also reflected in two photographs which 
accompany this article which, as stated earlier, will not be analysed in this study. 
However, I feel they ought to be mentioned here in order to present a more 
comprehensive account of the article. In the first photo, an attractive, Asian woman 
(no conclusive evidence she is Muslim) wearing 'Westernised' dress and full make- 
up looks directly into the camera (and therefore directly at the viewer). She is wide 
eyed, smiling and confident; the camera has a direct angle, level with the model's 
face, connoting an equal relation between subject and viewer. In contrast the 
second photograph shows three conspicuously Muslim women wearing the hijab 
and holding veils across their faces so that only their eyes and the fringe of one 
woman are visible. They are all looking away from the camera, eyes to the ground; 
the expression of their eyes is not exactly 'inviting' or friendly, in as much it is non- 
expressive; the camera is angled down on them, connoting an elevated and 
therefore empowered (perhaps male) gaze. The contrast between the photographs 
is striking: the liberated, attractive and seemingly happy Westernised Asian woman 
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vs. the deferential, unhappy and repressed Muslim women. The juxtaposed 
meaning of the photos is also reflected in the photocaption: "Restricted viewing: 
toiletry adverts showing women smiling seductively have been banned as growing 
fundamentalism demands only the modestly dressed can be portrayed". 
Articles which use 'sexism' and 'the repression of women' in derogating 
Islam are analysed in more detail in a later section of this chapter. 
6 Ironically, this letter was written in response to a column (The shifting sands, 
David Gardner, Financial Times, 19 November 1997) in which, Lord Stone 
suggests, David Gardner had chosen "a convenient cast of villains to blame for US 
policy `failures' in the Middle East". 
Taking the "perceived US bias towards Israel": based solely upon the wide 
disparity between (for example) the military and economic aid given to Israel and 
that given to the PA, Fateh and the PLO, US pro-Israel bias is surely more reality 
that perception. Regarding the nominalised "renewal of hostilities" between the US 
and Iraq, this structuring of expression conceals: first, the overwhelmingly one- 
sided nature of this violence; and second, the fact that this US hostility has 
continued unabated for much of the period since the 'end' of the 1991 Persian Gulf 
conflict - 'renewal' suggests otherwise. 8 This power is not merely symbolic - every democratically elected government 
since 1986 has been dismissed in such a way. The then-President Farooq Leghari 
had used it to dismiss the Prime Minister immediately prior to Sharif's term in office: 
Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People's Party, of which Leghari was 
also a member. 
9 Should Sharif have been found guilty of this charge - which was brought following 
his alleged criticism of the Chief Justice at a press conference - he would have had 
to stand down from office with no right of appeal. 
10 Surprisingly, the Independent did not report the political stand-off at all, whilst the 
Guardian reported the 'events' of the dispute with very little editorial commentary. 
On only one occasion did the Guardian express a position - in a weekly news 
summary (6 December 1997) where it stated the army has "thankfully" maintained 
that it is not interested in political power. 
" It is interesting to speculate on whether the use of the determiner "conservative" 
is intended to elliptically suggest that Khatami, in opposition, is "a moderate 
[cleric]"; or to simply provide a slightly pejorative identification of the "clerics". It 
appears that the Telegraph is using 'moderate', not as an adjective determining the 
elliptical noun "cleric", but as a noun in itself: 'Khatami is a moderate; he is one of 
the moderates'. With this choice, "a moderate" can be positioned in opposition to 'a 
cleric', (with, in this case, the added adjective "conservative _") 
implying that clerics 
are per se non-moderate. 
12 A hojatol-eslam is a junior shi'a Muslim cleric, subordinate to the higher ranking 
Ayatollahs and Grand Ayatollahs (Ayatollah-ol-ozma). They are not qualified to 
practice ijtihad, as Ayatollahs are, but have to spend a number of years in religious 
training in order to qualify - the exact amount depends on their ability and energy. 
In addition to being hojatol-eslam, Khatami also has an MA equivalency in Islamic 
Theology from Tehran University. 
13 At time of writing, the end of 2000, this schematic representation of 
Israel/Palestine has undergone a partial shift. Newspapers' positioning Israel as 
'We' has become problematic due to the seeming 'shoot to kill' policy of the Israeli 
army and the growing number of Palestinian children killed by Israeli troops. There 
is, however, a residual level of identification in the press (in the sense of 'identifying 
oneself with') illustrated by journalists representing the violence as Palestinian 
action (however ineffectual) and resulting Israeli reaction. Although this does 
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represent a significant shift from the framing of the conflict as 'Palestinians/Muslims 
attack; Israelis defend' shown in this sample, it still provides a defence (however 
tenuous) for Israeli violence and ignores the ongoing policies of, amongst other 
things, intimidation, incarceration, house demolition and torture practised by Israel 
in the occupied territories. 
14 Shahak (1997: 54) argues: 
Since the spring of 1992, public opinion in Israel is being prepared for the 
prospect of a war with Iran, to be fought to bring about Iran's total military and 
political defeat. In one version, Israel would attack Iran alone, in another it 
would 'persuade' the West to do the job. The indoctrination campaign to this 
effect is gaining in intensity. It is accompanied by what could be called semi- 
official horror scenarios purporting to detail what Iran could do to Israel, the 
West and the entire world when it acquires nuclear weapons as it is expected to 
a few years hence. 
Shahak illustrates this point by quoting "respected and influential Israeli experts or 
commentators on strategic affairs" (1997: 58) whose opinions are regularly 
included in mainstream Israeli newspapers. Daniel Leshem for example, a member 
of the Centre for Strategic Research at Tel Aviv University, is quoted proposing to 
"create the situation which would appear similar to that with Iraq before the Gulf 
crisis" (1997: 55; originally in Al Hamishmar, 19 February 1993). His proposal is as 
sinister as it sounds: 
"Iran claims sovereignty over three strategically located islands in the Gulf. 
Domination over those islands is capable of assuring domination not only over 
all the already active oil-fields of the area, but also over all the natural gas 
sources not yet exploited. We should hope that, emulating Iraq, Iran would 
contest the Gulf Emirates and Saudi Arabia over these islands and, repeating 
Saddam Hussein's mistake in Kuwait, start a war. [... ] This prospect is in my 
view quite likely, because patience plays no part in the Iranian mentality. But if 
they nevertheless refrain from starting a war, we should take advantage of their 
involvement in Islamic terrorism which already hurts the entire world. " (Ibid. ) 
The report Israel steps up plans for air attacks against Iran should be viewed as 
part of this belligerent anti-Iranian heritage. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis makes justifiable claims to originality and contributes to 
knowledge in a number of significant ways. In this brief conclusion I restate 
the principal argumentative and corroborative claims made in the thesis. 
First, the thesis employs methods of data collection and analysis which are 
both highly detailed and methodologically sophisticated. I developed and 
operationalised a unique and expansive coding manual which allowed me to 
explore journalistic content across the recorded items of broadsheet 
coverage. In addition, I applied often complex methods of (critical) discourse 
analysis in order to explore meaning - implicit and explicit, transparent and 
opaque - within journalistic texts. The combination of these quantitative and 
qualitative methods therefore considerably enriched the ensuing analysis, 
yielding results which illuminated and enhanced my understanding of both 
the manifest and latent content of the sampled texts. 
Second, the thesis makes a contribution to the development of media 
theory. Throughout this thesis I have applied a context-sensitive theoretical 
model of language in use - 'discourse'. That is, I consider and approach 
journalism as the inseparable combination of 'social practice', 'discursive 
practice' and the 'text' itself. In doing so, my analysis is able to illuminate the 
social and ideological meanings which journalistic texts variously 
presuppose, draw upon, imply and therefore (implicitly and/or explicitly) 
support. More specifically, by adopting such a theoretical position I am able 
to contextualise journalistic practice within its historic, political, economic, 
social, cultural and professional context(s), thereby enabling a critical and 
precise examination of the salient features of the sampled items of 
journalistic coverage. Further, such a grounded discursive analytical 
approach supports inferential conclusions as to how the above contexts 
exert an influence upon and during the production of journalistic discourse, 
and how the analysed texts may, in turn, affect these (social, cultural, 
professional etc. ) contexts, particularly in their ability to produce and 
reproduce racism. 
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Third, the thesis makes a major empirical contribution to knowledge in 
a field of research which is both socially consequential and significantly 
under-researched. In the presentation and discussion of results, I 
foregrounded the dialectic characteristic of discourse, showed that 
journalistic texts should be understood as being both socially determined 
and socially constitutive and, therefore, that journalistic discourse plays a 
crucial role in the enactment as well as in the reproduction of (racist) social 
systems. I showed that broadsheet representations of Islam and Muslims 
predominantly argue that Muslims are 'homogenous', 'separate', 'inferior', 
'the enemy', (etc. ) and can therefore, by the Runnymede Trust's (1997) 
suggested binary oppositions, be regarded as 'Islamophobic'. I argued that 
such an approach is based on a two-fold approach of 'division and rejection' 
characteristic of prejudiced discourse which, in its application, relies upon 
negative other-presentation and a simultaneous positive self-presentation. 
Accordingly, broadsheet newspapers predominantly reframe Muslim cultural 
difference as cultural deviance. 
However, and in keeping with the theoretical model adopted, the 
exact forms which such 'Islamophobic' and racist discourses take varies 
between different reporting contexts and across different reporting topics. In 
the final results chapter I identified four archetypal prejudicial strategies, or 
topoi, which were predominantly used across the sampled texts to derogate 
Muslims: the military threat 'They' pose to other countries; the terrorist or 
extremist threat 'They' pose; the threat 'They' pose to the democratic stability 
of 'Their' own countries; and the threat 'They' pose to women - both Muslim 
and non-Muslim. I showed that the national contexts analysed in this final 
results chapter drew differently on such prejudicial discourses. Thus, the 
reporting of Iran focused predominantly on the 'military threat' Iran poses to 
other countries and the threat 'Islam' poses to the democratic stability of 
Iran, and drew to a lesser extent on Iranian gender inequality. The reporting 
of Palestine on the other hand focused almost exclusively on the 'terrorist or 
extremist threat' of Muslims and, to a lesser extent, suggested that 
Palestinian Muslims pose a military threat to 'other countries' - in this case 
Israel. 
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The remaining results chapters, which analysed the coverage and 
context of broadsheet reporting of the United Kingdom, Algeria and Iraq, 
also draw upon these prejudicial discourses, although their frequency and 
combination differed between each national context and (in the case of the 
United Kingdom) according to the reporting topic. The almost exclusive focus 
of Algerian articles on the 'internal' nature of its civil and military 
disturbances emphasises the terrorist or extremist threat 'They' pose in 
'Their' own country whilst automatically precluding any suggestion of the 
military threat 'They' pose to other countries. Conversely, the military threat 
which 'They' pose to other countries forms the very basis of the UNSCOM 
stand-off and the 'frame' within which Iraq was reported. Given the 
ubiquitous nature of this 'single issue reporting' of Algeria and Iraq, the 
`threat' of Islam and Muslims to (not exclusively Muslim) women, apparently 
so considerable in other reporting contexts, was almost completely absent. 
The findings of this thesis emphasise the need for any future research 
on broadsheet journalism to adopt a context-sensitive analytic position, and 
take into account not merely the product(s) of reporting, but also the 
ideological, generative and the contextual controls on reporting (specific 
stories and in general). In embracing such an approach, future research will 
not only foreground broadsheet newspapers' location in the social and 
political world, but should also illustrate the manipulation of journalists by 
empowered groups within the social and political world. 
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Appendix 1 
Coding Frame 
Titscher et al (2000) argue that in traditional content analysis, the variables 
"should be so clearly defined that different coders can achieve the same 
results" (p. 148). What this means is that the variables recorded during 
content analysis "must be specifiable by a body of theory and by a set of 
coding rules which are invariant to the user's interpretation" (Cicourel, 1964: 
148, cited in Titscher et al, 2000: 9). Although I do not accept that the "user's 
interpretation" of a text can be wholly divorced from the application of coding 
rules as the above quotations appear to suggest, I will here introduce and 
discuss the variables included as part of the initial content analysis. 
Specifically I explain what the variables were aimed at recording, a reason for 
inclusion, and, in the case of the more subjective variables, a method for the 
actual process of coding. 
The coding process was completed on the assumption that a 'text' is 
not simply an object open to coding and classification, but is a 
"communicative event" borne of "text-internal as well as text-external 
conditions of meaning" (Titscher et al, 2000: 21). I identify myself as one such 
text-external condition of meaning. The following account of the coding rules 
which I applied is intended to make my role in the coding and completion of 
the current research as transparent as possible. I will give the name of a 
variable (written in CAPITALS) followed by the values of the variable 
employed in this coding process and a brief description of how this variable 
was recorded. The variables are divided into four groups of variables: 
'technical data', recording the more manifest or physical properties of the texts 
the `topics of reporting' 
variables aimed at recording the 'character and tone of reporting' 
and 'lexicon', recording the presence and textual location of specific words and 
phrases. 
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1. Technical Data 
CASE NUMBER 
A consecutive number was given to each article satisfying the qualification 
criteria. This was intended to make locating the text a great deal easier during 
analysis. 
PAPER: 1= Financial Times; 2= Guardian; 3= Independent; 4= Telegraph; 5= 
The Times; 6= Sunday Independent; 7= Sunday Times; 11= Saturday 
Financial Times; 12= Saturday Guardian; 13= Saturday Independent; 14= 
Saturday Telegraph; 15= The Saturday Times 
The paper in which the recorded article appeared was expected to be a 
particularly important variable. The coding of this variable would enable me to 
separate and compare the reporting output of the different newspapers during 
analysis. 
DATE: 
Recording the date allows the patterns of reporting across the whole sample, or 
according to a specific variable value -a topic, a country, articles referring to 
'terrorism' etc. - to be plotted and analysed. The whole date is recorded. 
PAGE: 
Recording the page on which the report or article starts is based on the 
presumption that the news considered the 'most important' by the newspaper will 
be included on the front page, or in another otherwise conspicuous location in 
the newspaper. This allows for the crosstabulation of Page, and other variables. 
LOCATION: 1= top left quarter; 2= top right quarter; 3= bottom left quarter; 4= 
bottom right quarter. 
In a similar way to Page, the position on the page that the article is located is 
hypothesised as an indication of 'newsworthiness'. The variable codes the 
quarter of the page in which the majority of the recorded article resided. 
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SECTION: 1= main/news; 2= (weekly) news review; 3= financial/money; 4= 
Saturday colour supplement; 5= Sunday colour supplement; 6= 
culture/society; 7= style/fashion; 8= media/ IT; 9= education; 10= Travel; 11= 
Books/ literature; 12= sport; 13= Tabloid section; 14= Leisure; 15= weekend; 
The Section of the newspaper in which a coded article is included is a very 
accurate indication of its agenda and intended audience. After the Newspaper, I 
hypothesise that the Section should offer the next meta-summary of the content 
of the recorded article. 
PAGE LABEL: 1= News; 2= Home News; 3= European News; 4= 
International News; 5= Analysis; 6= Comment; 7= Finance/economics; 8= 
Sport; 9= Policy/politics; 10= Editorial; 11= Television/media; 12= Profile; 13= 
World trade/Overseas business/Consultancy; 14= News, Asia/Pacific; 15= 
Travel; 16= Overseas/Foreign news; 17= Focus/ Perspectives; 18= News, 
Africa; 19= World News; 20= Interview; 21= Gulf/ Middle East; 22= 
Environment; 23= Despatches; 24= Ethnicity; 25= Censorship; 26= 
Obituaries; 27= Flashpoints; 28= Kidnapping; 29= Leading stories; 30= Islam; 
31= Books; 32= Leader and Letters; 33= Algeria's Terror; 34= Hamilton 
Report; 35= Iraq; 36= Egypt; 37= Temple Massacre/Egypt killings; 38= 
Women; 39= Jordan; 40= Middle East terror/turmoil; 41= Features; 42= 
Commodities & agriculture; 43= Week ahead/preview; 44= Secret war [Iraq]; 
45= Oil bonanza; 46= News: Americas; 47= War Criminals; 48= Asia/Far 
East in Crisis; 49= Architecture; 50= Briefing; 51= Body & Mind; 52= Iran; 53= 
The Jackal; 54= Rushie's future; 55= Peace on Earth?; 56= Moments that 
made the year; 57= Cars; 58= The Back Page; 59= Refugees; 60= Indonesia; 
61= The Clinton Affair; 62= Lobbyists; 63= Yugoslavia; 64= Society; 65= 
News review/The Week; 66= Israel's debacle; 67= Crime; 68= Royal visit; 
69= Hard life; 70= Commonwealth Conference; 71= Algeria; 72= Yemen; 73= 
Iraq crisis; 74= Changing Iran; 75= Terrorism; 76= Al Fayed Accused; 77= 
Food & Drink; 78= Education/Higher education; 79= Saudi Cash Scandal; 
99= none 
The page labels of newspapers provide a summary to the content of articles 
appearing on each particular page. The variable Page Label is therefore 
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hypothesised to play a similar function as the higher order variables Section and 
Newspaper, summarising the semantic content of the recorded text at a level 
above the headline. This list of variable values started small (#1-19), and 
expanded significantly in light of the content of sampled newspapers. The exact 
page label was maintained in the codes due to the potentially ideological 
significance of a newspaper choosing to label a page 'International News', 
'World News', 'Foreign News' or a more specific label such as 'Middle East 
News'. 
FORMAT: 1= news report; 2= editorial; 3= column; 4= feature; 5= 
cartoon/illustration; 6= diary; 7= letter; 8= weekly news summary; 9= review; 
10= `news in brief; 11= Obituary; 
The format of a recorded article is an important variable, where the relationship 
between textual 'form' and 'content' is perhaps most clearly visible. In addition, 
the format of an article is a very important variable to consider when discussing 
and evaluating the 'function' of textual 'content'. 
COLUMN/ARTICLE SIZE 
The size of the coded article, measured in centimetres squared, will be an 
important variable in crosstabulating the coverage of the sampled newspapers 
and thereby inferring the relative importance which they give to, for example, the 
reporting of a particular Topic, Primary Country or Representation of Islam (see 
below). 
IS A SOURCE BYLINED?: 1= Yes; 2= No; 9= other 
Not all articles are given a by-line. This article codes the existence of a by-line 
before coding who is cited. 
SOURCE BYLINED: 1= no source mentioned; 2= newspaper; 3= Agence 
France Presse; 4= Associated Press; 5= Press Association; 6= Reuters; 7= 
United Press International; 8= other UK newspaper; 9= US newspaper; 10= 
Israeli newspaper; 11= Muslim newspaper; 12= `agencies; 13= UK Govt; 14= 
Foreign Govt; 15= Member of public; 16= Business sector; 99= other 
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This variable codes who is by-lined as the source of an article. In the case of two 
codes being mentioned - e. g. a house journalist and a news agency - the source 
presumed to have had the most recent authorial input into the article is coded - 
in the example above, this would have been the journalist. 
LOCATION: 1= domestic; 2= international. 
This variable coded whether the recorded article was located in a domestic or 
international setting. An article was considered 'domestic' if geographically 
located in the UK, all actors cited were identified as, or could be construed as 
being 'British' or else all reported action was located within the domestic sphere. 
For example, despite Mohammed Fayed 'being' Egyptian, articles reporting the 
'cash for questions' controversy, the burial of Dodi Fayed or former Harrods 
employees accusing Fayed of idiosyncratic or illegal behaviour, were coded as 
'domestic' due to being located firmly in the domestic sphere. Articles not 
displaying such emphasis were coded as 'international' articles. 
(if Domestic, then) DOMESTIC AREA: 1= London; 2= South/ S. West 
England; 3= South East England; 4= East Anglia; 5= East Midlands; 6= West 
Midlands; 7= Wales; 8= Merseyside/ Lancashire; 9= South Yorkshire; 10= 
East Yorkshire; 11= West Yorkshire; 12= North Yorkshire; 13= 
Northumberland/ Cumbria; 14= Scotland; 15= 'Home Counties'; 98= multiple; 
99= other 
I also imagined that the area of the UK which a domestic article was located may 
have an effect on the form, content or angle of the article, due to the 
concentration of Muslim communities in certain metropolitan areas of the 
country. 
PRIMARY COUNTRY CODE: 1= Afghanistan; 2= Albania; 3= Algeria; 4= 
Bahrain; 5= Bangladesh; 6= Bosnia; 7= Egypt; 8= Ethiopia; 9= India; 10= 
Indonesia; 11= Iran; 12= Iraq; 13= Israel; 14= Jordan; 15= Kuwait; 16= 
Lebanon; 17= Libya; 18= Malaysia; 19= Morocco; 20= Oman; 21= Pakistan; 
22= Qatar; 23= Saudi Arabia; 24= Somalia; 25= Sudan; 26= Syria; 27= 
Tunisia; 28= Turkey; 29= United Arab Emirates; 30= Yemen; 31= Palestine; 
32= Kashmir; 33= Kosova; 34= Serbia; 35= Kurdistan; 37= Sri Lanka; 38= 
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Uganda; 39= Turkmenistan; 40= Azerbiajan; 41= Sierra Leone; 42= 
Uzbekistan; 43= Kazakstan; 44= Tajikistan; 45= Chechnya; 98= 'Arab' 
countries; 99= Multiple Muslim Countries; etc.. 
100= UK; 101= USA; 102= France; 103= Germany; 104= Spain; 105= 
Portugal; 106= Italy; 106= Holland/Netherlands; 107= Canada; 108= Norway; 
109= Denmark; 110= Sweden; 111= Finland; 112= Russia; 113= Austria; 
114= Switzerland; 115= Singapore; 116= Australia; 117= India; 118= 
Philippines; 119= South Africa; 120= Greece; 121= Belgium; 122= Croatia; 
123= Timor; 124= Cyprus; 125= China; 126= Ireland; 127= Luxembourg; 
128= Japan; 129= Argentina; 130= Armenia; 131= Burma; 132= Thailand; 
133= S. Korea; 134= Vatican; 135- Hong Kong; 136= Iceland; 137= Kenya; 
138= Nigeria; 139= Cuba; 140= Zanzibar; 141= Columbia; 142= Panama; 
196= 'African' countries; 197= UN; 198= EU; 199= Multiple Non-Muslim 
countries; 200= Unknown; 201= 'Western' countries; 
The Primary Country Code recorded the country in which the reported action of 
the coded article was located. This was occasionally a little more difficult to code 
than the above instruction indicates, for example, in the case of an article in 
which an American politician criticises the actions of President Saddam Hussein 
of Iraq, America was coded as the primary country due to the location of the 
criticiser and not the criticised. However, it was decided in the case of (for 
example) an article reporting falling Iraqi oil prices, that Iraq would be coded as 
the primary country, despite the fact that it was the American Dow Jones or the 
British FTSE exchanges that were recording - or creating? - such a drop in 
prices. Therefore, this variable coded the country cited in the text as 'the most 
important country in this article' - this was usually the text's geographical location 
but could (in the case of the second example above) be the country identified as 
the driving agent in the reported action. 
SECONDARY COUNTRY CODE: variable codes are as above for the 
Primary Country. 
Following from the variable recording the Primary Country, this variable is aimed 
at recording a second country involved in the reported action. On occasion this 
meant literally 'the country which was mentioned second', but more usually 
meant the country presented as: secondary actor; minor (as opposed to major) 
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actor; referent (as opposed to referrer); reactor (as opposed to actor); or as 
dissenting, contesting or otherwise combating the country in the primary 
position. In the case on the first example given above (US politician criticising 
Saddam Hussein) Iraq would be coded as the secondary country. For the 
second example, the secondary country would be coded as the geographical 
location of the Stock Exchange reporting the drop in oil prices. This variable 
enabled me to better record the interactive and international approach to 
reporting Islam, and also provides the potential to revealing the extent to which 
'Western' countries, such as the USA and the UK are involved in report 
'covering' Islam. 
TERTIARY COUNTRY CODE: variable codes are as above for the Primary 
Country. 
The Tertiary Country provides a third opportunity to record the interactive and 
international approach to reporting Islam. A Tertiary Country is recorded when a 
country cited is important to the reported action. Imagine that in the first example 
cited above, the US politician is criticising Saddam Hussein for threatening 
Israel: Israel is coded as a tertiary country, a record which may prove to be 
significant. Conversely, should the second example also mention a drop in price 
of Saudi oil, then this could potentially change the whole angle of the article: the 
article could now be a report from (e. g. ) the Dow Jones exchange (USA = 
primary country) wherein Iraq and Saudi Arabia are cited as factoral or examples 
in the larger story of lowering oil prices (secondary and tertiary countries 
respectively? ). The Tertiary Country therefore acts to code the reported action 
more specifically, and provides a great deal more contextualisation to the 
recorded article. 
As a general note: the variable values above show entries for Chechnya, 
Kashmir, Kosova, Kurdistan and Palestine. I recognise that some will consider 
entries such as these a little inappropriate whilst others may feel incensed by 
their inclusion as 'countries'. These places are coded as countries where I felt 
that it was appropriate to do so - i. e. where, as suggested above, the place was 
identified as the geographical location of the reported action or was presented 
as a factor in understanding the reported action. Their coding therefore reflects 
their use by the newspaper. Their inclusion is not an intentionally political act - 
although it is, no doubt political - but rather, the inclusion of these variable codes 
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was intended to enable greater recording of the reported action, in much the 
same way as including 'Cyprus' (code #124) as a country code does. 
WHY'OTHER'? (#1) (string variable) 
This 'string' (i. e. written) variable refers to the preceding variables and records 
why it was necessary to code the variable 'other. Rarely was this variable 
needed, due to the method adopted of introducing new codes in order to 
accurately record the stated variables, and was included as an 'insurance 
variable'. 
2. Topics in the News 
PRIMARY, SECONDARY, TERTIARY & QUATERNARY TOPICS: same 
codes, as below: 
*Race/Community Relations (0-19): 1= general; 2= ... and legislation; 3= 
problems of..; 4= positive; 5= demonstrations; 6= violence; 7= Muslim 
organisations; 8= research; 9= anti-Muslim prejudice; 10= Muslim prejudice 
directed at whites/Christians/Jews; 11= Muslim/ Sikh relations; 12= election 
issue; 13= race discrimination; 14= Muslim/Hindu relations; 19= other 
*Immigration (20-39): 20= general; 21= numbers entering country; 22= 
numbers leaving country; 23= immigration controls; 24= future threat of 
immigration; 25= reunification of families; 26= illegal entry; 27= immigration 
as an election issue; 28= deportation; 29= asylum; 30= Immigration and 
citizenship; 39= other 
*Crime (40-59): 40= general; 41= violence; 42= sexual crime; 43= 
robbery/theft; 44= social security fraud; 45= arson; 46= general association; 
47= human interest; 48= illegal drug use; 49= drug smuggling; 50= 
`terrorism'; 51= gerrymandering; 52= Yvonne Gilford murder; 53= 
hostages/hijacking; 54= cash for questions/corruption; 55= `organised crime'; 
56= prostitution; 59= other 
*Education (60-79): 60= general; 61= funding private schools; 62= religion 
and..; 63= school leavers; 64= overseas students; 65= language and...; 66= 
Muslim University Students; 67= poor education services; 79= other 
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Housing (80-99): 80= general; 81= overcrowding; 82= 'ghetto areas'; 83= 
benefits; 84= landlords, non-Muslim; 85= landlords, Muslim; 86= orphanages; 
99= other 
*Employment (100-119): 100= general; 101= unemployment levels; 102= job 
prospects; 103= cultural differences and...; 104= language differences 
and...; 105= religious differences and...; 106= discrimination; 107= Muslim 
employers; 108= agriculture; 109= human interest; 110= Muslim women 
and...; 119= other 
*Race Legislation (120-139): 120= general; 121= positive reporting of...; 122= 
negative reporting of...; 123= .. and religious 
discrimination; 124= blasphemy 
laws; 139= other 
*Health (140-159): 140= general; 141= health problems?; 142= cosmetic 
surgery; 143= private health care; 144= private health care in Muslim 
countries; 145= state health & welfare provision, Muslim countries; 146= 
natural disaster; 147= rail/ air disaster; 148= ... and fasting; 149= ... and 
organ/blood donorship; 150= ... and gender; 
151= obituaries; 152= child 
malnutrition; 153= human interest; 154= psychological health; 155= 
euthanasia; 156= burial; 159= other 
*Policing/Law and order (160-179): 160= general; 161= selective/target 
policing; 162= positive relations; 163= negative relations; 164= 
demonstrations; 165= rioting; 166= court rulings; 167= recruitment of Muslim 
officers; 168= execution/capital punishment; 169= Islamic law, negative; 170= 
Islamic law, positive; 171= Police racism; 172= court cases; 173= child 
imprisonment; 174= prisons/imprisonment; 179= other 
*International Relations/Politics (180-219): 180= general; 181= trade; 182= 
aid; 183= sport; 184= UN; 185= sanctions; 186= cordial relations; 187= 
antagonism between nations; 188= 'rogue nations'; 189= demonstrations; 
190= 'democracy'; 191= 'dictatorship'; 192= Islam vs. West/Huntingdon; 193= 
'naked aggression'; 194= occupied territory; 195= international law; 196= 
peace talks; 197= meetings between leaders; 198= environmental issues; 
199= actions of Int. Leaders; 200= history; 201= terrorism; 202= charity; 203= 
Govt. incompetence; 204= illegal weaponry; 205= human rights; 206= 
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Israeli/Pal. peace process; 207= diplomacy; 208= World Court/international 
trials; 209= spying/covert operations; 210= EU; 211= elections; 212= 
released prisoners; 213= censorship; 214= torture; 215= Iraq/US/UN stand- 
off; 216= peace deal; 217= human interest; 218= `instability'; 219= other 
*War (220-239): 220= general; 221= between nations; 222= civil war; 223= 
`annexation'; 224= threat of...; 225= acts of...; 226= human interest; 227= 
... and civilian deaths; 228= cease-fire(s); 229= war crimes; 239= other 
*Culture/Custom (240-269): 240= general; 241= westernisation/imperialism; 
242= Islam and...; 243= enforced culture; 244= patriarchy and...; 245= 
Islam/west contrast; 246= food; 247= travel; 248= clothing; 249= ... and 
law/Judiciary; 250= film industry; 251= media/ press; 252= cosmetic surgery; 
253= marriage and Islam; 254= fine art; 255= multiculturalism; 256= 
death/burial of Dodi; 257= literature; 258= `silly stories' concerning Islam; 
259= music; 260= Islamist activities; 261= family life; 262= architecture; 263= 
marriage; 264= 'Faith'; 265= technology; 266= celebrity; 267= fatwa and/or 
Rushdie; 269= other 
*Sport (270-289): 270= general; 271= business interests; 272= advertising; 
273= racism in .; 274= ... and 
Islam; 275= Muslim non-involvement in ...; 276= 
... and 
Muslim countries; 277= ... and 
Muslim non-involvement; 278= ... and 
conflict; 
*Business (290-309): 290= general; 291= success; 292= failure; 293= shares; 
294= international trade; 295= financial crisis, international; 296= financial 
crisis, domestic; 297= arms trade; 298= privatisation; 299= Govt. budget; 
300= oil; 301 = economic talks; 302= agriculture; 303= economic reform; 304= 
take-over/buyout; 309= other 
*Women (310-339): 310= general; 311= gender inequality; 312= marriage, 
arranged; 313= marriage, 'forced'; 314= female conversion; 315= female 
circumcision; 316= human rights and ...; 317= ... and Islam; 318= hijab; 319= 
women in Islamic countries; 320= Muslim women in the UK; 321= ... and 
Islamic culture; 322= human interest; 323= sex/sexuality; 339= other; 
*Youth (340-369): 340= general; 341= education attainment; 342= youth and 
employment; 343= youth and popular culture; 344= youth and tolerance, 
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racial; 345= youth and intolerance, racial; 346= youth and tolerance, other; 
347= youth and intolerance, other; 348= youth in Islamic countries; 349= 
Muslim youth in the UK; 350= custody; 351= child labour; 369= other 
Coding of topics is an interesting aspect of content analysis, since it is based on 
the perception, knowledge and 'common sense' of the researcher. As such it is, 
for the most part, a relatively easy activity to perform (particularly with a coding 
manual as detailed as that which I used) but incredibly difficult to accurately 
summarise. The coding of topics in this research is prefaced by van Dijk's (1988) 
work on textual semantic macrostructures, and the idea that through macrorules 
such as deletion, generalisation and construction, a concept -a topic - can be 
derived from the text. Here, the topic of a text is regard as different to the theme: 
a theme is not a concept but a macroproposition, similar to the headline of a 
news report, which groups topics into a complex summary or gist of the text. 
To complicate matters further, inherent in the coding manual which I adopted 
are two levels of topical summary - these I refer to as the 'topic' and the 'parent 
topic'. The parent topics were higher order semantic concepts which group 
together between 20 and 40 topics: for example, 'Crime' is one such parent topic 
grouping 20 topics such as 'violent crime', 'sexual crime', 'robbery/theft', 'arson', 
etc.; 'Race and Community Relations' is another parent topic grouping a further 
20 topics. I structured the coding manual in such a way in order to be able to 
summarise the quite specific and numerous topics into larger and more 
manageable sections - the parent topics - during analysis. 
The coding regime which I adopted allowed me to code four topics to 
summarise the content of the recorded articles: primary, secondary, tertiary and 
quaternary topics. These four variables were coded according to importance: the 
most important, or significant topic was coded as the Primary Topic, and so on. 
The ordering of these topics is significant, often indicating the angle which a 
newspaper wished to put on a story as opposed to the 'manifest content' of the 
event itself. In an article reporting weapons inspections in Iraq, for example, the 
primary topic could be: the UN; the sanctions regime which the inspections were 
part of; the weapons alleged to exist which UNSCOM were looking for; the threat 
of war; or a number of other potential topics depending on the emphasis of the 
report. Similarly, a number of stories could be written from 'within' the primary 
topic 'Iraq & the UNSCOM crisis' (code #215). The coding of four topics is 
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therefore an attempt to record both the content of reporting more specifically and 
also to show, albeit in a superficial way, how newspapers actively construct the 
actions which they 'report'. The parent topics are marked as'*' in the list above. 
WHY'OTHER'? (#2): (string variable) 
Again, this string variable was included in order to record why I had felt it 
necessary to code a topic as `other. 
3. Framing of the News 
In attempting to record the framing of sampled news articles, I first coded eight 
variables which were applied to the first four individuals or groups (e. g. pressure 
group, political party, etc. ) the article referred to. 
ACTOR: Domestic Political Sources (1-100): 1= Prime Minister; 2= named 
Chief Secretary; 3= named Govt. Minister; 4= named Govt. departmental 
spokesperson; 5= named Govt. MP; 6= generic 'Govt. source'; 7= generic 
'Cabinet source'; 8= generic 'Sources close to the P. M. '; 9= 'Ruling' party 
councillor; 10= named opposition party leader; 11= named opposition party 
'Minister'; 12= named opposition party MP; 14= named opposition party 
councillor; 15= generic 'opposition party leader'; 16= generic 'opposition 
party Minister'; 17= generic 'opposition party member'; 18= generic MP; 19= 
generic Peer; 20= Govt Lord; 21= Opposition Lord; 22= Cross bench Lord; 
23= Generic Lord; 24= named Ambassador/Diplomat; 25= Generic 
Ambassador/Diplomat; 
50= named Muslim party leader; 51= named Muslim party minister/cabinet; 
52= named Muslim party Member; 53= generic Muslim party 'leader'; 54= 
generic Muslim party 'official'; 55= generic Muslim party 'representative'; 56= 
generic Muslim 'party member'; 
International Political Sources (101-200): 101= UN; 102= European Comm. / 
Parliament/ Politician; 103= NATO; 104= Other Int. body/ committee of 
Nations; 105= International Govt. Leader; 106= Int. Govt. Member; 107= Int. 
Govt. Spokesperson; 108= Generic Int. Government spokesperson; 109= Int. 
(legitimate) Opposition Party Leader; 110= Int. (legitimate) Opposition party 
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member; 111= Int. (legitimate) Opposition party representative; 112= Generic 
Int. (legitimate) Opposition party spokesperson; 113= Int. (illegitimate) 
Opposition. Party leader; 114= Int. (illegitimate) Opposition. party member; 
115= Int. (illegitimate) Opposition. Party representative; 116= Generic Int. 
(illegitimate) opposition party spokesperson: 117= Int. Govt. /Military 
Intelligence agency; 118= terrorist; 119= Terrorist Group; 120= Former Int. 
Govt Member; 121= Ambassador/Diplomat; 122= 'Arab diplomat'; 
Other sources (201-300): 201= Scientific research centre/scientist; 202= 
University Academic (where different); 203= Muslim University Academic 
('Islamic state'); 204= Other public sector research inst. /centre; 205= 
Religious spokespersons (Non-Muslim); 206= Health Care Professional 
(Doctor/ Nurse/ Authority); 207= Police/Prisons/Law enforcement; 208= 
Teachers; 209= Social services; 210= other public sector officials; 211= 
Armed forces; 212= Trade Unions; 213= Royalty; 214= Celebrity; 215= Media 
organisations; 216= opinion pollsters; 217= private sector research/market 
researchers; 218= other business sector/corporate sector actors; 219= 
members of the public, adult; 220= members of the public, children; 221= 
Artist; 222= writer; 223= criminal; 224= lawyer/solicitor/barrister; 225= 
Political Analyst; 226= Religious Spokespersons, Muslim; 227= Pressure 
Group; 228= Sportsman; 229= actor/actress; 230= 'Tribesman'; 231 = student; 
232= Musician; 233= charity; 234= reporter; 235= animal; 299= other 
The first of these variables recorded the job or social position of the actor. On 
occasion an individual was referred to in the text who could be coded with more 
than one value - for example, should Minister Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of 
Islam be coded as 'Muslim Party Leader (#50), 'International Oppositional Party 
Leader (#109) or 'Muslim religious spokesman' (#226)?. Cases such as these 
were noted, along with the value chosen to represent them, in order that they 
could be consistently coded in future appearances. The remaining 8 variables 
are relatively straightforward, coding the manifest characteristics and 
descriptions which the actor received in the text. 
IS THE SOURCE MUSLIM?: 1= yes; 2= no; 9= unclear 
364 
IS THIS SOURCE IDENTIFIED AS BEING MUSLIM?: 1= yes; 2= no; 9= other 
POLITICAUGROUP AFFILIATION OF SOURCE (if applicable): 1= Al 
Muhajiroun; 2= Nation of Islam; 3= Muslim Council of Britain; 4= Muslim 
Parliament; 5= UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs; 6= Al Nisa; 7= Islamic 
Human Rights Commission; 8= Muslim News; 9= Q News; 10= PLO/ PA/ 
Fatah; 11= Taleban; 12= Hamas; 13= Islamic Jihad; 14= Hizb Allah; 15= GIA 
(Algeria); 16= Ba'ath; 17= Harakat (Kashmir); 18= Kosova Liberation Army; 
19= Shia Clergy; 20= Islamic Welfare Party (Turkey); 21= FIS (Algeria); 22= 
National Council of Resistance (Iran); 23= Muslim Brotherhood; 24= PKK 
(Kurdistan); 25= KDP (Kurdistan); 26= Movement for Peaceful Society 
(Algeria); 27= Sudan Peoples Liberation Army; 28= AI-Gamaa aI-Islamiyya; 
29= PUK (Kurdistan); 30= Muslim Solidarity Committee; 31= Islamic Action 
Front (Jordan); 32= Hizb-Wahadat (Afghan); 33= Iran Freedom Movement; 
34= mujihadeen (Afghan); 35= PPP (Indonesia); 36= Muhammadiyah 
(Indonesia); 37= Sipah-e-Sahaba; 38= Nahdlatul Ulama; 39= Warriors of 
Jhangui (? ); 40= Shi'ite Amal Movement (Lebanon); 41= Iraqi National 
Congress; 42= Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines); 43= PAGAD (S. 
Africa); 44= Democratic League of Kosova; 99= no group cited 
IN WHAT PART OF THE ARTICLE ARE THEY QUOTED? (if applicable): 1= 
headline/leader; 2= first sentence; 3= first paragraph; 4= second paragraph; 
5= upper half of report; 6= text; 7= photocaption; 9= other 
IN WHAT PART OF THE ARTICLE ARE THEY FIRST REFERRED TO? 1= 
headline/leader; 2= first sentence; 3= first paragraph; 4= second paragraph; 
5= upper half of report; 6= text; 7= photocaption; 9= other 
PROPORTION OF THE ARTICLE CONCERNING THE ACTIONS/ 
OPINIONS OF SOURCE: 1= all; 2= vast majority; 3= majority; 4= half; 5= less 
than half; 6= hardly at all; 7= only gets a mention; 8= source used as example 
of larger trend; 99= other 
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IS THE SOURCE AN 'ACTOR' OR COMMENTATOR?: 1= actor; 2= minor 
actor; 3= commentator; 5= neither actor nor commentator, but instrumental to 
story; 6= neither, and ancillary to story; 7= 'pawn'/victim; 9= other 
WHY'OTHER'? (#3) (string variable) 
(B) Character of Commentary 
This next set of variables attempted to code the tone, or 'character' of the 
sampled texts. 
EVALUATION OF A TEXT'S MUSLIM ACTORS/ACTION 
1= laudatory; 2= favourable; 3= neutral; 4= critical; 5= abrasive; 99= other 
The first variable coded any 'evaluative' dimension to the journalists' 
representation of the reported actions. The variable values - laudatory, 
favourable, neutral, etc. - recorded the journalists' or the report's evaluation of 
the report's Muslim actors or their evaluation of Islam in general. 
The next two variables, recording the primary and secondary stylistic dimensions 
of the reports were also quite subjective. I will not go into the features which 
made me code an article as 'crusading' or 'argumentative' other than to say that 
these reports appeared to have a clear agenda in the construction and 
presentation of material - the 'crusading' articles doing so to a degree above 
those coded as 'argumentative'. Categories such as 'cynical', 'humorous' and 
'lyrical/loquacious' are similarly highly subjective to code and extremely difficult 
to describe. The majority of articles were expected to adopt a 'descriptive' (used 
to code articles describing the 'who, what, where, when and how' of an event) 
and/or a 'summarising' style of reporting (used to code reports providing 
background information on the 'who, what, where, when and how' of an event). 
PRIMARY STYLISTIC DIMENSION OF THE REPORT: 1= crusading; 2= 
argumentative; 3= descriptive, 'event based'; 4= summarising or 
backgrounding; 5= cynicalldismissive; 6= 'humorous'; 7= 'warning'/ 'helpful'; 
8= 'lyrical'; 
SECONDARY STYLISTIC DIMENSION OF THE REPORT (coding as above) 
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The next eight variables were suggested by the Runnymede Trust (1997) in their 
report on Islamophobia. I included them in order to empirically test the Think 
Tank's hypothesis that negative representations of Islam are predominant in the 
British Press. I treated such representations - both `positive' and negative' - as 
non-obligatory argumentation. Only the semantic content of the texts across 
lexical, sentential or more global levels, were used to evaluate whether or not 
such argumentation was included. The syntactic structuring of expression was 
ignored for the purposes of these variables (but is discussed during the later 
discoursive analysis). 
The first variable, recording the representation of Islam across the 
monolithic/diverse binary, was interpreted and coded in quite a restrictive 
manner which inevitably coloured the data produced. I decided that the text 
could only be described as arguing 'Islam is monolithic' or'Islam is diverse' when 
more than one 'variety' of Muslim, more than one orthodoxy of Islam, are 
included in the text and held up - implicitly or explicitly - for comparison. Further, 
the variable only coded representation(s) within individual texts and not across 
the sample as a whole. It is therefore possible that only 'one Islam' was included 
or represented across the sampled newspapers (and therefore a picture of a 
'monolithic Islam' was the result) but, because of the coding rules adopted for 
the variable (coding explicit not implicated content) the results would show that 
the articles did not argue for one binary nor the other. This strategy needs to be 
borne in mind when considering the results from this variable. 
REPRESENTATION OF ISLAM AS... 1= monolithic; 2= diverse; 9= neither 
REPRESENTATION OF ISLAM AS... I= separate; 2= interacting; 9= neither 
REPRESENTATION OF ISLAM AS... 1= inferior; 2= equal; 3= superior; 9= 
neither 
REPRESENTATION OF ISLAM AS... 1= enemy; 2= partner; 3- both; 9= 
neither 
REPRESENTATION OF ISLAM AS... 1= manipulative; 2= sincere; 9= neither 
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CRITICISM OF `THE WEST' BY ISLAMIC SOURCES IS... 1= rejected; 2= 
considered; 9= neither 
ISLAMOPHOBIA IS... 1= defended; 2= criticised; 9= neither 
ISLAM VS. `THE WESTIS SEEN AS... 1= natural; 2= inaccurate; 9= neither 
IS ISLAM PRESENTED AS AN INFLUENCIAL FACTOR IN THE REPORTED 
ACTION? 1= yes; 2= no; 3= unclear; 9= neither 
ARE 'ISLAM' AND 'DEMOCRACY' SET AGAINST EACH OTHER? 1= yes; 2= 
no; 9= neither 
WHY `OTHER'? (#4) (string variable) 
4. Lexicon 
This final section recorded the presence and textual location of particular words. 
The list of words recorded is shown below: 
General words 
'Islamophobia' 
'human rights' 
'Arab mind/Arab-ness' 
'westernised' 
`Negative' words 
`anger' 
'threat' 
Arabic words 
jihad' 
'fatwa' 
'sharia' 
'hijab/veil' 
'halal' 
`Positive' Antonyms 
'clemency / calmness' 
'unthreatening' 
`violence' or reference to acts of `peaceful' or reference to acts of 
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violence 
'villainy' 
'irrational' 
`fundamentalismllst' 
'terrorist' 
'traditionalist / archaic' 
`sexistlism or chauvinismnst' 
peace 
'heroism / virtue' 
'rational' 
'liberal / moderate' 
'emissary / ambassador' 
'modernising' 
'sexual equality' 
Should these words be included in an article, their location was recorded as 
follows: 
1= headline/leader; 2= first sentence; 3= first paragraph; 4= second 
paragraph; 5= upper half of report; 6= text; 7= photo caption; 9= other 
For some words it was particularly difficult to think of an antonym, and therefore 
the words eventually chosen may appear a little strange - particularly 
'ambassador/ial' as the antonym for 'terrorist'. This choice was based on finding 
a term opposite to the definition which I had adopted of a terrorist - 'one who 
brings terror. 'Ambassador seemed to capture a sense of 'one who makes 
peace' in addition to its use as a complementary adjective: 'ambassadorial'. 
The decision to include these variables was based on the hypothesis that 
negative terminology and references will be used in representing Islam and 
Muslims more frequently than their positive antonyms. By recording the location 
of negative words and their antonyms, I can tentative deduce their importance to 
the sampled articles and perhaps to the representation of Islam and Muslims as 
a whole. 
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Appendix 2 
Chi-Square test 1: 'Is Actor 1 quoted? ' by variable 'Is Actor I Muslim? ' 
Chi-Square Tests 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 7.169' 2 . 028 
Likelihood Ratio 7.242 2 . 
027 
Linear-by-Linear 
1.166 1 . 280 Association 
N of Valid Cases 265 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 10.78. 
Directional Measures 
Asymp. Std. 
Value Errora Approx. '" Approx. Sig. 
Nominal Lambda Symmetric . 036 . 082 . 438 . 662 
by Is the Actor quoted? 
Nominal . 
042 
. 
104 
. 
397 
. 
692 
Dependent 
Is the Actor Muslim? 
. 031 . 088 . 346 . 730 Dependent 
Goodman and Kruskal tau Is the Actor quoted? 
. 027 . 020 . 028c Dependent 
Is the Actor Muslim? 
. 020 . 015 . 005c Dependent 
Uncertainty Coefficient Symmetric . 017 . 012 1.359 . 027d 
Is the Actor quoted? 
. 020 . 015 1.359 . 0274 Dependent 
Is the Actor Muslim? 
. 015 . 011 1.359 . 027d Dependent 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis 
c. Based on chi-square approximation 
d. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. 
Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi 
. 
164 
. 
028 
Nominal Cramer's V 
. 
164 . 
028 
Contingency Coefficient . 162 . 028 
N of Valid Cases 265 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
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Chi-Square test 2: `Is Actor 2 quoted? ' by variable `Is Actor 2 Muslim? ' 
Chi-Square Tests 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.931a 2 . 
003 
Likelihood Ratio 12.461 2 
. 
002 
Linear-by-Linear 
999 1 
. 
318 Association 
N of Valid Cases 252 
a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 4.82. 
Directional Measures 
Asymp. Std. 
Value Error Approx. lb Approx. Sig. 
Nominal Lambda Symmetric 
, 000 . 
000 cC 
Is the Actor quoted? Cc Nominal Dependent . 000 . 000 
Is the actor Muslim? cC 
Dependent . 000 . 000 
Goodman and Kruskal tau Is the Actor quoted? d 
Dependent . 047 . 025 . 003 
Is the actor Muslim? d 
Dependent . 040 . 021 OOO 
Uncertainty Coefficient Symmetric 
. 033 . 018 1.826 . 002° Is the Actor quoted? 
Dependent . 039 . 021 1.826 , 002 
Is the actor Muslim? 
Dependent . 029 . 016 1.826 . 002 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
C. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero 
d. Based on chi-square approximation 
e" Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. 
Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi 
. 
218 
. 
003 
Nominal Cramer's V 
. 218 . 
003 
Contingency Coefficient 
. 
213 
. 
003 
N of Valid Cases 252 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
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Appendix 3 
Chi-Square test 3: 'Islamic agency' by the occurrence of 'Terrorism' 
Is Islam cited as a factor? * Terrorist/ism included? 
Crosstabulation 
Terrorist/ism 
included? 
Yes No Total 
Is Islam cited Yes Count 37 121 158 
as a factor? Expected Count 25.2 132.8 158.0 
No Count 7 111 118 
Expected Count 18.8 99.2 118.0 
Total Count 44 232 276 
Expected Count 44.0 232.0 276.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) (2-sided) (1-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.412 1 . 
000 
Continuity Correctior? 14.135 1 . 000 
Likelihood Ratio 17.053 1 . 000 
Fisher's Exact Test 
. 
000 
. 000 
Linear-by-Linear 
356 15 1 . 000 Association . 
N of Valid Cases 276 
a. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
b. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 
18.81. 
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Directional Measures 
Asymp. Std. 
Value Error Approx. 1' Approx. Sig. 
Nominal Lambda Symmetric . 000 . 000 
cC 
by Is Islam cited as a factor? Cc Nominal Dependent . 000 . 000 , 
Terrorist/ism included? cC 000 . 000 Dependent 
Goodman and Kruskal tau Is Islam cited as a factor? 
. 056 . 022 . 000d Dependent 
Terroristfism included? 
Dependent . 
056 
. 
023 
. 
000d 
Uncertainty Coefficient Symmetric . 055 . 024 2.239 . 0008 
Is Islam cited as a factor? 
. 045 . 020 2.239 000 Dependent . 
Terrorist/ism included? 
. 070 . 030 2.239 . 000 Dependent 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis 
C. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero. 
d. Based on chi-square approximation 
e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. 
Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi . 236 . 000 Nominal Cramer's V . 236 . 000 
Contingency Coefficient . 230 . 000 
N of Valid Cases 276 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
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Appendix 4 
Chi-square test 4: Islam represented as 'separate vs interacting' by variable 
'Is Islam cited as a factor? ' 
Is Islam cited 
ac a fnrtnr? 
Yes No Total 
Represented as: Separate Count 152 4 156 
separatelnteracting Expected Count 130.2 25.8 156.0 
Interacting Count 6 0 6 
Expected Count 5.0 1.0 6.0 
No response Count 44 36 80 
Expected Count 66.8 13.2 80.0 
Total Count 202 40 242 
Expected Count 202.0 40.0 242.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 70.241a 2 . 000 
Likelihood Ratio 69.688 2 . 
000 
Linear-by-Linear 
67.568 1 . 000 Association 
N of Valid Cases 242 
a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is . 99. 
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Directional Measures 
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errors Approx. 'f' Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Lambda Symmetric . 254 . 034 5.351 . 000 Nominal Represented as: 
separate/interacting . 372 . 058 5.351 . 000 Dependent 
Is Islam cited as a 
. 
000 
. 000 
CC 
factor? Dependent 
Goodman and Kruskal tau Represented as: d 
separatelnteracting . 259 . 047 . 000 Dependent 
Is Islam cited as a 
. 290 . 057 . 000d factor? Dependent 
Uncertainty Coefficient Symmetric . 242 . 049 4.637 . 000° 
Represented as: 
separate/interacting . 194 . 042 4.637 . 000 Dependent 
Is Islam cited as a 
. 321 . 060 4.637 . 000 factor? Dependent 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero 
d. Based on chi-square approximation 
e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. 
Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi . 
539 
. 000 Nominal Cramer's V . 
539 
. 000 
Contingency Coefficient . 
474 
. 000 
N of Valid Cases 242 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
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Chi-square test 5: Islam represented as 'inferior vs. equal' by variable `Is 
Islam cited as a factor? ' 
Is Islam cited as a 
factor? 
Yes No Total 
Represented as: Inferior Count 151 5 156 
inferior/equal Expected Count 130.2 25.8 156.0 
Equal Count 18 3 21 
Expected Count 17.5 3.5 21.0 
No response Count 
Expected Count 
33 32 65 
54.3 10.7 65.0 
Total Count 202 40 242 
Expected Count 202.0 40.0 242.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 70.531a 2 . 
000 
Likelihood Ratio 65.435 2 . 000 
Linear-by-Linear 68.303 1 . 000 Association 
N of Valid Cases 242 
a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The 
minimum expected count is 3.47. 
Directional Measures 
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Error Approx. 7b Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Lambda Symmetric . 
214 
. 
036 4.631 
. 000 
Nominal Represented as: 
. 314 . 059 4.631 . 000 inferior/equal Dependent 
Is Islam cited as a 
. 000 . 000 
c c 
factor? Dependent 
Goodman and Kruskal tau Represented as: 
. 217 . 044 . 0004 inferior/equal Dependent 
Is Islam cited as a 
. 291 . 064 000d factor? Dependent " 
Uncertainty Coefficient Symmetric . 209 . 047 4.270 . 000e 
Represented as: 
. 159 . 038 4.270 000e inferior/equal Dependent . 
Is Islam cited as a 
. 302 . 063 4.270 000 factor? Dependent . 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
C. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero 
d. Based on chi-square approximation 
e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. 
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Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi 
. 
540 
. 000 Nominal Cramer's V 
. 
540 
. 000 
Contingency Coefficient 
. 
475 
. 000 
N of Valid Cases 242 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
Chi-square test 6: Islam represented as 'enemy vs. partner' by variable 'Is 
Islam cited as a factor? ' 
Is Islam cited 
as a factor? 
Yes No Total 
Represented as: Enemy Count 145 2 147 
enemy/partner Expected Count 122.7 24.3 147.0 
Partner Count 12 0 12 
Expected Count 10.0 2.0 12.0 
No response Count 45 38 83 
Expected Count 69.3 13.7 83.0 
Total Count 202 40 242 
Expected Count 202.0 40.0 242.0 
Chi-Square Tests 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 78.375a 2 . 000 
Likelihood Ratio 81.362 2 . 000 
Linear-by-Linear 
73.496 1 
. 
000 Association 
N of Valid Cases 242 
a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 
5. The minimum expected count is 1.98. 
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Directional Measures 
Asymp. 
Value Std. Error Approx. '1b Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Lambda Symmetric . 267 . 
029 6.116 
. 000 Nominal Represented as: 
enemy/partner Dependent . 
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. 
052 6.116 
. 000 
Is Islam cited as a factor? 
. 
000 
. 000 
cc 
Dependent 
Goodman and Kruskal tau Represented as: 
. 264 . 039 . 0004 enemy/partner Dependent 
Is Islam cited as a factor? 
. 324 . 055 000d Dependent . 
Uncertainty Coefficient Symmetric . 265 . 
046 5.347 
. 
000° 
Represented as: 
. 205 . 039 5.347 000e enemy/partner Dependent . 
Is Islam cited as a factor? 
. 
375 
. 056 5.347 000 Dependent . 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
C. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero. 
d. Based on chi-square approximation 
e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. 
Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi . 569 . 000 Nominal Cramer's V . 
569 . 000 
Contingency Coefficient . 
495 
. 000 
N of Valid Cases 242 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
Chi-square test 7: 'Islam vs. the West represented as natural or problematic' 
by variable 'Is Islam cited as a factor? ' 
Is Islam cited 
as a factor? 
Yes No Total 
Islam vs the west: Natural Count 128 1 129 
natural/problematic Expected Count 107.7 21.3 129.0 
Problematic Count 91 10 
Expected Count 8.3 1.7 10.0 
No response Count 65 38 103 
Expected Count 86.0 17.0 103.0 
Total Count 202 40 242 
Expected Count 202.0 40.0 242.0 
378 
Chi-Square Tests 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 54.473a 2 
. 
000 
Likelihood Ratio 63.155 2 . 000 
Linear-by-Linear 
53.708 1 . 
000 Association 
N of Valid Cases 242 
a. I cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 
5. The minimum expected count is 1.65. 
Directional Measures 
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errol' Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Lambda Symmetric . 242 . 026 6.408 . 000 Nominal Islam vs the west: 
natural/problematic . 327 . 045 6.408 . 000 Dependent 
Is Islam cited as a 
. 000 . 000 
c c 
factor? Dependent 
Goodman and Kruskal tau Islam vs the west: d 
natural/problematic . 198 . 030 . 000 Dependent 
Is Islam cited as a 
. 225 . 041 0004 factor? Dependent . 
Uncertainty Coefficient Symmetric . 204 . 038 5.059 . 000° 
Islam vs the west: 
natural/problematic . 157 . 032 5.059 . 000e Dependent 
Is Islam cited as a e 
factor? Dependent . 291 . 047 5.059 . 000 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero 
d. Based on chi-square approximation 
e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. 
Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi 
. 
474 
. 000 Nominal Cramer's V 
. 
474 
. 000 
Contingency Coefficient 
. 
429 
. 
000 
N of Valid Cases 242 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
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Appendix 5 
Chi-square test 8: 'Is Actor 1 quoted? ' by variable 'Is Actor 1 Muslim? ' 
Chi-Square Tests 
Value 
Asymp. Sig. 
df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 13.371a 2 . 001 
Likelihood Ratio 13.381 2 . 001 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 1.084 1 . 298 
N of Valid Cases 1498 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. 
The minimum expected count is 80.75. 
Directional Measures 
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Errors Approx. 1b Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Lambda Symmetric . 000 . 000 .°C Nominal Is Actor I quoted? 
Dependent 
000 
. 000 
Is source 1 Muslim? 
. 000 000 
CC 
Dependent . 
Goodman and Kruskal tau Is Actor 1 quoted? 
. 009 
d 
. 005 001 Dependent . 
Is source 1 Muslim? 
. 006 . 003 000d Dependent , 
Uncertainty Coefficient Symmetric . 005 . 003 1.833 , 001 
Is Actor 1 quoted? 007 . 004 1 833 001 
e 
Dependent . . 
Is source 1 Muslim? 
. 004 . 002 1 833 0010 Dependent . . 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis 
c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero. 
d. Based on chi-square approximation 
e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. 
Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi 
. 094 . 001 Nominal Cramer's V 
. 094 . 
001 
Contingency Coefficient 
. 094 . 001 
N of Valid Cases 1498 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
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Chi-square test 9: 'Is Actor 2 quoted? ' by variable 'Is Actor 2 Muslim? ' 
Chi-Square Tests 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.954a 2 . 000 
Likelihood Ratio 16.430 2 . 000 
Linear-by-Linear 
4.954 1 . 026 Association 
N of Valid Cases 1438 
a. 0 cells (. 0%) have expected count less than 5. 
The minimum expected count is 56.00. 
Directional Measures 
Value 
Asymp. 
Std. Error' Approx. 'tl' Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Lambda Symmetric . 000 . 000 .°C Nominal Is Actor 2 quoted? cc 
Dependent . 
000 . 000 
Is source 2 Muslim? 
. 000 . 000 
cc 
Dependent 
Goodman and Kruskal tau Is Actor 2 quoted? 011 
. 005 000d Dependent . 
Is source 2 Muslim? 
. 006 . 003 000d Dependent 
Uncertainty Coefficient Symmetric . 007 . 004 2.064 . 000° 
Is Actor 2 quoted? 
. 011 . 005 2.064 0008 Dependent . 
Is source 2 Muslim? 
. 006 . 003 2.064 000e Dependent . 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Cannot be computed because the asymptotic standard error equals zero 
d. Based on chi-square approximation 
e. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. 
Symmetric Measures 
Value Approx. Sig. 
Nominal by Phi 
. 105 . 000 Nominal Cramer's V 
. 
105 
. 
000 
Contingency Coefficient 
. 
105 
. 000 
N of Valid Cases 1438 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis. 
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